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Foreword 
 Last January, I taught a study 
abroad course called Islam in Europe. A 
colleague and I brought twenty-five 
American students to five European 
countries to study the political and cultural 
tensions pertaining to Muslim minority 
communities and to gain insight into how 
Muslims were responding to these 
tensions. The last country on our itinerary 
was the UK. 
 While sitting in our hotel lobby in 
London one morning, a British gentleman, 
also staying at the hotel, sat across from 
one of my students and struck up a 
conversation. Noticing that she was 
reading a book called The Fear of Islam, and 
assuming it was an anti-Islam book (when 
in fact it was a book about Islamophobia), 
he immediately started complaining. 
“We’re having LOTS of problems with 
Muslims in Britain,” he said to her, 
lamenting both the plight of Muslim 
women forced to wear a hijab and the loss 
of British values and culture in the wake of 
Muslim immigration. He said all of this as 
casually as if he were commenting on the 
weather outside.  
 When my student told me about 
the conversation, I thought to myself, 
“Baroness Warsi was right. Islamophobia 
‘has passed the dinner table test’ in the 
UK.” Her famous quip from 2011 was a 
reminder that articulating Islamophobic 
beliefs was now acceptable in polite British 
society, whether in the family home or in 
the Houses of Parliament.  
 Without a doubt, in the twenty plus 
years since the Runnymede Report on 
Islamophobia was released, Islamophobia 
has gone mainstream and become 
normalised. It has been used on both sides 
of the Atlantic to win elections, to justify 
restrictions on refugees and immigrants, to 
encourage teachers to “monitor” Muslim 
students for signs of radicalisation, to 
validate the surveillance and profiling of 
Muslims, and to discriminate against 
Muslims in the employment and 
educational sectors. Islamophobia has also 
translated into increasing levels of violence 
as anti-Muslim hate crimes have climbed 
over the past two decades, reaching 
disturbing levels in the past several years.  
 Islamophobia poses one of the 
greatest political and moral challenges of 
our time precisely because it is so widely 
accepted. By most metrics, hostility toward 
Muslims in the UK and other Western 
nations is only getting worse. Until 
policymakers develop a better 
understanding of Islamophobia and 
prioritize efforts to counter it, we can 
expect the situation to worsen in the 
foreseeable future.   
 Under these circumstances, the 
MEND report, More Than Words: 
Approaching a Definition of Islamophobia, is 
both timely and essential. The report offers 
a nuanced definition of Islamophobia that 
will help policymakers better to 
understand and respond to the problem of 
anti-Muslim prejudice. It also addresses 
the various cultural, social, and political 
manifestations of Islamophobia along with 
the real impact of Islamophobia on the 
lives and livelihoods of Muslims and those 
perceived as Muslims. And it does all of 
this by drawing on the expertise of some of 
the most prominent scholars and analysts 
of Islamophobia.  
 The MEND report goes a long way 
toward helping policymakers do their part 
to ensure Islamophobia no longer has a 
place at the proverbial dinner table, or in 
the halls of Parliament for that matter.  
 
Professor Todd Green 








Defining the phenomenon of Islamophobia 
is important as it will provide much-
needed clarity in legislation and policies 
that are intended to protect vulnerable 
minorities. However, it is also an act of 
recognition. For British Muslims, it 
demonstrates that the Government 
recognises the hardships they face and has 
given them a name. It officially validates 
their experiences and cements these 
experiences as undeniable facts in need of 
address. Furthermore, it reassures Muslim 
communities that these hardships can and 
will be tackled in a critical and dedicated 
manner. 
Whilst providing a full working definition 
of Islamophobia on page 22, MEND 
defines Islamophobia as a prejudice, 
aversion, hostility, or hatred towards 
Muslims and encompasses any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction, discrimination, or 
preference against Muslims that has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on 
an equal footing, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural or any other field 
of public life. 
Why “Islamophobia” 
Despite longstanding semantical debates 
and proposals of alternative terms, such as 
“anti-Muslim hatred”, MEND argues 
unequivocally that the term 
“Islamophobia” is the most appropriate 
terminology to use in this debate for a 
variety of reasons. 
 It is an established terminology in 
academic, activist, advocacy, and 
victim vocabularies. 
 It is a terminology with an existing 
broad conceptual understanding. 
Therefore, it is a holistic descriptor that 
explicitly identifies the phenomenon in 
all its social, economic and political 
forms. 
 Contrary to some claims, it has not 
historically, nor should it presently, be 
seen as attempt to stifle free speech 
and, in particular, an effort to curtail all 
questioning or criticism of religion. 
Assumptions of Islamophobia 
While not every instance of Islamophobia 
may embody all of the underlying 
assumptions discussed within this report, 
they are common themes that drive and 
infiltrate Islamophobic narratives 
surrounding Muslims and their place in 
society. Such assumptions include: 
 Muslims are a monolithic group with 
static views, beliefs and practices. Such 
a stance ignores the huge diversity 
between Muslims in terms of beliefs, 
practices, ideologies, ethnicities, 
cultures, languages and values. 
 Muslims are not only different, but this 
difference also makes them inferior; 
uncivilised, irrational, violent and 
sexist. As such, they have no place in 
the civilised West unless they 
denounce their barbaric and illogical 
ways in order to progress to an 
enlightened Western way of life. 
 Racial discrimination is normalised 
within political and public debate as 
something deemed necessary due to 
the perceived threat of Muslims to 
security. Moreover, prejudiced and 
racist comments about Muslims have 
increasingly become normalised. 
Rather than being considered bigoted 
and inappropriate, such views are 
frequently seen as justified and normal. 
 Western commentators are justified in 
criticising Muslim individuals and 
countries for their beliefs, practices, 
policies and behaviours, however, the 
reverse is unjustified and baseless.  
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Islamophobia, Xenophobia, 
Racism, and Anti-Semitism 
While animosity towards the religion is 
frequently used as a justification for 
Islamophobic sentiments, this hostility is 
also a product of animosity towards race, 
ethnicity and culture. In this way, Muslims 
collectively have become racialised 
through their religious identities. 
Therefore, rather than viewing 
Islamophobia in a vacuum, it is important 
to view it through the lens of racisms. As 
Runnymede’s recent report attests, 
Islamophobia should be understood as an 
anti-Muslim racism. 
In analysing Islamophobia, critical 
perspectives are enlightening. Indeed, 
there needs to be an understanding of the 
history and the social, political, and 
economic processes through which the 
behaviours, practices and identities 
Muslims have become regulated at a social, 
political, and legislative level. For example, 
understanding how institutional racisms 
within stop and search procedures or 
integration strategies are used to normalise 
racisms and regulate Muslim identities. 
Xenophobia plays an integral role in the 
development of Islamophobias. British 
Muslims, even those whom have been born 
in the UK and whose parents were born in 
this country, may be perceived to be as 
foreign as someone born halfway around 
the world. The reason for this foreignness 
is found not only in distinctions of 
ethnicity, but also in a perceived conflict of 
views, values, norms, practices, beliefs, 
and behaviours that all culminate in a 
threat or an insult to the Western identity 
and way of life. Furthermore, there is an 
intimate link between Islamophobia and 
xenophobia that cannot be dislocated from 
the perceived decentring of Western power 
and erosions of Western and White 
privilege as an existential threat. 
Islamophobia in the UK is not an 
ahistorical phenomenon, rather, it must be 
contextualised within the history of 
Britain’s colonial past. Therefore, to fully 
understand Islamophobia in any 
meaningful way, there must be an 
acknowledgement of the relationship 
between Islamophobia, Orientalism, and 
empire. 
Orientalism is a mechanism through which 
to gain cultural and civilising power over 
Muslim populations. Islamophobia 
thereby becomes the conduit through 
which Muslims are regulated into 
hegemonic Western conceptions of 
modernity. Muslims who resist such 
Western appropriation are deemed a threat 
to the stability of the state and are thus 
placed in the dichotomy between the good 
“moderate” Muslims (those who 
unquestioningly adhere to the sensibilities 
of Western identity constructs) and the bad 
“extremist” Muslims (those who threaten 
Western hegemonic notions of modernity 
through maintaining their religious-
cultural identities or through questioning 
the status quo of this hegemony). 
Islamophobia is often portrayed as 
completely distinct from anti-Semitism. 
However, this is a misunderstanding of 
hatred and racisms. Islamophobia, anti-
Semitism, racism, xenophobia, sexism, 
homophobia and other forms of hatred are 
all mechanisms of social regulation and 
control of minorities. Therefore, they need 
to be understood in the interconnectivity of 
their logics, manifestations, and 
consequences. 
Driving Islamophobic 
Narratives: The Islamophobia 
Industry 
The term “Islamophobia Industry” (also 
known as the “Counter-jihad movement”) 
encompasses a largely interconnected and 
well-funded network of think tanks (for 
example, the Henry Jackson Society), 
media outlets (such as Breitbart and Rebel 
Media), public figures, politicians, and 
policy-makers that advance, disseminate 
and perpetuate negative discourses about 
Muslims and Islam for economic and 
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political gains. Commonly guided by right-
wing and neoconservative ideologies, the 
Islamophobia Industry employs the 
rhetoric of an array of “experts” in order to 
disseminate misinformation and fear about 
Muslims and Islam, primarily by 
perpetuating the myth of an Islamic 
invasion of the Western world. Through 
this kind of propaganda, the industry is 
able to influence and hijack political 
discourses, to influence voting patterns, 
and even to set the basis for legislative 
debates and drafting.1  
Grassroots organisations, such as the EDL 
or Football Lads Alliance, who are often 
guided by strong nationalistic sentiments, 
subscribe to the anti-Muslim discourse 
advanced by these experts and fuelled by 
the statements of media and political 
figures, thus giving this divisive rhetoric a 
voice among broader society. 
Moral Panic, Media, and 
Broadcasting 
Considering the overly negative 
representation of minorities and British 
Muslims within the British press, the 
media’s monopoly on public 
understanding has detrimental impacts 
which are acutely felt by minority social, 
ethnic and religious communities, and 
Muslims in particular. This leads to 
potentially dangerous repercussions in 
terms of hate crime, discrimination, and 
marginalisation. 
Furthermore, the level of bias, 
misinformation and distortion within 
reporting on British Muslims has fostered 
a sense of distrust in the media institutions 
amongst parts of the Muslim community, 
and for many individuals, has led to a 
disengagement from traditional media. 
Meanwhile, this Muslim disengagement is 
often accompanied by a sense of 
frustration and insecurity with regards to 
their perceived place and value in society. 
                                                     
1 Nathan Lean, The Islamophobia Industry: how the right manufactures fear of Muslims, 2nd 
Edition, (S.I. : Pluto Press, 2017) 
It is, therefore, essential that effective 
regulation is examined and implemented 
to hold publishers accountable. 
Within broadcasting, the lack of diversity 
and inclusive images stemming from a lack 
of minority representation results in a 
vision which neglects segments of society 
and thus alienates and marginalises 
minority communities. Therefore, industry 
initiatives that promote diversity are of 
upmost importance in fostering a shared 
sense of national identity and in order to 
tackle stereotypes that result from the lack 
of normalised images of minority groups. 
Racial and Religious Hate Crime 
Hate crime is in many ways the most overt, 
visible, and undeniable symptom of the 
Islamophobia prevalent across certain 
segments of society. Over recent years, 
British Muslims have suffered from 
increasing levels of hate crime in 
conjunction with seemingly obsessive 
demonisation in the media and an 
increasing presence of online hate speech 
on social media platforms. Major socio-
political events, such as terror attacks and 
the EU referendum, often mobilise acts of 
hostility towards Muslims and the impacts 
of these crimes are long-lasting, with many 
victims left feeling anxious and fearful for 
their safety. 
In tackling anti-Muslim hate crimes, it is 
important to address the disparity in 
protections afforded by the Racial and 
Religious Hate Crime Act, 2006, on 
grounds of race versus the protections 
afforded to religious groups. At the same 
time, effective strategies and primary 
legislation need to be enacted to tackle 
online hate speech whilst protecting 
freedom of speech. 
Youth and Education 
Islamophobia in the education system is a 
serious problem which impacts Muslim 
children and their development in a wide 
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variety of ways. From being bullied 
explicitly in reference to their faith, to 
being stigmatised and reported to the 
PREVENT strategy for views they may 
hold, and to being interminably 
questioned on their apparent divergence 
from (thus far ill-defined) “British Values”, 
Muslim children are struggling to navigate 
this complex maze. Meanwhile, 
controversies such as the apparent “Trojan 
Horse” affair and Amanda Spielman’s 
recent proposals to question schoolgirls 
who wear the hijab highlight the obsessive 
scrutiny and problematisation of Muslims 
within the sphere of education. The 
impacts of these experiences can be long-
term, damaging their ability to achieve 
success in the employment sphere and 
inhibiting their participation in wider civic 
society and the political arena.  
Economic Exclusion: 
Islamophobia and the Labour 
Market 
It is necessary to examine Islamophobia in 
terms of its ability to economically exclude 
Muslims from the labour market, thereby 
furthering socio-economic divides. Indeed, 
numerous studies in recent years have 
researched the failure of Muslims to 
progress and reach levels of success in the 
workplace which their non-Muslim 
counterparts enjoy. These studies have 
pointed to a combination of Islamophobia, 
racism and discrimination as reasons for 
Muslims to be paid less than their non-
Muslim counterparts, less likely to be in 
work, less likely to be in skilled and 
professional occupations, and less likely to 
break through the glass ceiling to access 
top level executive positions. 
Securitising Muslim Identities: 
Security and Counter-Terror 
The lens through which Muslims are 
repeatedly and forcefully portrayed as 
security threats is a narrative desperately 
in need of recalibration. Meanwhile, the 
damaging consequences that result from 
misguided policies predicated upon 
Islamophobic assumptions and discourses 
is an area that is in need of immediate 
address. 
Processes of securitising Muslim identities 
have intersected with vague definitions of 
“extremism”, “radicalisation”, and 
“Fundamental British Values” to result in 
damaging policies such as the PREVENT 
strategy, which are based on flawed 
evidence and serve to stigmatise Muslims 
and marginalise their voices within 
democratic debates. 
Crime, Policing and the Criminal 
Justice System 
Institutional Islamophobia relating to 
discriminatory practices ingrained within 
the Criminal Justice System is particularly 
significant because of both its disruption to 
the lives of many Muslims and for its long-
term consequences to their future social 
engagement as equal members of society. 
While noteworthy and commendable steps 
have been made to improve equalities in 
the Criminal Justice System since the 
publication of the Macpherson report in 
1999, Muslims and ethnic minorities 
remain over-represented and demonstrate 
lower levels of trust in the system. 
Furthermore, homogeneity within the 
Criminal Justice system needs to be 
examined as conduit for potential biases 
and as a hindrance to understanding the 
experiences of Muslim offenders, thereby 
obstructing meaningful strategies to 
approach Muslim socio-economic mobility 
and the driving forces behind criminality. 
As such, Islamophobia must be examined 
as a mechanism potentially maintaining 
inequalities at all levels of the Criminal 
Justice System.  
Political Representation and 
Exclusion 
Islamophobia should be understood as a 
mechanism which marginalises and 
excludes Muslims from being able to fully 
participate in social, political and civic life. 
 13 
While barriers have been broken by 
individuals such as Mohammad Sarwar, 
Sayeeda Warsi, Naz Shah, Yasmin 
Qureshi, Shabana Mahmood and 
Rushanara Ali, to name but a few, Muslim 
representation of 2% of the House of 
Commons still lags far behind what is 
proportional considering the population of 
British Muslims, which stands at 4.4% 
according to the 2011 census. 
Furthermore, divisive security strategies 
such as PREVENT have been utilised by 
certain groups (such as the Henry Jackson 
Society and its project Student Rights) to 
shut down Muslim voices, particularly on 
university campuses which are intended to 
be the epicentres of critical debate and 
engagement of ideas. The result is that 
young Muslims in particular are actively 
discouraged from being politically active 
and engaging with the debates that are 
integral to a democratic society. 
Moreover, it is essential that the 
Government’s policy of disengagement 
with credible mainstream Muslim 
organisations and be urgently reversed so 
that the relationship between Government 
and Muslim communities may be 
recalibrated.  
Public Exclusion, Integration and 
Minority Rights 
Britain has always claimed to embody a 
proud history of supporting 
multiculturalist principles advocating 
respect and celebration of the multitude of 
diverse ethnic and religious identities that 
have led themselves to a British identity 
built upon pluralism and collaboration. 
However, recent years have seen 
simmering resentments and debates 
surrounding national identity and a 
perceived “ghettoisation” of minorities.  
In line with the development and 
consequences of moral panic, these fears 
have culminated in calls for the UK to 
reassess its policies towards 
multiculturalist principles. The result is an 
increasingly restrictive integration 
strategy, within which examples of 
Islamophobic assumptions and 
institutional racism can be readily 
witnessed regarding the treatment of 
Muslim communities. 
The Government’s current approach 
towards integration heavily relies on the 
highly criticised 2016 Casey Review. As a 
consequence, its analysis and suggested 
strategies are inherently tainted by the 
same flawed evidence and lack of 
understanding. This has resulted in the 
infiltration of Islamophobic narratives and 
assumptions which have directed the 
development of this strategy, and 
therefore, limit its potential to make a 
positive difference. 
Of particular concern are its overlap with 
counter-terror strategies, its prescribed 
views of “acceptable Islam”, the de-
contextualisation of challenges facing 
minorities, and an absence of introspection 
concerning Government strategies such as 
“hostile environment” policies, austerity, 
cuts to healthcare and policing, or the 
cancellation of Leveson Part II.  
Furthermore, despite the protections 
afforded by the ICCPR, the ECHR and the 
Human Rights Act, 1998, recent years have 
witnessed numerous controversies, 
scandals, and vicious public debates that 
have challenged Muslim religious practice 
and observance in the UK context. 
Particular public controversy has 
surrounded the right to halal meat, the 
building of mosques, and the right to 
religious dress, amongst other topics of 
public interest. Such debates demonstrate 
how religious practices, whilst protected 
by national and international legislation, 
can still be contested and the discourse 
around them used as a proxy argument to 
marginalise minority communities and 
Muslims specifically. 
The model to tackle 
Islamophobia  
To solve a society-wide problem, a 
combination of legislative change, 
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Government and industry initiatives, 
Muslim community empowerment, and 
wider community engagement is required. 
As such, MEND humbly proposes the 
following initiatives and policy changes to 
tackle the causes, driving forces, and 
impacts of Islamophobia, 
Legislative changes 
Press regulation: We call on policy makers 
to ensure the commencement of the second 
part of the Leveson inquiry. Furthermore, 
Leveson II should place explicit emphasis 
on including an investigation of 
Islamophobia in the press as a mandatory 
requirement. 
Counter-Terror legislation: It is 
imperative that the Government commits 
to an independent review of PREVENT 
and all counter-terrorism legislation 
enacted since 2000 with a view to curbing 
the encroachment of counter-terrorism 
policies on civil liberties.  
Incitement to Religious Hatred 
legislation: Considering the disparities 
between the protections afforded for racial 
and religious hatred, it is essential to 
review the 2006 Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act with a view to strengthening 
legal protection afforded to religion and 
equalise it with those granted to race. 
Primary legislation to deal with social 
media offences and online hate speech: 
The Government should consider primary 
legislation to deal with social media 
offences and work with social media 
companies to protect free speech while 
developing an efficient strategy to tackle 
online hate speech online. 
Government and industry initiatives 
Racial and religious equality: In the 
context of current Brexit negotiations, 
attention needs to be given to supporting 
the principles of the EU Equal Treatment 
Directive to advance protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of religion 
to education, healthcare, housing, access to 
goods and services and social protection, 
within UK law post-Brexit.  
Employment: The barriers to Muslim 
economic empowerment is an area that 
needs to be tackled by both governmental 
and industry initiatives designed to 
address religious, racial and gendered 
discrimination in the workplace through 
targeted interventions at all stages of 
recruitment, retention and promotion, 
including through the use of name-blind 
applications.  
Media and broadcasting: There needs to 
be emphasis on promoting positive and 
normalised images of Muslims within 
media and broadcasting. It is also essential 
that support is given to educative and 
industry initiatives designed to attract 
Muslim and BAME individuals into the 
spheres of journalism and broadcasting. 
Public exclusion: It is imperative that 
public figures show greater maturity and 
responsibility when discussing integration 
debates and take care not to cause hysteria 
for the sake of political popularity and 
agendas. Meanwhile, especially 
considering the unclear status of human 
rights commitments within Brexit 
negotiations, we must ensure that the 
tenants of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 
are preserved within UK law post-Brexit.  
Crime and policing: Areas in need of 
government support include: 
 Tackling the high number of Muslim 
prisoners through schemes to facilitate 
rehabilitation, cut re-offending and 
develop pathways for social inclusion.  
 Launching research into the 
underlying reasons for the 
disproportionately high numbers of 
Muslim prisoners, including issues of 
socio-economic deprivation and 
structural issues within the judicial 
system. 
 Supporting educative and industry 
initiatives to attract BAME individuals 
into the police force. 
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Muslim community empowerment  
The Government’s current disengagement 
policy is a clear barrier to British Muslim’s 
participation in social and political life. It is 
essential that the Government mends its 
broken relationship with Muslim 
communities by committing to engaging 
with and listen to a wider spectrum of 
representative Muslim grassroots 
organisations, such as MEND and MCB.  
Muslims themselves have a responsibility 
to ensure that they are engaging with 
processes of democracy to overcome the 
challenges they face. As such, there are a 
number of ways in which British Muslim 
communities may be empowered to play 
their full role as civic actors. Strategies to 
achieve this include: 
 Supporting educative and industry 
initiatives designed to attract Muslims 
and BAME individuals into the spheres 
of politics, the civil service, media, and 
broadcasting. 
 Placing greater emphasis on 
educational programs aimed at 
empowering minority communities to 
be actively engaged within politics and 
media.  
 Encouraging grassroots and 
community-led movements to 
overcome barriers to reporting hate 
crime and encourage maximum 
reporting of Islamophobic incidents to 
the police. 
Wider community engagement  
Islamophobia, like all forms of hatred, is an 
issue of social justice, and therefore, it is 
inherent upon every member of society to 
contribute towards ending it. As such, 
there are certain areas that MEND feels 
should be addressed: 
 Promoting a greater awareness of 
Islam. 
 Promoting greater inter-community 
engagement. 
 Prioritising PSHE and PSRE in the 
national curriculum to prepare young 
people for life in a diverse and 
pluralistic society. 
 Developing training programmes and 
resources for teachers focussed on 
tackling bullying based on race, 
religion, disability or sexuality. 
 Developing teaching materials to 
educate young people on the dangers 
of Islamophobia, racism, anti-
Semitism, homophobia and other 
forms of hatred. 
 Supporting community and school-led 
programmes that encourage cultural 
exchange between pupils of different 
racial, religious, ethnic and other 
backgrounds. 
 Supporting academic freedoms and 
initiatives to decolonise education, 
whilst giving greater emphasis within 
the national curriculum to shared 
histories and the contributions of 
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A Call for a Definition 
of “Islamophobia” 
An important part of the movements to fight 
anti-Semitism, racism, and homophobia in this 
country was the development of terminologies 
to identify these biases. The stigmatization of 
Jews, African-Americans, and the LGBTQ 
community existed long before we had words to 
describe it, but the formulation of these words 
— anti-Semitism, racism, and homophobia — 
and their usage by prominent figures, was a 
critical step in communicating to the public the 
serious prejudice and discrimination these 
groups faced.2  
The Bridge Initiative, “Islamophobia: The 
Right Word for a Real Problem”, 2016 
In 2018, the All Party Parliamentary Group 
for British Muslims launched an inquiry 
into a definition of Islamophobia. Such a 
development is hugely important and a 
significant step in tackling the prejudice 
and discrimination facing British Muslims, 
and, indeed, many Muslims across the 
world.  
Why is a definition important? 
Defining the phenomenon of Islamophobia 
is important as it will provide much-
needed clarity in legislation and policies 
that are intended to protect vulnerable 
minorities. As duly observed by 
Gottschalk and Greenberg, “movements 
against discrimination do not begin until a 
commonly understood label evolves that 
brings together under one banner all forms 
of that particular prejudice”.3 Once 
established, terms such as sexism, 
homophobia, racism and anti-Semitism 
became important tools to oppose and 
tackle the various discriminations and 
prejudices these labels embody; prejudices 
and discriminations which at one time 
were considered normal and thus 
remained unchallenged.  
                                                     
2 "Islamophobia: The Right Word for a Real Problem," The Bridge Initiative | A 
Research Project on Islamophobia, September 08, 2016, accessed June 19, 2018, 
http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-the-right-word-for-a-real-problem/. 
It is now time to afford official recognition 
to a definition of Islamophobia so that the 
same progress will be afforded to the 
efforts to tackle the prejudices, hostilities, 
discriminations, and barriers faced by 
Muslims on account of their ethno-
religious identities. As such, a working 
definition is important for the following 
reasons: 
 It is a critical tool for awareness raising in 
communicating to the public the serious 
prejudice and discrimination faced by 
Muslims. 
 It is an asset in formulating effective and 
meaningful legal protections. 
 It encourages a full and holistic exploration 
of the phenomenon, which in turn presents 
effective methods for approaching and 
challenging it. 
 It is also an act of recognition. For British 
Muslims, it demonstrates that the 
Government recognises the hardships they 
face and has given them a name. It 
officially validates their experiences and 
cements these experiences as undeniable 
facts in need of address. Furthermore, it 
reassures Muslim communities that these 
hardships can and will be tackled in a 
critical and dedicated manner. 
 While being an act of recognition for 
victims of Islamophobia, it also forms a 
basis for countering the vocal minority in 
our society who deny Islamophobia’s very 
existence, despite overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary. 
This report is intended to provide critical 
analysis to the following: 
 The roots and causes of Islamophobia. 
 The manifestations of Islamophobia. 
 The socio-political and personal 
consequences of Islamophobia. 
 Potential solutions to tackling 
Islamophobia. 
3 Peter Gottschalk and Gabriel Greenberg, Islamophobia Making Muslims the Enemy 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), p11. 
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It is our hope that the discussions 
contained in this report will advance 
conceptual understandings of 
Islamophobia that will, in turn, assist 
policymakers in approaching a holistic 
appreciation and an all-encompassing 
working definition of Islamophobia. 
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A Message from our 
CEO  
Dr Shazad Amin 
 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, 
in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I 
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” 
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether 
you can make words mean so many different 
things.” “The question is,” said Humpty 
Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.” 
Through the Looking Glass, ChVI, Lewis 
Carroll, 1872 
 
A couple of centuries on from Lewis 
Carroll’s immortal words, words are even 
more important than ever. We are now 
living in an era of globalised instant 
communication where ideas, emotions, 
hopes, and tragedies are communicated to 
others in an instant, and words can indeed 
mean so many things. The potential for 
miscommunication, misunderstanding, 
obfuscation and distortions is enormous. 
As such, when we are tackling the big ideas 
of the modern era the importance of 
precision within definitions is paramount, 
and the need to define “which is to be 
master” has never been greater. 
As this report shows, Islamophobia is 
much more than the common perception of 
a woman with hijab being verbally abused 
in the street. It has many faces, from the 
criminal Islamophobia ranging from a few 
hateful words to murder, to economic 
Islamophobia, from the overlooked 
promotion to the sustained campaigns of 
bullying and harassment. At a higher level, 
we see media Islamophobia from vile 
tweets to an incessant barrage of articles 
and full-blown documentaries. Finally, we 
have professional and structural 
Islamophobia, whereby the apparatus of 
the state and other institutions conspire to 
deny Muslims opportunities to play their 
full part in the political and civic life of this 
country. 
We must call out all of these examples, but 
to do so we need a definition that captures 
Islamophobia in its many colours and 
shades. I believe that in this report from 
MEND, supported by a variety of excellent 
contributions from guest authors, we have 
not only produced a comprehensive 
definition, but have highlighted the socio-
political context in which it sits. 
I hope that whatever definition is 
eventually proposed it captures the 
essence of this report. We owe it to the next 
generation and beyond to tackle this 










MEND’s Definition of 
Islamophobia 
Short Definition: 
Islamophobia is a prejudice, aversion, 
hostility, or hatred towards Muslims and 
encompasses any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction, discrimination, or preference 
against Muslims that has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
equal footing, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural or any other field 
of public life. 
Working Definition: 
Islamophobia (in line with anti-Semitism, 
racism, homophobia, sexism and other 
forms of hatred and discrimination) is a 
tool used to gain and maintain power. It is 
inextricably linked with socio-economic 
factors, and frequently reflects the 
underlying inequalities within society.  
Islamophobia is a prejudice, aversion, 
hostility, or hatred towards Muslims and 
encompasses any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction, or preference against Muslims 
that has the purpose or effect of nullifying 
or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal footing, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any 
other field of public life. 
As such, Islamophobia is demonstrated in, 
and articulated through, speech, writing, 
behaviours, structures, policies, legislation 
or activities that work to control, regulate 
or exclude Muslim participation within 
social, civic, economic and political life, or 
which embody hatred, vilification, 
stereotyping, abuse or violence directed at 
Muslims.  
Taking into account the overall context, 
examples of Islamophobia in public life, 
the media, schools, the workplace, and in 
the religious sphere may include (but are in 
no way limited to): 
 Causing, calling for, aiding, or justifying 
the killing or harming of Muslims or those 
perceived to be Muslim due to their 
religious identity. 
 Causing, calling for, aiding, or justifying 
the killing or harming of individuals due to 
their perceived or actual connection to or 
support of Muslims. 
 Charging Muslims with conspiring to 
harm humanity and/or the Western way 
of life or blaming Muslims for the 
economic and social ills of society. 
 Making mendacious, dehumanising, 
vilifying, demonising, or stereotypical 
allegations about Muslims. 
 Objectifying and generalising Muslims as 
different, exotic or underdeveloped, or 
implying that they are outside of, distinct 
from, or incompatible with British society 
and identity. 
 Espousing the belief that Muslims are 
inferior to other social or religious groups.  
 Accusing Muslims as a collective of being 
responsible for real or imagined 
wrongdoing committed by a single 
Muslim person, group or nation, or even 
for acts committed by non-Muslims. 
 Applying double standards by requiring of 
Muslims a behaviour not expected or 
demanded of any other social, religious or 
ethnic group. 
 Applying ethnocentric approaches to the 
treatment of Muslims (judging another 
culture solely by the values and standards 
of one's own culture). For example, 
evaluating Muslim women’s choice of 
dress exclusively through the speaker’s 
expectations and without reference to the 
personal cultural norms and values of the 
women in question. 
 Acts of aggression within which the 
targets, whether they are people or 
property – such as buildings, schools, 
places of worship and cemeteries – are 
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selected because they are, or are perceived 
to be, Muslim(s) or linked to Muslims. 
While criticism of Islam within legitimate 
realms of debate and free speech is not in 
itself Islamophobic, it may become 
Islamophobic if the arguments presented 
are used to justify or encourage vilification, 
stereotyping, dehumanisation, 
demonisation or exclusion of Muslims. For 
example, by using criticism of religion to 









MEND’s working definition of 
Islamophobia is 480 words long, while 
even our short definition consists of 58 
words. This may seem rather long for a 
definition, however, in order to encompass 
the full breadth of Islamophobia and its 
consequences, clarity is required; and such 
clarity requires a lengthy explanation. 
While we have attempted to achieve this 
clarity in our definition, we would like to 
take this opportunity to introduce the 
reasoning and multiple layers of 
understanding contained within this 
definition. As such, the following 
discussion seeks to deconstruct our 
definition and contextualise it within the 
wider framework of this report. 
Islamophobia (in line with anti-Semitism, 
racism, homophobia, sexism and other forms of 
hatred and discrimination) is a tool used to gain 
and maintain power. It is inextricably linked 
with socio-economic factors, and frequently 
reflects the underlying inequalities within 
society.  
Hatred and discrimination are used as 
tools to oppress, restrict, control, regulate, 
exclude and deprive those against whom 
they are directed. They are frequently used 
as mechanisms to distract society from 
wider socio-economic issues. A glaring 
example of this is when the Nazi Party 
used anti-Jewish propaganda to scapegoat 
innocent Jewish communities and distract 
from Germany’s economic struggles 
following WWI.  
Often, hatred and discrimination may also 
be a reaction to real or imagined threats to 
economic, political, social and ideological 
interests and may stem from a fear of 
losing one’s longstanding privilege or 
benefits. In response to these threats, the 
perceived culprit is assigned 
responsibility, which frequently escalates 
to the scapegoating of whole communities.  
Part Two of this report explores how and 
why Islamophobia exists and is 
manifested. As such, we will analyse 
themes such as:  
 Islamophobia and its relationship to 
xenophobia, racism, and anti-
Semitism. 
 Perceptions of collective threat and 
processes of securitisation. 
 The counter-jihad movement and 
Islamophobia as a mechanism for 
control. 
 Moral panic, the media and 
broadcasting. 
Islamophobia is a prejudice, aversion, hostility, 
or hatred towards Muslims and encompasses 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or 
preference against Muslims that has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life. 
As this report attests, Islamophobia 
encompasses far more than simply 
hostility and hate crime. Islamophobia 
infiltrates every aspect of public life and 
creates barriers to Muslims (or those 
perceived to be Muslim) in overt ways, but 
also in ways that are subtler, and thus 
much harder to detect and demonstrate. 
For example, hatred and physical abuse on 
the streets is overt and impossible to 
ignore. However, the CV that is passed 
over because it boasts a Muslim sounding 
name; or the British-Pakistani man who is 
repeatedly assumed a threat at the airport 
on the basis of his beard; or the child who 
feels unable to ask questions in class 
because she is worried she may be swept 
up into the apparatus of PREVENT, these 
are examples that may be harder to detect, 
but which have dire repercussions on 
British Muslims’ daily enjoyment of 
freedoms. 
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Part Three of this report thus explores the 
consequences of Islamophobia on British 
Muslims. Within this section, we will 
attempt to highlight the impacts of 
Islamophobia in terms of: 
 Racial and religious hate crime 
 Youth and education 
 Economic exclusion 
 Security and counter-terror 
 The criminal justice system 
 Political exclusion 
 Public exclusion 
As such, Islamophobia is demonstrated in, and 
articulated through, speech, writing, 
behaviours, structures, policies, legislation or 
activities that work to control, regulate or 
exclude Muslim participation within social, 
civic, economic and political life, or which 
embody hatred, vilification, stereotyping, abuse 
or violence directed at Muslims.  
In other words, Islamophobia can be found 
in and may be upheld by a variety of 
mediums. For example: 
 Speech: such as political statements or 
individual verbal abuse. 
 Writing: such as in opinion articles and 
online hate speech. 
 Behaviours: such as aggressive and 
unreasonable acts, or attitudes towards 
Muslim employees.  
 Structures: such as the 
underrepresentation of Muslims in 
upper echelons of business, politics, 
and teaching. 
 Policies: such as questioning Muslim 
girls who wear the hijab. 
 Legislation: such as security legislation 
that excludes the need for reasonable 
suspicion in stop and search, and thus 
relies on ethnic, racial and religious 
profiling. 
                                                     
4 Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, Summary, The Runnymede Trust, 1997, 
https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/islamophobia.pdf. 
While criticism of Islam within legitimate 
realms of debate and free speech is not in itself 
Islamophobic, it may become Islamophobic if 
the arguments presented are used to justify or 
encourage vilification, stereotyping, 
dehumanization, demonization or exclusion of 
Muslims. For example, by using criticism of 
religion to argue that Muslims are collectively 
evil or violent.  
It is important to note that criticism of 
religion is excluded from our definition of 
Islamophobia. “Islamophobia” as a term, is 
often wrongly accused of being an attempt 
to stifle legitimate arguments surrounding 
religion. The 1997 Runnymede report 
“Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All”4 
highlighted the need to recognise the 
contrast between “open views” of 
legitimate criticism of Islam, and the 
“closed” views that constitute 
Islamophobia. It is these “closed” views 
that MEND’s definition is attempting to 
address. Further analysis will be given to 
this issue in later discussions. 
There is also frequently concern that the 
word “Islamophobia” is being used as a 
tool to hinder freedom of speech. 
However, within MEND’s proposed 
definition as an example, there is no 
conflict with freedom of speech that 
extends any further than what already 
exists. Indeed, the only potential 
limitations to speech within our definition 
already have existing legal precedents, for 
example, legislation that protects racial 
minorities from abuse, and legislation that 




Terminology: Why use 
“Islamophobia”? 
Islamophobia is a term that consistently 
produces a wide range of responses and 
emotions. For some time, there has been 
considerable debate as to whether such a 
term is appropriate, accurate or even 
counterproductive when it comes to 
discussing processes of hatred and 
discrimination facing Muslim individuals 
and communities. This has led individuals 
and organisations to propose the use of 
other terms such as “anti-Muslim hatred” 
as alternative descriptors. 
However, MEND argues unequivocally 
that the term “Islamophobia” is the most 
appropriate terminology to use in this 
debate for a variety of reasons. The 
following discussion sets out MEND’s 
arguments for why the term Islamophobia 
remains the most effective linguistic tool to 
understand and tackle the roots, 
manifestations, and consequences of 
hatred, discrimination, and exclusions 
facing Muslim communities in the social, 
economic and political fields. 
An established terminology 
While Islamophobia is a term around 
which linguistic debates may centre, there 
is a great deal of conceptual clarity and 
understanding. In other words, while there 
may be a definitional problem, no such 
problem exists conceptually. As such, what 
is needed is a label to be attached to this 
concept.  
Islamophobia is a term that already holds 
currency within public discourse and is 
well established within public and popular 
understanding. Consequently, it has an 
existing legitimacy and emotional power. 
Many individuals affected by 
Islamophobia may not have the technical 
vocabulary nor the theoretical framework 
to fully articulate the roots, causes or the 
precise definition of their experiences. 
However, the long-standing existence and 
usage of “Islamophobia” as a descriptive 
tool for approaching and explaining these 
experiences means that the term has 
accepted credibility amongst those whom 
it affects. Meanwhile, due to this wide and 
established legitimacy, it has a galvanising 
and mobilising force within the realms of 
activism.  
Therefore, it is not a term that will be easily 
replaced within political, activist or victim 
vocabularies. As such, there is merit in the 
efficiency of using the most widely 
recognised and used linguistic tools to 
challenge urgent socio-political issues.  
While others have suggested “anti-Muslim 
hatred” as a replacement, this would be 
counter-productive as it would involve 
forcing a new terminology into the place of 
a well-established concept. Consequently, 
at this point, it is far more prudent to 
devise a strong and comprehensive 
definition for the word “Islamophobia”, 
than to attempt to force a new terminology 




Differences between terms such as 
Islamophobia and “anti-Muslim hatred” 
reflect differences in focus and 
understanding of the phenomenon. 
Therefore, they produce different 
approaches and priorities in tackling it. 
“Anti-Muslim hatred” does not have the 
same conceptual understanding attached 
to Islamophobia. Therefore, while “anti-
Muslim hatred” may be used to describe 
hate crime, verbal abuse, and harassment, 
it obfuscates the damaging effects of 
political and media discourses and the 
dangers of discrimination and socio-
political exclusion. Anti-Muslim hatred 
thus should not be divorced from the roots 
from which in emanates. 
Consequently, understanding the hatred, 
discrimination, and exclusions facing 
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Muslim communities as Islamophobia 
provides a holistic understanding that 
explicitly identifies the phenomenon in all 
its social, economic and political forms. 
Furthermore, because this definition 
makes it possible to identify Islamophobia 
in all its forms, it is a useful tool in 
extrapolating specific areas for address, 
approaches, and priorities in tackling it. 
It is worthy to note that the term “anti-
Muslim racism” is a term that could also 
potentially encompass this full and holistic 
understanding. However, due to the 
previously mentioned arguments 
surrounding Islamophobia as an 
established and credible linguistic tool, we 
do not feel that “anti-Muslim racism” can 
be easily co-opted as an activist concept 
into the public understanding with the 
same efficiency as Islamophobia. 
Furthermore, it risks precipitating 
distracting semantic and legal arguments 
that Muslims are not a race, in the same 
way that Jews and Sikhs have been defined 
as by UK case law. 
Islamophobia is not about 
prohibiting criticism of religion 
Islamophobia, as a term, is often wrongly 
accused of being an attempt to stifle free 
speech and, in particular, an effort to 
curtail all questioning or criticism of 
religion. However, it has never historically, 
nor should it presently, be seen in this 
light. 
The historical usage of Islamophobia can 
be found in colonial communications as far 
back as the turn of the 20th Century. One of 
the earliest examples can be found in the 
writing of French colonialist Maurice 
Delafosse in his discussion of 
“Islamophobie”5 in 1910. Delafosse discusses 
Islamophobia as “a principle of indigenous 
administration.”6 As such, Islamophobia 
was a reference to how Muslims living 
                                                     
5 Over time, the French “Islamophobie” became translated into English as 
“Islamophobia”. This follows the same pattern set by the term “Judeophobie” and 
“xenophobie”, which later became anti-Semitism and xenophobia. 
under colonial rule were perceived and 
treated by the French colonizers. In this 
instance, Islamophobia is about people, 
about Muslims, not about religion. 
Islamophobia truly entered mainstream 
political discourse with the publication of 
the 1997 Runnymede report 
“Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All”.7 
Within this report, Runnymede 
unwaveringly defined Islamophobia as 
being about the believers and not the 
religion. Indeed, they exerted considerable 
effort in highlighting the need to mitigate 
the dangers of Muslim belief and practice 
becoming beyond the realm of critical 
inquiry. As such, they stressed the need to 
recognise the contrast between “open 
views” of legitimate criticism of Islam and 
the “closed” views that constitute 
Islamophobia. It should also be noted that 
although the term Islamophobia has been 
used in public discourse for over 20 years 
it has not hitherto stifled debate or free 
speech. 
Islamophobia should not be understood as 
a protection against questioning or 
criticising religion. Nor should it be seen as 
an attempt to enforce restrictions on 
freedom of speech beyond what is 
necessary for civil society to protect 
individuals from abuse and violence – 
protections for which there already exists a 
vast array of legal precedents. 
Whilst cherishing the right to freedom of 
speech in an open democratic society, one 
must not allow individuals to hide behind 
the free speech argument to peddle anti-
Muslim and racist agendas. There is 
currently no absolute right to free speech 
that harms others, and we would support 
that position. 
6 Abdoolkarim Vakil, “Is the Islam in Islamophobia the same as the Islam in Anti-
Islam; Or When is it Islamophobia Time?” in S. Sayyid and Abdoolkarim Vakil, 
eds., Thinking Through Islamophobia, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 38. 
7 Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All.  
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The beauty of lexically non-
sensical terms 
Another criticism often levied against the 
use of the term Islamophobia is concern 
over the use of “phobia” and the idea that 
it means “a phobia of Islam”. This is clearly 
not what is meant by Islamophobia as the 
term has always had the conceptual 
meaning of hostility and discrimination 
towards people who embody an identity 
based on a certain practice or belief (in this 
case Islam), much the same way as 
hostilities and discriminations are 
manifested within homophobia and 
xenophobia.  
Secondly, some have pointed to the use of 
“phobia” in arguing that the term 
incorrectly implies some kind of mental 
illness, thereby causing objections to the 
idea that it is an “irrational fear of Islam”. 
It is useful in this regard to remember that 
Islamophobia shares this suffix with both 
homophobia and xenophobia, neither of 
which are intended to imply a mental 
illness.  
However, despite not implying any mental 
illness, it is worth remembering that a great 
deal of public discourse surrounding 
Muslims stemming from certain elements 
of society serves the explicit purpose of 
engendering extreme or irrational fears of 
Islam in others, hence the term is not 
without some descriptive value in this 
regard. As such, examples of Islamophobia 
do include attempts to promote and 
propagate the spreading of heightened and 
irrational suspicion, hostility and fear of 
Islam and its adherents amongst the public 
imagination.  
English is a beautiful and interesting 
language in its inconsistencies as much as 
in its logic. It is not uncommon to find 
words that, at best, take a great deal of 
effort to understand (the fact that the 
words “flammable” and “inflammable” 
mean the same thing, for example), and, at 
worst, are lexically non-sensical. Anti-
Semitism is a good example of this. Indeed, 
not all Jews are Semites and not all Semitic 
people are Jews. However, anti-Semitism is 
a terminology that is well established and 
conceptually understood (much in the 
same way as Islamophobia), and therefore, 
is considered unproblematic. 
Lexically, Islamophobia may not be ideal. 
However, it is by far the most ideal term 
we have as a label for a concept that is well 






Britain has a relationship with Muslims 
that expands over 1000 years, with British 
Muslims today comprising of roughly 4.4% 
of the population. While in no way 
comprehensive (several volumes could be 
written on this topic), this section attempts 
to provide an insight into the history, 
contributions and vast diversity of British 
Muslims.8 
A (very brief) history of British 
Muslim communities 
Britain’s relationship with Islam can be 
seen from Elizabeth I to Elizabeth II; from 
shops offering sherbets in Shakespeare’s 
London to Muslims holding influential 
positions as today’s Ministers and 
Mayors.9 
Indeed, Muslims have played a valuable 
role in Britain for over 1000 years. In the 
eighth century, King Offa minted coins 
bearing the Islamic Arabic inscription “In 
the name of God, the Most Merciful, the 
Most Beneficent”. Some seven centuries 
later, Queen Elizabeth I asked Ottoman 
Sultan Murad for naval assistance against 
the Spanish Armada,10 and the Moroccan 
ambassadors Ahmed Bilqasim and 
Muhammad An-Nuri both visited London 
between 1589 and 1600.11 
The rise of the British Empire saw a 
deepening relationship between Britain 
and Muslims. By 1841, around 3,000 
Muslim seaman, or “lascars”, visited 
Britain every year and an increase in trade 
following the opening of the Suez Canal in 
1869 led to a number of seaman from 
Yemen settling in the port cities of Cardiff, 
Liverpool, South Shields, Hull, and 
                                                     
8 For a more comprehensive insight into the history of British Muslims, see Humayun 
Ansari, The "infidel" Within: The History of Muslims in Britain, 1800 (London: C. Hurst, 
2004). 
9 "British Muslims - Working for the Common Good," Muslim Council of Britain, 
accessed June 19, 2018, http://www.mcb.org.uk/british-muslims/. 
10 "Religions - Islam: History of Islam in the UK," BBC, September 07, 2009, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/history/uk_1.shtml. 
London. The first mosque in Britain is 
believed to have been established at Glyn 
Rhondda Street in Cardiff in 1860.12  
During the 19th century, Victorian high-
society were attracted to the teachings of 
Islam. George Allanson-Winn, the fifth 
Baron of Headley and a noted civil 
engineer who constructed the road 
between Baramula and Srinagar in the 
mountainous region of Kashmir converted 
to the faith; as did William Quilliam, a 
lawyer and poet who established a mosque 
and orphanage in Liverpool; and novelist 
and translator of the Holy Qur’an, 
Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall. 
Britain’s first purpose-built mosque was 
designed by architect Gottlieb Leitner and 
opened in Woking, Surrey, in 1889.13 
By the 1950s, Muslims responded to the 
shortfall in labour and the need to rebuild 
British infrastructure following the Second 
World War. This saw large-scale migration 
largely from South Asia, which still 
constitutes the large majority of British 
Muslim communities today. These groups 
mainly settled in the inner-city areas of 
London, the industrial towns of the 
Midlands and the textile towns of 
Lancashire, Yorkshire and Strathclyde. 
Today, Muslims living in Britain originate 
from a vast range of national and cultural 
backgrounds. The population also includes 
a significant number of British and 
European converts to Islam. Others have 
come from war-torn countries to find a 
better life in Britain. 
Moroccan Muslims have been present in 
significant numbers in England since the 
1960s. Nigerian Muslims arrived in the 
1950s and then again during the 1990s, 
mainly for economic reasons. Small 
numbers of Egyptians and Saudi Arabians 
have also been present in the UK for 
11 "The First Muslims in England," BBC, March 20, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-35843991. 
12 "History of Islam in the UK." 
13 "History of the Mosque - Part 1," Shah Jahan Mosque, accessed June 19, 2018, 
http://www.shahjahanmosque.org.uk/history-mosque-part-1. 
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decades. The Somali Muslim community, 
numbering over 100,000, form Britain’s 
largest refugee population. In more recent 
times, Muslims have arrived in the UK 
from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria as a 
result of war and societal breakdown.14  
Demographics  
The 2011 Census provides the most up-to-
date and comprehensive data available on 
the characteristics of the UK’s Muslim 
population, following the introduction of a 
religion identifier in the 2001 Census. The 
data revealed that the UK’s Muslim 
population had risen 75% over the 
intervening period, from 1.6 million in 
2001 to 2.8million by 2011.15 
Muslims make up 4.4%, or less than 1 in 20, 
of the overall UK population. The 
overwhelming majority of UK Muslims, 
95%, live in England. 3% of Muslims live in 
Scotland, 1.6% in Wales, while just 0.1% 
reside in Northern Ireland.16 
Despite making up a relatively low 
proportion of the overall population, 
Muslims are concentrated in specific areas 
of the UK. Half of Muslims in England and 
Wales reside in the cities of London, 
Birmingham and Bradford17, while almost 
60% of Scottish Muslims live in Glasgow or 
Edinburgh.18 
Certain council areas such as the London 
boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Newham, 
and Blackburn with Darwen in the North 
West of England, feature Muslim 
populations above 25%. Just under a 
quarter of Bradford residents are Muslim, 
while 22% of the population of 
Birmingham, the UK’s second largest city, 
                                                     
14 Jawad Iqbal, "The Diverse Origins of Britain's Muslims," BBC, January 18, 2016, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33715473. 
15 Aisha Gani, "Muslim Population in England and Wales Nearly Doubles in 10 Years," 
The Guardian, February 11, 2015, accessed May 10, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/11/muslim-population-england-
wales-nearly-doubles-10-years.  
16 Khadijah Elshayyal, Scottish Muslims in Numbers: Understanding Scotland’s Muslim 
Population through the 2011 Census, report, The Alwaleed Centre, The University of 
Edinburgh, December 2016, accessed May 10, 2018, 
https://www.ed.ac.uk/files/atoms/files/scottish_muslims_in_numbers_web.pdf.  
17 Sundas Ali, British Muslims in Numbers: A Demographic, Socio-economic and Health 
Profile of Muslims in Britain Drawing on the 2011 Census, report, Muslim Council of 
are Muslim. Muslims living in London 
make up 1 in 8 of the population of the 
UK’s capital, exceeding 1 million.19  
Blackburn with Darwen also contains the 
most concentrated area of Muslims across 
the whole of the UK, with the council 
wards of Bastwell and Shear Brow both 
having local Muslim populations above 
75%.20 
The age structure of the Muslim 
population in the UK is much younger 
than the general population, with only 4% 
of Muslims of retirement age compared to 
16% of the overall population. Almost half 
of UK Muslims are under the age of 25, 
compared to a third of the UK 
population.21  
Muslim toddlers under the age of 5 make 
up 9% of all children in this age range, 
indicating that young Muslims will have 
an increasing influence in society as time 
progresses.22  
This trend is more acutely seen in areas of 
high Muslim populations, with over 80% 
of children under 5 in the Birmingham 
wards of Washwood Heath, Bordesley 
Green and Sparkbrook being Muslim. 
More than 50% of children in Tower 
Hamlets, and 40% in Newham, are 
Muslim.23 
British Muslims are very diverse in terms 
of ethnicity, culture, and language. Two-
thirds of UK Muslims are of Asian 
ethnicity, with 10% being of Black ethnicity 
and 7% being of Arab ethnicity, while 
White British Muslims comprise 3% of the 
UK Muslim total.24 The range of languages 
spoken by British Muslims is also vast, 
including but not limited to, Arabic, 
Britain, January 2015, accessed May 10, 2018, https://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/MCBCensusReport_2015.pdf.  
18 Scottish Muslims in Numbers. 







Punjabi, Urdu, Bengali, Gujarati, Turkish, 
Somali, Kurdish, and Pashto. 
Finally, British Muslims are hugely diverse 
in their ideologies, beliefs and practices. 
While the majority of Muslims in the UK 
follow the Sunni schools, an estimated 1 in 
10 classify as Shia.25 
One of the key features of Islamophobia is 
to treat Muslims as a homogenous group. 
However, diversity in the reasons for 
migration, ideology, culture, background 
and language all show that Muslims in the 
UK are a community of communities, and 
arguably the most diverse religious 
community of all.  
The Demographics of Muslims in 
Britain 
Professor Sophie Gilliat-Ray 
Director, Centre for the Study of Islam in the 
UK 
It is difficult to summarise in a few 
sentences the complex picture that 
emerges from the most recent 
demographic/Census data in relation to 
Muslim communities in Britain.  Broadly 
speaking, however, we are talking about 
‘communities’ that are unevenly 
distributed around the UK, 
demographically ‘young’, suffering 
disproportionate socio-economic 
disadvantage compared to other faith 
groups, and reflecting a wide range of 
ethnic, racial and linguistic backgrounds.  
Nearly half the Muslim population in 
Britain was born here, and about two 
thirds originate from the Indian 
subcontinent.  Despite this, links with 
                                                     
25 "The Diverse Origins of Britain's Muslims." 
26 Tariq Modood et al., Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage - Fourth 
National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, report, Policy Studies Institute, 1997, 
http://www.psi.org.uk/pdf/Ethnic%20Minorities%20In%20Britain_small_file.pdf.  
27 Jamil Sherif, "A Census Chronicle – Reflections on the Campaign for a Religion 
Question in the 2001 Census for England and Wales," Journal of Beliefs & Values 32, 
no. 1 (2011): 1-18, doi:10.1080/13617672.2011.549306. 
28 Serena Hussain, Muslims on the Map: A National Survey of Social Trends in 
Britain (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008). 
relatives ‘back home’ remain strong via 
transnational marriage and remittances.   
Until 2001, statistic information about the 
demography of Muslim communities in 
Britain was largely a matter of guesswork.  
Extrapolation from Census data about 
ethnicity provided some clues, alongside a 
number of large-scale quantitative studies 
that included attention to questions of 
religion.26 But with the introduction of a 
question on religion in the 2001 Census, 
researchers interested in Muslims in 
Britain could begin to map their socio-
economic situation in detail.27 Analysis of 
the 2001 Census data was conducted by 
researchers at the University of Bristol, in 
collaboration with the Muslim Council of 
Britain.28 This volume provided an 
invaluable contribution to the field of 
British Muslim Studies, and 
complemented extensive qualitative 
understanding. Since 2001, demographic 
information about Muslim communities in 
Britain has been essential for policy-
makers, Muslim organisations, and 
academics.  Arguably, the successful 
campaign for the (voluntary) ‘religion’ 
question in the Census was an important 
driver for the incorporation of ‘religion and 
belief’ as one of nine ‘protected 
characteristics’ of the Equality Act 2010. 
A question on religion was retained in the 
2011 Census, thereby enabling the 
beginning of some longitudinal 
comparisons.  Data has been subject to 
detailed analysis, with the Muslim Council 
of Britain again having a significant role in 
interpretation of the findings.29 There is 
now a considerable body of research that 
investigates Muslim demography, both 
methodologically30 and empirically.31 
Census data is not the only source of 
29 British Muslims in Numbers. 
30 Clive D. Field, "Measuring Religious Affiliation in Great Britain: The 2011 Census 
in Historical and Methodological Context," Religion 44, no. 3 (2014): 357-382, 
doi:10.1080/0048721x.2014.903643. 
31 Abby Day and Lois Lee, "Making Sense of Surveys and Censuses: Issues in 
Religious Self-identification," Religion 44, no. 3 (2014): 345-356, 
doi:10.1080/0048721x.2014.929833. 
Serena Hussain and Jamil Sherif, "Minority Religions in the Census: The Case of 
British Muslims," Religion 44, no. 3 (2014): 414-433, 
doi:10.1080/0048721x.2014.927049. 
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demographic information about British 
Muslims, however.  Other large-scale 
quantitative surveys, such as the Ethnic 
Minority British Election Survey, provide 
important information on voting 
behaviour and attitudes to political issues, 
for example.   
While the 2011 Census data on Muslims is 
extremely detailed, there have since been 
demographic developments that will only 
be enumerated via the next Census in 2021. 
This means that certain statistical 
information in the intervening ten-year 
period can only be estimated using other 
methods. Where datasets are produced 
featuring information on ethnicity and not 
religion, a common method is to 
extrapolate estimates from ethnic groups 
with large Muslim representation. For 
example, with over 90% of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi individuals recording their 
religion as Muslim, these ethnic groups 
provide insight into Muslim experiences.  
However, these groups comprise just over 
50% of the overall UK Muslim population 
and, therefore, they often cannot provide a 
full picture. 
Amid the generation of new datasets and 
qualitative studies of British Muslims, it is 
essential to critically evaluate 
methodology, techniques of data analysis, 
interpretation of findings, and the 
‘interests’ that lie behind the 
commissioning of new research.  Who is 
engaged in the production of demographic 
information about Muslim communities, 
and with what authority, knowledge, 
power and evidence? Peer-review, 
triangulation (using more than one method 
on the same topic), and appropriate ethical 
scrutiny, are some of the hallmarks of 
reliable, high-quality, academic research.  
Through the particular emphasis given to 
research methodology, students of our MA 
in Islam in Contemporary Britain at Cardiff 
University are schooled to question data 
sources, and the credentials of those 
                                                     
32 The Muslim Pound: Celebrating the Muslim Contribution to the UK Economy, report, 
Muslim Council of Britain, 2013, http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/The-Muslim-Pound-FINAL.pdf  
involved in the production of information 
about Muslim communities.   
The production of reliable statistical data 
about Muslim communities in Britain is 
crucial for Islamic organisations involved 
with representing community interests in 
civil society, and advocating on their 
behalf. Demographic information about 
Muslim communities paints a clear picture 
of disproportionate socio-economic 
hardship and discrimination, but also the 
cumulative disadvantage that arises from 
the intersection of such things as poor 
housing quality, ill-health, economic 
inactivity, or low educational attainment.  
Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred may 
be difficult to measure quantitatively at a 
national level.  But we now have sufficient 
evidence – both qualitative and 
quantitative – to suggest that it has a 
compounding effect on other aspects of 
British Muslim experience and 
disadvantage and its effects justify new 
systematic high-quality research.   
Muslim contributions to Britain 
The British Muslim community is a vibrant 
and heterogeneous one, whose 
contributions to Britain are numerous and 
multi-layered. Muslim contributions to 
Britain include but are in no way limited to: 
 There are more than 13,400 Muslim-
owned businesses in London alone, 
creating over 70,000 jobs. As such, 
Muslim owned firms represent a third 
of small to medium enterprises in the 
capital.32 
 British Muslims donate more to charity 
than any other group, donating an 
average of £371 each.33 Indeed, during 
Ramadan 2016, British Muslims 




donated £100 million, which is 
equivalent to £38 per second.34  
 British Muslims contribute over £31 
billion to the UK economy.35 
Meanwhile, the halal food industry in 
Britain is worth £1 billion, with the 
global halal food market estimated to 
be worth £685 billion.36 
 The public sector draws heavily on 
skilled professionals from Muslims-
majority countries, with 26% of doctors 
working in the NHS being Asian or 
Asian British.37 
 Muslims are eager to participate in 
society and support their communities. 
In the last month alone, two Muslims 
have been appointed Mayor: Mayor of 
Swindon, Junab Ali, was re-elected in 
May 2018 for a fourth term and Magid 
Magid was elected in Sheffield. 
 There are currently 650 British Muslims 
soldiers in the British Army.38 In 2006, 
Jabron Hashmi became the first British 
Muslim soldier to die in Afghanistan. 
He was 24 years old. His older brother, 
Zeeshan, who had also worked in the 
British Army, said: “Jabron was a 
committed soldier and a committed 
Muslim. He was fiercely proud of his 
Islamic background and he was 
equally proud of being British and was 
very proud to live in Britain.”39 
 A number of high profile Muslims 
excel in all realms of British public life. 
One need not look far to witness the 
contributions of Muslim figures such as 
Sayeeda Warsi, Naz Shah, Rushanara 
Ali, Nazir Afzal, Mohammed Farah, 
Mohammed Salah, Nadiya Hussein, Dr 
Saleyha Ahsan, Mishal Husain, Dina 
                                                     
34 Nick Donaldson, "Ramadan – making a real difference," Charity Commission, July 
14, 2016, https://charitycommission.blog.gov.uk/2016/07/14/ramadan-making-a-
real-difference/. 
35 Asa Bennett, "British Muslims Add Over £31 BILLION To UK Economy," The 
Huffington Post, October 29, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/10/29/uk-muslims-
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36 The Muslim Pound: Celebrating the Muslim Contribution to the UK Economy, report, 
Muslim Council of Britain, 2013, http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/The-Muslim-Pound-FINAL.pdf.  
Torkia, Rimla Akhtar, and James Caan 
in all realms of life, be it within sports, 
media, politics, criminal justice or 
business.  
However, despite their important social, 
economic, and civic contributions and the 
fact that 95% of Muslims feel a strong sense 
of loyalty to the country, as evidenced by a 
targeted BBC poll,40 Muslims are 
frequently engulfed in a climate of 
suspicion; are often accused of being a 
community possessing little interest in 
being a full part of British society; and face 
high levels of discrimination and socio-
economic barriers to their active 
participation in social, political, civic, and 
economic life. It is the role of Islamophobia 
within these anti-Muslim hostilities, 
discriminations, and barriers that this 
report seeks to address.  
37 Haroon Siddique, "Figures show extent of NHS reliance on foreign nationals," The 
Guardian, January 26, 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jan/26/nhs-foreign-nationals-
immigration-health-service. 
38 "About Us." Armed Forces Muslim Association. Accessed June 4, 2018. 
http://afma.org.uk/about-us/.  
39 "British Muslim soldiers." The Open University. Accessed June 27, 2017. 
http://www.open.ac.uk/ccig/blogs/british-muslim-soldiers.  
40 “Most British Muslims 'oppose Muhammad cartoons reprisals'”, BBC News, accessed 
15.05.2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-31293196  
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The Assumptions of 
Islamophobia 
Part II of this report is intended to explore 
the manifestations, logics, and mechanisms 
that fuel Islamophobia. In opening this 
exploration, it is useful to briefly explore 
some of the underlying assumptions that 
underpin the logics of Islamophobia. While 
not every instance of Islamophobia may 
embody all of the assumptions discussed 
below, they are common themes that drive 
and infiltrate Islamophobic narratives 
surrounding Muslims and their place in 
society. 
“All Muslims are the same” 
One of the key features of Islamophobic 
narratives is that Muslims are a monolithic 
group with static views, beliefs and 
practices. Such a stance ignores the huge 
diversity between Muslims in terms of 
beliefs, practices, ideologies, ethnicities, 
cultures, languages and values. 
By ignoring this vast diversity, the result is 
that the acts and examples of a few are 
extrapolated to being considered 
representative of over a billion believers. In 
other words, the example of a small 
minority of Muslims is considered 
applicable to the whole Muslim 
population. One example of this is when 
the treatment of women in Saudi Arabia is 
portrayed as the collective treatment of all 
Muslim women, ignoring the freedoms the 
women enjoy in Muslim-majority 
countries such as Indonesia, or the 
empowering examples of British Muslim 
women such as Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, 
Naz Shah, Rushanara Ali, Nadia Hussein, 
Dr Saleyha Ahsan, Mishal Husain, Dina 
Torkia, or Rimla Akhtar, and too many 
other pioneering British Muslim women to 
name.  
As a consequence of generalisation, 
Muslims become vulnerable to 
stereotyping, vilification and 
dehumanisation. Furthermore, in 
assuming that the desires, ideologies, 
political standpoints and values are 
universal across Muslims, the guilt of a few 
is frequently attributed to all Muslims. A 
case in point is when innocent Muslims are 
considered culpable and blameworthy for 
the reprehensible violent actions 
committed by individuals such as 
Muhammad Emwazi, Salman Abedi, 
Michael Adebolajo, or Khalid Masood. 
Indeed, following acts of terrorism where 
the perpetrator is Muslim, there is the 
invariable suggestion that Muslims should 
come out in condemnation of the atrocity – 
as if they do not condemn it in the same 
way as everyone else. This has culminated 
in a 712-page Google document and 
website listing the times that Muslims have 
condemned violence. The absurdity of this 
suggestion is strikingly obvious when one 
makes the parallel suggestion that all 
White people should apologise for the 
atrocities committed by white 
supremacists such as Anders Breivik, 
Darren Osborne, Thomas Mair, Pavlo 
Lapshyn, David Copeland, Alexandre 
Bissonnette, and James Harris Jackson.  
This translation of guilt is an issue 
discussed in Part Three by Todd Green in 
his article “Islamophobia and the 
Presumption of Muslim Guilt in 
Terrorism”. 
Islamophobia includes: 
Making mendacious, dehumanising, vilifying, 
demonising, or stereotypical allegations about 
Muslims. 
Accusing Muslims as a collective of being 
responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing 
committed by a single Muslim person, group 
or nation, or even for acts committed by non-
Muslims. 
Muslims are the inferior “Other” 
Within the logics of Islamophobia, 
Muslims are presented as “different” and 
as sharing none of the core values of 
Western culture, such as respect for 
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freedom of belief. This perspective is 
epitomised in the lauding of “British 
Values” as something distinct from 
Muslim values and something that 
Muslims are reluctant to embody, so must 
be forced to accept. The issue of “Othering” 
Muslims within the ongoing debates 
concerning integration will be discussed in 
greater depth within “Political and Public 
Exclusion” of Part Three. 
According to Islamophobic assumptions, 
Muslims are not only different, this 
difference also makes them inferior; 
uncivilised, irrational, violent and sexist. 
As such, they have no place in the civilised 
West unless they denounce their barbaric 
and illogical ways in order to progress to 
an enlightened Western way of life. 
Inferiorisation is a time-tested tool of 
racisms and is a mechanism for controlling 
and regulating groups whom there is a 
concern they may disrupt the delicate 
balance of socio-economic power. This 
theme of inferiorisation will be returned to 
in following discussions of Islamophobia, 
racism and xenophobia. 
Islamophobia includes: 
Objectifying and generalising Muslims as 
different, exotic or underdeveloped, or 
implying that they are outside of, distinct 
from, or incompatible with British society and 
identity.  
Espousing the belief that Muslims are inferior 
to other social or religious groups 
Muslims are the manipulative 
enemy and hatred of Muslims is 
justified 
"Islam is above all a totalitarian political 
ideology, sugar-coated with the trappings of a 
primitive desert religion to help veil its true 
nature. The publicly stated goal of Islamic 
theology and political ideology is to impose the 
rule of Islam over the entire world, and make it 
                                                     
41 "The Counterjihad Manifesto," Gates of Vienna, accessed July 05, 2017, 
http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.co.uk/2009/11/counterjihad-manifesto.html  
part of Dar al-Islam, the 'House of 
Submission'. Widely accepted Islamic theology 
based in Koranic doctrine explicitly requires 
that Islam be spread by any and all means 
necessary, including by violence and mass 
slaughter, in a process known as jihad, or holy 
war. The fact that many Muslims do not 
support or engage in violent jihad is not 
germane.”41 
The counter-jihad movement (also known 
as professional Islamophobia and the 
Islamophobia Industry) is fuelled by the 
belief that Islam and Muslims living in 
Europe are a threat to “Western 
civilisation”. This logic of the “clash of 
civilisations” and Muslims as the enemy is 
narrated through the claim that the West is 
being subjected to an aggressive and 
politicised Islamic invasion. 
This invasion is exemplified by the 
apparent removal of Christian or Jewish 
symbols and the imposition of Islamic 
traditions, for example the building of 
mosques, the appearance of Islamic dress 
in public, and the accessibility of halal 
meat. 
According to those who espouse this fear, 
European culture is in a state of decline due 
to infiltration by Muslims who seek to 
destroy European national identities and 
values.  
Perceptions of collective threat, processes 
of securitisation and the counter-jihad 
movement will be discussed further in 
chapters surrounding the Islamophobia 
Industry in Part 2 and Counter-Terror in 
Part 3 of this report 
Islamophobia includes: 
Charging Muslims with conspiring to harm 
humanity and/or the Western way of life, or 
blaming Muslims for the economic and social 
ills of society. 
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Islamophobia and racial 
discrimination is normal 
As the later chapter on Islamophobia, 
Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism 
attests, Islamophobia is frequently 
conflated with racism. In Britain, 
longstanding prejudices against 
Pakistanis, for example, have become 
inter-mingled with anti-Muslim sentiment 
to the point that they are often difficult to 
separate. 
These compounded hostilities are further 
augmented by heightened fears of security. 
The consequence of this is that the focus on 
the apparent threat of Muslims serves to 
justify suspicion of anyone who could 
potentially be Muslim – anyone who 
“looks” Muslim. This results in issues such 
as racial profiling at airports. In the UK 
context, profiling is frequently defended 
on the basis of the statistical probability of 
a Muslim being of certain ethnicities. 
Therefore, the security threat justifies 
increased suspicion of South Asians, for 
example.  
Former UKIP candidate, Raheem Kassam, 
(who was the first British politician to meet 
Donald Trump upon his inauguration 
alongside Nigel Farage and, until recently, 
was the editor of Breitbart News UK before 
resigning to challenge Sadiq Khan in the 
next mayoral election) has repeatedly 
voiced support for Donald Trump’s anti-
Muslim policies and has been an advocate 
of racial profiling at airports. He has stated 
that “I get worried when I’m not profiled 
in an airport”.42 
Issues of racial profiling will be explored 
further in discussions surrounding 
Schedule 7 in the later Chapter “Muslims 
and Counter-Terror” in Part Three of this 
report. 
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Racial profiling, racial discrimination, and 
racist exclusionary policies are in direct 
conflict with the principles of equality. 
However, this is an example of where 
racial discrimination has become 
normalised within political and public 
debate as something deemed necessary. 
Moreover, prejudiced and racist comments 
about Muslims have increasingly become 
normalised. Rather than being considered 
bigoted and inappropriate, such views are 
frequently seen as justified and normal. As 
Baroness Sayeeda Warsi commented in 
2011, “Islamophobia has passed the dinner 
table test.”43 
Muslim criticisms of the West are 
invalid 
There is an attitude amongst certain 
segments of political and public 
commentators who appear to perpetuate 
the view that Western commentators are 
justified in criticising Muslim individuals 
and countries for their beliefs, practices, 
policies and behaviours, however, the 
reverse is unjustified and baseless.  
One area that is a good example of this is 
the way in which arguments surrounding 
freedom of speech are applied. Indeed, 
organisations such as Student Rights, a 
project of the Henry Jackson Society, claim 
to protect the freedom of speech when they 
have expressed opposition to university 
student unions’ “no-platform” policy for 
far-right speakers from organisations such 
as the BNP.44 However, it has 
simultaneously severely criticised Muslim 
students who criticise the current 
PREVENT strategy.45 




45 "Salford Student President who opposes Prevent reveals troubling views on social 




Liberal and Illiberal 
Islamophobias46 
Dr Aurelien Mondon  
University of Bath 
and Dr Aaron Winter  
University of East London 
In recent years we have seen a rise in 
suspicion and hate directed at Muslims 
and Islam across Europe and North 
America. It has manifested in a wide 
variety of ways, from hate speech, hate 
crimes and far-right activism, to more 
insidious forms of systemic and state 
racism, such as surveillance, profiling and 
attempted travel and clothing bans.47 
Added to these, we have also witnessed a 
rise of Islamophobic discourse based on 
the defence of traditionally progressive 
tropes such as free speech,48 secularism 
and women’s rights.49 In addition to this, 
we have seen ongoing difficulties and 
debates over how to define this 
phenomenon, as Islamophobia or anti-
Muslim racism,50 and the evolving nature 
of racism, which anti-Muslim discourses 
have in part fed on and utilised.  
To make sense of the contemporary 
landscape of anti-Muslim racisms, and 
diverse, seemingly contradictory and 
changing articulations of Islamophobia, we 
have developed our analytical concepts of 
liberal and illiberal articulations of 
Islamophobia.51 Our aim with these 
concepts is to provide a more nuanced 
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conceptual and analytical framework and 
tool to come to grips with the diversity, 
contradictions, transformation and 
slipperiness of Islamophobia(s), and 
racism itself, in order to combat it more 
effectively. Currently, the signifiers 
‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ are constructed 
through different modes of articulations, 
from the most extreme to the seemingly 
progressive, but ultimately create an 
inchoate and yet clear Other used as a 
template to single out homogenised, 
suspect communities. We argue that it is 
only through the dual offer of what we 
define as illiberal and liberal 
Islamophobias that this racist discourse 
can become naturalised and common 
sense, since it allows for those espousing 
the liberal position to justify their racist 
discourse by opposing it to the illiberal 
articulation, even though both are part of 
the same exclusionary paradigm. It is 
worth noting that our distinction between 
the liberal and illiberal articulation here is 
not so much based on political and 
ideology theory, but rather on the 
perceived quality and level of acceptability 
of each concept in the mainstream 
discourse within modern liberal 
democracies.52  
Illiberal Islamophobia commonly emerges 
from exclusivist ideologies, discourses and 
identities associated with easily 
recognisable forms of racisms, typically 
originating on the far-right and within 
ultra-conservative circles. This type of 
Islamophobia is closest to traditional 
racism and often presents Islam as 
50 Claire Alexander, “The Muslim Question(s): Reflections from a Race and Ethnic 
Studies perspective”, The New Muslims, eds. C. Alexander, V. Redclift and A. Hussain 
(London: Runnymede Trust, 2013), 5-7; Chris Allen “Islamophobia: From K.I.S.S. to 
R.I.P.”, Thinking Through Islamophobia: Global Perspectives, eds. S. Sayyid and A. Vakil 
(London: C. Hurst & Co, 2010), 51-64; Nasar Meer and  Tariq Modood, “Refutations of 
racism in the ‘Muslim Question’”’, Patterns of Prejudice no. 43, 3-4 (2009), 332–351; 
Mondon and Winter, “Articulations of Islamophobia”; Runnymede Trust, 
Islamophobia: a challenge for us all  (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997); Runnymede 
Trust, Islamophobia (2017);  
Raymond Taras, “‘Islamophobia never stands still’: race, religion, and culture”, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 36, 3 (2013), 417-433; Pnina Werbner, “Folk devils and racist 
imaginaries in a global prism: Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in the twenty-first 
century”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36, 3 (2013), 450-467. 
51 Mondon and Winter, “Articulations of Islamophobia”; Mondon and Winter, Charlie 
Hebdo. 
52 Mondon and Winter, “Articulations of Islamophobia”.  
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monolithic and innately threatening and 
inferior (in terms of ‘race’ if not also 
culture) and takes the form of open threats, 
hate attacks, calls for repatriation or ethnic 
cleansing. Illiberal Islamophobia is thus 
‘illiberal’ inasmuch as it is not only rejected 
by the liberal norm, but denounced as 
unacceptable and alien to our post-racial 
societies,53 thus allowing the legitimisation 
of other, more insidious and less racialised 
forms, which also rely on cultural 
differences. 
Contrary to illiberal and more extreme 
forms of Islamophobia, liberal 
Islamophobia is anchored in a pseudo-
progressive discourse in the defence of the 
rule of law based on liberal equality, 
freedom and rights (e.g. liberal versions of 
freedom of speech, gender and sexual 
equality). We see its clearest articulations 
in calls to ban the hijab or burka and the ‘Je 
suis Charlie’ phenomenon.54 To gain 
legitimacy, it is thus crucial that liberal 
Islamophobia goes beyond its attacks on 
Muslims, and appears to challenge 
traditional far-right and ultra-conservative 
discourses and ideologies. In its self-
proclaimed yet limited opposition to the 
reviled ‘racists’, ‘sexists’ and 
‘fundamentalists’ of all kinds, it enables far 
greater mainstream and even progressive 
acceptance.  
Two aspects thus make the liberal 
articulation of Islamophobia distinct from 
illiberal forms:  
It allows for limited distinctions between 
‘Islam’ as a religion or set of ideas and 
‘Muslims’ as a people, and where people 
are implicated, as they always are, between 
‘good’ (redeemable) and ‘bad’ Muslims 
subject to a loyalty test. The test operates 
through (demands for) explicit expressions 
of opposition to ideas and practices 
projected on to Muslims and apologies 
from ‘moderate’ Muslims, even though the 
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line to satisfy such demands is arbitrary, 
and always moving out of reach.  
It emphasises the apparent and limited 
inclusion of other ethnic and religious 
groups typically hated by the far-right and 
traditional racists. The presentation of 
criticism of Islam and Muslims as 
reactionary as a defence of women’s and 
LGBT rights for example provides a veneer 
of tolerance and progressivism. The 
victimisation is only partially 
acknowledged, in order to be diverted onto 
a particular scapegoat: those racialised and 
stigmatised groups can join if ‘They’ 
decide to integrate through hate.  
While it is crucial that liberal Islamophobia 
posits itself clearly in opposition to the 
reviled illiberal articulation, the mask slips 
easily and often. The focus of public debate 
on Muslim garments and their ban has 
often led to attacks on Muslim women 
wearing head coverings. Similarly, the ‘Je 
suis Charlie’ moment has not led to the 
liberalisation of speech for all, but the 
increased securitization of Muslims and 
the reinforcing of privileges and whiteness 
as a norm.55 In turn, the tactical and racist 
use of potentially progressive ideals such 
as free speech, feminism or secularism 
against Muslims has allowed the far right 
to mainstream itself and its discourse 
further. 
We believe that our framework is essential 
to understand the current dynamics of 
racism and exclusion. Only with a full 
picture of these diverse and seemingly 
contradictory articulations, can we both 
understand the complex and evolving 
nature of racism, but also provide 
progressive movements with the tools to 
fight racism at a time when mainstream 
movements, media, policy and discourse is 
trying to hijack their language and causes 
for reactionary ends.  
  
54 Titley et al, After Charlie Hebdo. 





Earlier in this report, we laid out our 
argument of Islamophobia being distinct 
from criticism of religion – it is not a fear of 
Islam, it is a fear of Muslims. This is an 
important point as a misunderstanding of 
this magnitude obscures the roots and 
causes of Islamophobic sentiments, thus 
inhibiting opportunities to address them. 
It would be possible to write many 
volumes on the interconnectivity and 
symbiotic relationship between 
Islamophobias, racisms, anti-Semitism, 
xenophobia, and other forms of hatred. 
This is clearly beyond the limits of what is 
possible in one report. Therefore, this 
chapter seeks instead to touch upon (albeit 
very briefly) a non-exhaustive exploration 
of a number of theories, themes, and 
approaches that are all useful in fully 
exploring Islamophobia as a phenomenon. 
Cultural Racism 
From a policy perspective, Islamophobia is 
a hostility that is directed at and serves to 
exclude people. While animosity towards 
the religion is frequently used as a 
justification for these sentiments, this 
hostility is also a product of animosity 
towards race, ethnicity and culture. A case 
in point is the conflation between ethnic 
and religious insults (such as the 
application of “p*ki” when the pejorative 
term is expressed in hostility towards a 
Muslim as well as an ethnic identity), or the 
reality that British Sikhs have frequently 
been the unfortunate targets of 
Islamophobic abuse on the basis of their 
ethnicity and assumed connection to a 
Muslim identity. 
Therefore, rather than viewing 
Islamophobia in a vacuum, it is important 
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to view it through the lens of racisms. As 
Runnymede’s recent report attests, 
Islamophobia should be understood as an 
anti-Muslim racism. 
In Todd Green’s seminal work “The Fear of 
Islam”, he states that, “Islamophobia is not 
racially blind, nor is it simply a 
manifestation of older forms of racism 
rooted in biological inferiority. It is an 
example of what some scholars have 
labelled “cultural racism”. This form of 
racism incites hatred and hostility based on 
religious beliefs, cultural traditions, and 
ethnic backgrounds.”56 
In this manner, Muslims collectively have 
become racialised through their religious 
identities. 
Islamophobia: a form of cultural 
racism57 
Tariq Modood, MBE, FBA, FAcSS, FRSA 
University of Bristol 
Islamophobia is the racialising of Muslims 
based on physical appearance or descent as 
members of a community and attributing 
to them cultural or religious characteristics 
to vilify, marginalise, discriminate or 
demand assimilation and thereby treat 
them as second class citizens. 
It was not very long ago that Anglophone 
scholars of racism understood it in terms of 
biology, and specifically in terms of the 
black-white binary. At the same time, other 
scholars, especially in continental Europe, 
understood racism in terms of anti-
semitism, especially in the recent 
biologised forms that Europe has 
manifested. When it began to be clear that 
these two paradigms were failing to 
capture some contemporary experiences, 
such as anti-Asian cultural racism in 
Britain or anti-Arab cultural racism in 
France, some scholars began to move away 
57 This is a shortened version of a submission to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on 
British Muslims, 1 June 2018, in response to the call for evidence on ‘Working 
Definition of Islamophobia'. 
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from these paradigms.58 Yet, following the 
assertive Muslim agency triggered off by 
The Satanic Verses affair and other Muslim 
controversies, as Muslims responded to 
such hostilities and articulated their 
misrecognition, they were constantly told, 
especially in Britain, that there is no such 
thing as anti-Muslim racism because 
Muslims are a religious group and not a 
race. Hence Muslims could legitimately 
ask for toleration and religious pluralism 
but not for inclusion in anti-racist 
egalitarian analyses and initiatives. While 
this view continues to be expressed even 
today, and some deny that there is a racism 
that could be labelled ‘Islamophobia’, it no 
longer has the hegemony it once had. 
While a number of Anglophone authors, 
including myself, started using the concept 
of Islamophobia in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, it was the Runnymede Trust, with 
its 1997 report, ‘Islamophobia: a challenge 
to us all’, which launched the career of the 
term as a concept of public discourse in 
Britain and much beyond it. It presented 
Islamophobia as ‘a useful shorthand way 
of referring to dread or fear of Islam – and 
therefore to fear or dislike of all or most 
Muslims’. While the report was ground-
breaking and played a crucial role in 
getting people to think about anti-Muslim 
prejudice I felt it did not sufficiently locate 
Islamophobia as a racism, like say, anti-
semitism. I continued to write about 
Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism, 
which may be built on racism based on 
physical appearance (e.g. colour-racism) 
but was a form of racism in its own right – 
like anti-semitism.59 This also became the 
approach of UNESCO and I am pleased to 
see that it has been explicitly embraced by 
the new Runnymede Trust report of 
November, 2017. 
Islamophobia is a form of cultural racism 
because while the perception and 
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treatment of Muslims clearly has a 
religious and cultural dimension it, equally 
clearly, bears a physical appearance or 
ancestral component.  For while it is true 
that ‘Muslim’ is not a (putative) biological 
category in the way that ‘black’ or ‘south 
Asian’ (aka ‘Paki’), or Chinese is, neither 
was ‘Jew’.  In that instance it took a long 
non-linear history of racialisation to turn 
an ethno-religious group into a race.  More 
precisely, the latter did not so much as 
replace the former but superimposed itself 
because even though no one denied that 
Jews were a religious community, with a 
distinctive language(s), culture(s) and 
religion, Jews still came to be seen as a race, 
and with horrific consequences. Similarly, 
Bosnian Muslims were ‘ethnically 
cleansed’ because they came to be 
identified as a ‘racial’ group, that is to say, 
as having a perceived line of descent by 
people who actually were phenotypically, 
linguistically and culturally the same as 
themselves.  The ethnic cleanser, unlike an 
Inquisitor, wasted no time in finding out 
what people believed, if and how often 
they went to a mosque and so on: their 
victims were racially identified as Muslims 
in terms of community membership based 
on a perceived line of descent.   
Race, then, as I understand it is not just 
about biology or even ‘colour’, for while 
racialization has to pick on some features 
of a people related to physical appearance 
and ancestry (otherwise racism cannot be 
distinguished from other forms of 
groupism) it need only be a marker. This is 
illustrated in the conceptualisation of 
cultural racism as what I have called a two-
step process.60  While biological racism is 
the antipathy, exclusion and unequal 
treatment of people on the basis of their 
physical appearance or other imputed 
physical differences, saliently in Britain 
their non 'whiteness', cultural racism 
builds on biological racism a further 
60 Modood, Multicultural Politics…, Intro and chp 1 
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discourse which evokes cultural 
differences from an alleged British, 
'civilised' norm to vilify, marginalise or 
demand cultural assimilation from groups 
who may also suffer from biological 
racism. As white people's interactions with 
non-white individuals increased, they did 
not become necessarily less conscious of 
group differences but they were far more 
likely to ascribe group differences to 
upbringing, customs, forms of socialisation 
and self-identity than to biological 
heredity.  
Cultures and cultural practices are usually 
internally diverse, containing and omitting 
various “authentic” elements, and 
adaptations and mixes.  So to racially 
group all Jews or Muslims together as one 
cultural ‘race’ or as one ethnoreligious 
entity, it follows that the culturalized 
targeting is expansive, rather than purist, 
aiming to catch most if not all cultural 
minorities in that targeted group.  For 
example, a non-religious Muslim might 
still be targeted as a cultural Muslim or 
Muslim by community, which of course 
means Muslim by background, which 
means birth and ancestry. Hence my point 
that Muslims, no less than Jews, are 
identified ‘racially’ and not simply in terms 
of religious beliefs or behaviour. Moreover, 
if we accept that racism does not 
necessarily involve attributing qualities 
which inhere in a deterministic law-like 
way in all members of a group, then we do 
not have to rule out cultural racism as an 
example of racism. As such we should 
guard against the characterisation of 
racism as a form of biological determinism 
which leaves little space to conceive the 
ways in which cultural racism draws upon 
physical appearance as one marker 
amongst others.61  
While understanding some contemporary 
treatment of Muslims and aspects of their 
societal status in terms of ‘racialisation’ 
clearly is an advance, we should beware 
that the conceptualisation of Muslims in 
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the West is not reduced to racialisation or 
any other ‘Othering’ theoretical frame such 
as Orientalism. By definition ‘othering’ 
sees a minority in terms of how a dominant 
group negatively and stereotypically 
imagines that minority as something 
‘other’, as inferior or threatening, and to be 
excluded. Indeed, the dominant group 
typically projects its own fears and 
anxieties on to the minority. Minorities, 
however, are never merely ‘projections' of 
dominant groups but have their own 
subjectivity and agency through which 
they challenge how they are 
(mis)perceived and seek to not be defined 
by others but to supplant negative and 
exclusionary stereotypes with positive and 
prideful identities. Oppressive 
misrecognitions, thus, sociologically imply 
and politically demand recognition. Our 
analyses therefore should be framed in 
terms of a struggle for ‘recognition’ – the 
recognition of one’s own identity.62 
The danger of reducing Muslims to 
racialised identities is particularly high at 
the moment because the Islamophobic 
‘othering’ of Muslims is acute, and if 
anything, rising. This can be seen in how 
aggressive negative portrayals of Muslims 
is standard in so much right-wing 
nationalism, whether in President Trump’s 
Muslim bans, Marine Le Pen’s Front 
National, Alternative fur Deutschland in 
Germany or in various parties in central 
and eastern Europe. I do worry, however, 
that just as in the 1970s and 1980s some 
anti-racists, including academics, reduced 
blackness to a form of anti-racism, anti-
Islamophobia activism and studies risks 
seeing Muslims only in terms of 
racialisation and anti-racialisation. Because 
like all ethnic or religious groups Muslims 
are not merely created by their oppressors 
but have their own sense of identity too. 
Multicultural inclusivity means 
recognising and respecting these identities. 
Recognition of course does not mean 
thinking of Muslims as a group with 
62 Modood, Multicultural Politics, Intro and chp 1 
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uniform attributes or a single mind-set, all 
having the same view on religion, personal 
morality, politics, the international world 
order and so on. Muslims are just like any 
other group – they cannot be understood in 
terms of a single essence. Groups do not 
have discrete, nor indeed, fixed boundaries 
as these boundaries may vary across time 
and place, across social contexts and will 
be the subject of social construction and 
social change – and Muslims are no 
different in this respect. This ‘anti-
essentialism’ is rightly deployed in the 
study of Islamophobia and Muslims. It is a 
powerful way of handling ascriptive 
discourses, of showing that various 
popular or dominant ideas about Muslims, 
just as in the case of, say, women, gays etc, 
are not true as such but are aspects of 
socially constructed images that have been 
made to stick on to those groups of people 
because the ascribers are more powerful 
than the ascribed. Anti-essentialism is an 
intellectually compelling idea and a 
powerful resource in the cause of equality. 
Islamophobia is the racialising of Muslims 
based on physical appearance or descent as 
members of a community and attributing 
to them cultural or religious 
characteristics to vilify, marginalise, 
discriminate or demand assimilation and 
thereby treat them as second class citizens. 
Critical Race Theory  
Critical race theories are a useful lens 
through which to explore Islamophobia. 
Critical theorists are concerned with how 
history, political economy, and social 
processes exert direct and indirect 
domination over the social, political, 
cultural, and economic expressions and 
practices of individuals and groups. This 
requires a focus on the ways in which 
gender, sexuality, class, culture, religion, 
race, ethnicity, nationality, and power 
intersect to shape inequalities. Of 
particular interest is the impact of power 
on minority groups and/or those groups 
who remain marginalised without power. 
As such, critical race theories examine 
society and culture as they relate 
to categorisations of race, law, and power. 
Ultimately, these theories are concerned 
with how racial inequalities are preserved 
through social structures that appear 
normal and inconspicuous. In particular, 
this involves an exploration of how racial 
power is maintained over time, and the 
role of policies and legislation in the 
process through which racisms become 
normalised.   
In other words, in terms of Islamophobia, 
there needs to be an understanding of the 
history and the social, political, and 
economic processes through which the 
behaviours, practices and identities of 
Muslims have become regulated at a social, 
political, and legislative level. For example, 
understanding how institutional racisms 
within stop and search procedures or 
integration strategies are used to normalise 
racisms and regulate Muslim identities. 
These structures and processes are 
important because Islamophobia and other 
forms of racism cannot be examined purely 
as a matter of personal prejudices. A police 
officer may not be prejudiced, but the 
parameters of their role dictate that they 
must reinforce and replicate institutionally 
racist policies and procedures. 
Likewise, a teacher or academic may not be 
personally prejudiced, but within their 
syllabi, they are required to teach the 
canonical teachings of predominantly 
White men from a handful of Western 
countries, thereby continuing an education 
system predicated upon ethnocentric 
assumptions and perspectives. 
Therefore, a critical examination of history, 
political economy, and social processes is 
necessary to fully comprehend the full 
breadth and consequences of 
Islamophobia and other forms of racism. 
Xenophobia  
In his exploration of the Islamophobia 
Industry (a topic that will be explored in 
the next chapter of this report), Nathan 
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Lean observes that, “The arch of prejudice 
and anti-Other discrimination is a long 
one. Societies in Europe and North 
America have, over the course of their 
histories, grappled with populations that 
they felt were not truly a part of the 
essential national fabric in an ugly way. At 
the root of much or all of this intolerance is 
xenophobia, the fear or intense dislike of 
foreigners… The predominant sentiment 
among many right-wing Americans, for 
instance, is that they are not welcome in 
“our” country. Such ferocity and dogged 
nationalism is predicated on the 
assumption that Muslims are immigrants 
and that the religion of Islam is not a fluid 
or borderless belief system, but rather 
originates from afar and has, with the 
relocation of populations from Morocco to 
Bahrain, invaded the United States.”63 
It is important to note that being 
considered “foreign” is not necessarily an 
attribute limited to those born outside of 
territorial borders. Rather, someone seen as 
foreign is anyone who is deemed to be 
outside the dominant group identity. 
Therefore, British Muslims, even those 
whom have been born in the UK and 
whose parents were born in this country, 
may be perceived to be as foreign as 
someone born halfway around the world. 
The reason for this foreignness is found not 
only in distinctions of ethnicity, but also in 
a perceived conflict of views, values, 
norms, practices, beliefs, and behaviours 
that all culminate in a threat or an insult to 
the dominant identity and way of life. 
Moreover, there is the divisive assumption 
that the threat that Muslims pose cannot be 
overcome through relationship building 
and inter-community engagement. Rather, 
Muslims are particularly problematic in 
comparison to other “foreign” groups as 
they are uniquely unwilling or incapable of 
adapting to Western society. 
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At the same time, this supposed 
incompatibility with Western culture 
makes Muslims inferior and, therefore, 
undeserving of the freedoms and 
privileges of Western life. As Lean explains 
it, “capitalist economic values that overlap 
with social ideals breed suspicions that 
ethnic, racial, and religious minorities 
want to take advantage of freedoms and 
opportunities for prosperity that are 
thought to be uniquely American or 
European.”64 
These negative assumptions are 
channelled into racist expressions directed 
at Muslims.  
Commentators such as Daniel Pipes 
exemplify this conflation between 
foreignness and Muslim identities. As far 
back as 1990, Pipes stated that, “Western 
societies are unprepared for the massive 
immigration of brown-skinned peoples 
cooking strange foods and not exactly 
maintaining Germanic standards of 
hygiene… All immigrants bring exotic 
customs and attitudes, but Muslim 
customs are more troublesome than most. 
Also they appear most resistant to 
assimilation.”65 
White revanchism 
As previously discussed, within 
xenophobic narratives, the rhetoric of 
Islamophobia is often predicated upon the 
inferiority of minorities and the desire to 
“take back” one’s country. 
Revanchism is usually understood as the 
political manifestation of a will to reverse 
territorial losses incurred by a country, 
often following a war or social movement. 
Extreme revanchist ideologues often 
suggest that the desired objectives of 
reclaiming what has been lost can be 
achieved through the positive outcome of 
conflict with whomsoever has been 
identified as those responsible for the 
perceived loss. 
64 Lean, The Islamophobia Industry, p6 
65 Cited in Lean, Nathan The Islamophobia Industry, p5 
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In this context, White revanchism should 
be viewed as a largely white supremacist 
ideology intended to “take back” the 
privileges and power that its adherents 
have perceived to have been deprived of. 
However, this ideology is not limited to 
White supremacists alone. Indeed, the 
arguments, grievances, and logics are 
frequently adopted and/or reinterpreted 
to represent the loss of Western hegemonic 
power and also the erosions of male 
privilege in the face of women’s 
empowerment. 
Global socio-political and economic 
developments stretching from the decline 
of the British Empire, the Cold War, global 
economic recessions, and conflicts in the 
Middle East have destabilised a previously 
secure sense of Western hegemonic power. 
Muslim identities in Western contexts, 
therefore, represent a physical 
manifestation of the destabilisation of the 
supremacy of Western hegemonic notions 
of identity, culture, norms, and socio-
economic and political power. 
As such, there is an intimate link between 
Islamophobia and xenophobia that cannot 
be dislocated from the perceived 
decentring of Western power and erosions 
of Western and White privilege as an 
existential threat. In other words, the fears 
and hostility directed at minorities and 
Muslims in particular should be examined 
alongside a crisis within White supremacy 
and Western nation states’ abilities to 
regulate themselves. 
Colonialism, Orientalism, and 
“Othering” 
Islamophobia in the UK is not an 
ahistorical phenomenon, rather, it must be 
contextualised within the history of 
Britain’s colonial past. Therefore, to fully 
understand Islamophobia in any 
meaningful way, there must be an 
acknowledgement of the relationship 
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between Islamophobia, Orientalism, and 
empire. 
Between the specific forms of medieval 
xenophobia and prejudices that 
characterised the Crusades, the Orientalist 
discourses of colonial powers, and 
securitisation of Muslim identities in the 
context of the current threat of ISIS, 
contemporary anti-Muslim hostilities and 
racisms are situated within a long history 
of imperial rivalry and conflict. Perhaps 
the most significant major development 
within this trajectory of anti-Muslim 
animosity is the emergence of the modern 
nation state and the subsequent ability of 
governments to successfully 
institutionalise racist policies and practices 
to a far greater extent than previously 
possible.66 However, contemporary 
Islamophobia cannot be divorced from its 
precursors within its historical lineage, for 
example, the imagery of the violent and 
angry Muslim that was so embedded 
within the rhetoric of the Crusades which 
has endured to this day. 
As a general introduction, Orientalism 
may roughly be understood as the way in 
which the West, particularly through the 
use of colonial and imperial knowledge 
production and discourses, essentialises 
non-Western societies as static and 
undeveloped. This constant depiction of 
other cultures and peoples fabricates and 
reinforces a perception of Western 
society’s inherent nature as developed, 
rational, flexible, and superior, which is in 
direct contrast to the “Other” – largely 
Muslims and previous subjects of 
colonialism – who remain innately 
backwards, barbaric, under-developed 
and in need of Western enlightenment; 
“the White man’s burden”. 
However, the concept of “Orientalism” is 
not a static and undisputed concept. While 
first promoted by Edward Said as a 
discourse through which imperialist 
knowledge was produced and sustained 
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surrounding the Muslim world, many 
scholars regard it more as an ideology. For 
example, Arun Kundnani refers to it as an 
ideology which “offers an everyday 
‘common sense’ explanatory framework 
for making sense of mediated crisis events 
(such as terrorist attacks) in ways that 
disavow those events’ political meanings 
(rooted in empire, racism and resistance) 
and instead explain them as products of a 
reified ‘Muslimness’. Thus, Islamophobia 
involves an ideological displacement of 
political antagonisms onto the plane of 
culture, where they can be explained in 
terms of the fixed nature of the ‘Other’.”67 
In other words, by essentialising the innate 
backwardness of the “Other”, Orientalist 
narratives act as a mechanism for 
regulating and controlling minorities. 
Taking the example of reducing terrorism 
to an issue purely of religion or innate 
barbarity without reference to other socio-
political and economic factors, Orientalist 
depictions of Muslim populations allow 
those with power over the narrative to 
exclude Muslims from critical discussions 
and representative analysis. As such, this 
method of obscuring grievances and 
justifying the regulation of Muslim 
identities casts Orientalist narratives as a 
form of structural violence representing 
the intersection between knowledge, 
power, and discourse. 
Orientalism is thus a mechanism through 
which to gain cultural and civilising power 
over Muslim populations. Islamophobia 
thereby becomes the conduit through 
which Muslims are regulated into 
hegemonic Western conceptions of 
modernity. Muslims who resist such 
Western appropriation are deemed a threat 
to the stability of the state and are thus 
placed in the dichotomy between the good 
“moderate” Muslims (those who 
unquestioningly adhere to the sensibilities 
of Western identity constructs) and the bad 
“extremist” Muslims (those who threaten 
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Western hegemonic notions of modernity 
through maintaining their religious-
cultural identities or through questioning 
the status quo of this hegemony). 
The consequences of such a “good vs bad 
Muslim” distinction can be seen in the 
political exclusion of Muslims and the 
British Government’s current 
disengagement policy regarding 
mainstream Muslim organisations. This is 
an issue that will be explored in greater 
depth throughout this report. 
This problematic situating of Muslim 
identities is also seen in the ways in which 
states will often emphasise and give 
prominence to Muslim individuals when 
they are in a position to be co-opted as 
agents of the state agenda. Again, this is 
seen in the Government’s position 
regarding their engagement with and 
promotion of only a hand-picked selection 
of Muslim organisations and individuals 
who support their established policy 
positions. 
Islamophobia and anti-Semitism 
Islamophobia is often portrayed as 
completely distinct from anti-Semitism. 
However, this is a misunderstanding of 
hatred and racisms. Islamophobia, anti-
Semitism, racism, xenophobia, sexism, 
homophobia and other forms of hatred are 
all mechanisms of social regulation and 
control of minorities. Therefore, they need 
to be understood in the interconnectivity of 
their logics, manifestations, and 
consequences. Moreover, it is important 
that all forms of hatred are understood as 
mechanisms of control and are, therefore, 
opposed with equal vigour. Failure to do 
so merely results in allowing hatred to 
manifest itself differently once one form 
has been tackled, thus transforming and 
redirecting itself at other vulnerable 
groups. 
Moreover, in line with the liberal 
Islamophobias discussed previously by 
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Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter, 
accusations of Muslim anti-Semitism are 
often used as a justification to discriminate 
further against Muslims collectively. 
It is imperative that both anti-Semitism 
and Islamophobia are fully viewed and 
understood for their consequences and are 
tackled collaboratively by Muslims, Jews 
and people of all faiths and none. 
Islamophobia in its Relation to 
Anti-Semitism 
Dr Yulia Egorova  
Durham University 
Scholars have made important 
interventions into the study of 
Islamophobia in its relation to anti-
Semitism. Edward Said had famously 
described Orientalism as the ‘Islamic 
branch’ of anti-Semitism, 68 and suggested 
that ‘hostility to Islam in the modern 
Christian West has historically gone hand 
in hand with, has stemmed from the same 
source, has been nourished in the same 
stream as anti-Semitism, and that a critique 
of the orthodoxies, dogmas, and 
disciplinary procedures of orientalism 
contribute to an enlargement of our 
understanding of the cultural mechanisms 
of anti-Semitism’.69 
More recently, Gil Anidjar has shown how 
in Europe the figure of the enemy is 
contingent on the way Europeans had 
related to both Jews and Arabs, who in 
contemporary Western imaginary became 
associated with Muslims, and argued that 
it is these attitudes that had set up in 
motion processes which had resulted in 
current conflicts in Europe, the Middle 
East and the United States.70 
Important attempts to explore the 
relationship between Jewish and Muslim 
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imageries in the context of contemporary 
Europe have been made in the past decade 
by scholars who focused on the diasporic 
conditions of contemporary Muslims. 
These contributions come from a wide 
range of disciplines and have involved 
drawing parallels between the historical 
experiences of the Jewish people and the 
current experiences of Muslims in Europe. 
For instance, historian Dan Diner has 
observed that ‘Muslims today, like Jews in 
the past, face the task of transforming their 
all-encompassing religion into a confessio, 
an abstract faith community among other 
faith communities’.71 Sociologist Sara 
Farris in her essay From the Jewish 
Question to the Muslim Question argues 
that nowadays in Europe it is the Muslims, 
rather than the Jews that are seen as a 
group allegedly behaving as a separate 
constituency within Western nations and 
discriminated against on account of this 
alleged behaviour.72 Finally, philosopher 
Brian Klug asks the broader question about 
whether the analogy between the anti-
Semitism of the past and the Islamophobia 
of the present is analytically valid, and 
concludes that within limits it is worth 
asserting, because it usefully sheds light on 
the multiple social and political realities 
that Europe faces at the moment. 
At the same time, Western mass media 
often portrays Muslims as the main 
victimisers of European Jews, and presents 
the attacks on Jewish persons and property 
where perpetrators were Muslim as further 
evidence of Muslim immigrants’ 
susceptibility to extremist ideologies and 
failure to integrate.73 Moreover, in recent 
decades European right-wing 
commentators started constructing the 
Jews and the Muslims as polar opposites 
with the former being presented as a model 
minority, and in some cases as the allies of 
72 Sara Farris, “From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question. Republican 
Rigorism, Culturalist Differentialism and Antinomies of Enforced Emancipation”, 
Constellations 2017, 21 (2): 296-307.  
73 Paul Silverstein, “Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, 
Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe”, Annual Review of Anthropology, 
2005, 34: 367 
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the Christian West74 and the latter as 
inassimilable strangers.75 Judaism is thus 
essentialized and othered, but portrayed as 
more compatible with life in Europe than 
Islam.  
These tropes show that while in the past, 
Jews and Muslims in Europe were put 
together into one category of a threatening 
other, in recent decades their identities 
have become polarized in the European 
public and political discourse, which 
created a rhetorical dichotomy between the 
‘well-integrated’ and ‘law-abiding’ Jews 
and the ‘violent’ and ‘inassimilable’ 
Muslims failing to adjust to the conditions 
of liberal democracy.  
I suggest that though at first glance such 
discourses construct Jews and Muslims as 
members of two opposing categories, they 
still at the same time configure them both 
as the ‘other’, even though they associate 
with them different imageries of alterity. In 
contemporary European imagination, Jews 
and Muslims are thus both juxtaposed as 
social groups allegedly adhering to 
radically different social and cultural 
values and religious practices, but at the 
same time are also conflated as static and 
unchanging minorities who, no matter 
how different they may be from each other, 
are also unmistakably unalike the 
perceived host society. This phenomenon 
highlights the porousness of conceptual 
borders between anti-Jewish, anti-Muslim 
and other forms of prejudice and 
problematises attempts at drawing rigid 
definitional boundaries around terms such 
as anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. 
What is the relationship between 
Islamophobia and Antisemitism? 
Professor Nasar Meer FAcSS 
University of Edinburgh 
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Islamophobia and antisemitism both 
involve the suspicion, dislike or hatred of 
Jewish or Muslim individuals or groups. 
This can be attitudinal or structural, and 
proceeds from a real or assumed 
‘Jewishness’ or ‘Muslimness’ respectively. 
Both therefore reflect a racial and not just 
theological character, and can take a 
number of forms spanning behaviour, 
discourse and state policy. 
For these reasons it is accurate to say that 
both antisemitism and Islamophobia are 
similar in drawing upon signs of race, 
culture and belonging. As such they are not 
limited to hostility to a religion alone, but 
are tied up with pressing issues of 
community identity, stereotyping, socio-
economic location, and political conflict 
amongst other dynamics.76 
Self-evidently therefore, Muslim and 
Jewish minorities have a clear and pressing 
rationale for collaborating further and 
tackling both together.  
What does the comparative data tell us 
about mass attitudes to both groups? 
One of the best available data sets offering 
a statistical comparison of attitudes 
towards Jews and Muslims can be found in 
the Pew Global Attitudes Project (PGAP),77 
which surveyed almost 25,000 people 
across 24 countries. Among its findings, it 
reports: 
“A strong relationship between anti-
Jewish and anti-Muslim sentiments in the 
West. Indeed, among the U.S. and the six 
European countries included in the survey, 
the correlation between unfavorable 
opinions of Jews and unfavorable opinions 
of Muslims is remarkably high.”78 
The expression of anti-Muslim and anti-
Jewish attitudes therefore emerges not 
separately but instead as a conjoined 
activity. Indeed, and in the most up to date 
77 Disclosure note: The author in an academic advisor to Pew. 
78 PRC (Pew Research Center) (2008) Pew Global Attitudes Project: Unfavorable Views of 
Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe. Washington DC: PRC. Summary available 
from: http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262  P. 9. 
 47 
2018 data, Pew confirms that “those who 
express negative views of Muslims are also 
more likely to express negative views of 
Jews”.79 This is a trend first discovered a 
decade ago where Pew data showed that 
opinions of Muslims in almost all of the 24 
European countries surveyed were more 
negative than they were of Jews, with more 
than half of Spaniards and half of Germans 
stating that they did not like Muslims, 
while the figures for Poland and France 
were 46% and 38% for those holding 
unfavourable opinions of Muslims. 
Indeed, while Americans and Britons 
displayed the lowest levels of 
antisemitism, one in four in both countries 
was hostile to Muslims. This means that in 
the USA, France and Germany, 
unfavourable views of Muslims are 
roughly at twice the rate of unfavourable 
views of Jews, while in Poland and Spain 
the former are only a few percentage points 
more. 
While quantitative surveys do not always 
provide the best accounts of prejudice and 
discrimination, they can be useful in 
discerning trends – alerting us in this case 
to the widespread prevalence of anti-
Muslim feeling.   In British Social Attitudes 
survey data, for example, Voas and Ling 
reported that one fifth of the total 
population responds negatively only to 
Muslims, and that relatively few people 
feel unfavourable towards any other 
religious or ethnic group on its own.80 
The visibility of Muslims, in terms of 
sometimes distinctive dress and 
appearance, is frequently the means 
through which Islamophobic feeling is 
turned into Islamophobic behaviour.81 
A good European-wide illustration may be 
found in the summary report on 
Islamophobia published by the European 
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Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia shortly after 9/11. Its authors, 
Chris Allen and Jorgen Nielsen, identified 
a rise in the number of “physical and 
verbal threats being made, particularly to 
those visually identifiable as Muslims, 
especially towards women wearing the 
hijab”.82 What is of particular note is that 
despite variations in the number and 
correlation of physical and verbal threats 
directed at Muslim populations among the 
individual nation states, one overarching 
feature that emerged among the 15 EU 
countries was the tendency for Muslim 
women to be attacked because of how the 
hijab signifies an Islamic identity.83 
It is a finding that raises problems for 
people who want to distinguish between 
antipathy towards Muslims and antipathy 
towards Islam. What is common to such 
findings is that these are overlapping and 
interacting – rather than distinct. 
What are the implications? 
Although they are not passive objects of 
racism, Muslim and Jewish identities are 
not free of external pressures, 
objectification and racialization.  
What is required therefore are conceptions 
of Islamophobia and antisemitism that are 
able to explain how prejudice 
simultaneously draws upon signs of race, 
culture and belonging in a way that is by 
no means reducible to hostility to a religion 
alone, and compels us to consider how 
religion has a social and political relevance 
because of the ways it is tied up with issues 
of community identity stereotyping, socio-
economic location, political conflict and so 
forth.  
82 Cristopher Allen and Jorgen S. Nielsen, Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU15 
after 11 September 2001, (Vienna: European Monitoring Centre for Racism and 
Xenophobia, 2010), p. 16. 
83 Ibid p. 35. 
 48 
This is not an unproblematic cluster of 
issues to hold together, and good public 
policy here needs to draw on both the 
theoretical and empirical materials that are 






Xenophobic, racist, Islamophobic and anti-
Semitic sentiments do not become 
activated in a vacuum. While there are 
many wide-ranging theories surrounding 
how and why hatred becomes embraced 
and articulated, the following discussion 
will focus on one potential avenue through 
which Islamophobic narratives and 
attitudes84 have become normalised 
amongst sections of the public; collective 
prejudice and intergroup threat. Following 
this discussion, this chapter will then 
examine how themes of collective 
prejudice and intergroup threat are utilised 
by the Islamophobia Industry to 
manufacture, propagate and maintain 
Islamophobia across the West. 
Collective prejudice and 
perceived inter-group threat 
Intergroup threat theory (or integrated 
threat theory), is a theory used in 
sociological and psychological studies 
exploring perceptions of threat which may 
lead to hostility, prejudice, and tensions 
between social groups. 
Perceived threats include any threat that 
members of a group (whether it is the 
dominant or a minority group) believe 
they are experiencing, regardless of 
whether those threats are real or imagined. 
For example, people may feel their 
economic well-being is threatened by 
an outgroup “stealing their jobs” even if, in 
reality, the outgroup has no effect on their 
job opportunities. This is often an 
argument seen in debates surrounding 
immigration which frequently ignore other 
factors influencing labour insecurity, such 
as economic crisis and industry changes. 
Regardless of other factors, perceptions 
that the job security of the ingroup is under 
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threat can increase levels of prejudice 
against the outgroup.  
Perceptions of threat 
As previously mentioned, perceived 
threats may be threats that exist in reality 
(ie. genuine and real threats), or they may 
be threats that are imagined. Regardless of 
whether these threats are real or imagined, 
perceptions of threat can be broadly 
understood in two categories: 
Realistic threats 
Realistic threats are threats that pose a 
danger to the in-group’s well-being. These 
may include:  
Physical threats: In terms of prejudice 
against Muslims, an example of this 
perceived threat is the narrative that 
presents Muslim men as innately sexually 
violent and culpable to praying on Western 
women and girls, thereby creating the 
impression that “our women” are at risk of 
sexual violence and exploitation at the 
hands of Muslim men. 
Threats to economic power: For instance, 
the perception that Muslim refugees and 
illegal as well as legal Muslim migrants are 
creating job insecurities; the idea visited 
earlier that they are “stealing our jobs”. 
Threats to political power: This can be 
found in the idea of “creeping Shariah” 
which is a prominent theme of counter-
jihadist rhetoric. Proponents of the 
Islamophobia Industry frequently use the 
argument that Muslims are making 
political moves to impose “Shariah Law” 
on Western societies. 
Threats to existence: Perhaps the most 
prominent example of this kind of 
perceived threat is found in fears 
surrounding terrorism and threats to 
national security. 
Symbolic threats 
Symbolic threats largely arise from a 
perceived threat to the 
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ingroup's worldview as a consequence of 
perceived differences between 
group morals, values, standards, beliefs, 
practices, and attitudes. These differences 
can create the impression that the 
outgroup poses a threat to the ingroup’s 
sense of identity and accepted system of 
values and customs. This is a significant 
theme promoted by the Islamophobia 
Industry, within which those promoting 
anti-Muslim agendas often promote the 
perception that Western and European 
culture is in a state of decline due to 
infiltration by Muslims who seek to 
destroy Western identities and values. 
Conscious and unconscious bias:  
Perceptions of threat are mediated and 
compounded by both conscious and 
unconscious bias. As previously 
mentioned, perceived threats may be 
threats that exist in reality or they may be 
threats that are imagined. Regardless of 
whether these threats are real or imagined, 
perceptions of threat are often mediated 
through bias. Bias is defined as inclination 
or prejudice for or against one person or 
group, especially in a way considered to be 
unfair. Bias can be conscious or explicit, or 
unconscious or implicit.  
Conscious biases are well recognised 
and utilised widely by the Islamophobia 
industry to influence others. For 
example, attribution bias explains why 
people believe that violence perpetrated 
by Muslims is due to religious factors 
whereas in reality the causes are largely 
socio-political. Confirmation bias is the 
tendency to search for or 
present information that confirms one’s 
own existing beliefs, and can be seen in the 
media, where criminal acts by persons of a 
certain ethnic or religious background are 
highlighted whilst those same acts by 
members of the White community 
are ignored. 
Unconscious bias is much more difficult to 
measure but can be a powerful influence 
on how make assumption about minority 
groups, for example, that Black people are 
more dangerous, or that Muslim women 
wearing the hijab are oppressed.  
In reality of course, perceptions of threat 
are mediated by a combination of 
conscious and unconscious biases, that 
have a complex and symbiotic interaction 
at an individual level. 
Consequences of perceptions of threat 
The consequences of perceptions of threat 
manifest in diverse ways on both the 
psychological and individual level, as well 
as on the wider sociological level. 
However, two concepts are useful for 
exploration at this point; intergroup 
anxiety and negative stereotypes. 
Intergroup anxiety: One of the 
consequences of perceptions of threat is the 
development of anxieties in the face of 
interacting with members of the outgroup 
and the expectation that this interaction 
will result in a negative experience. 
Intergroup anxiety is, therefore, a fear that 
intergroup interaction will result in 
feelings of discomfort, embarrassment, or 
insecurity, or that those interacting may 
become judged by members of both the 
outgroup as well as their own ingroup.  
Negative stereotypes: The response to 
perceived threats often involves the 
construction of stereotypes depicting the 
designated enemy outgroup. These 
stereotypes allow the outgroup to be 
demonised and dehumanised to further 
justify prejudicial and discriminatory 
policies, practices, and attitudes directed 
towards them. Stereotypes also often allow 
the causes of a complex situation to be 
simplified and presented. In this manner, 
the understanding of overwhelmingly 
complex issues and social ills are 
frequently reduced to being the product of 
one root cause – in this case, Muslims.  
The ‘Islamophobia Industry’ 
Dr Hilary Aked 
PhD University of Bath 
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The term ‘Islamophobia industry’ was 
popularised in the US context by author 
Nathan Lean’s 2012 book of the same 
name.85 In the UK, the so-called 
Islamophobia industry consists primarily 
of a network of think tanks and pressure 
groups in civil society whose activities 
contribute to fomenting Islamophobic 
narratives and putting in place policies 
which exclude and discriminate against 
Muslims.  
It includes a spectrum of actors affiliated to 
overlapping movements, incorporating 
neoconservatives, far-right 
‘counterjihadists’, elements of the Zionist 
movement and even some left-liberal 
currents. Such actors often play an 
important role in feeding xenophobic and 
racist stories to the media, particularly in 
debates around immigration, integration, 
terrorism and ‘extremism’. The more 
‘respectable’ wing of the movement also 
seeks to work through the state and 
successfully exerts considerable influence 
within the political elite and on 
government policy. 
Take the Henry Jackson Society, amongst 
the most influential groups in this 
category. Its predecessor think tank, the 
Centre for Social Cohesion, was cited five 
times in the 2011 Prevent strategy, 
demonstrating its impact on the coalition 
government’s revised version of this 
harmful policy which went beyond 
targeting violence to pursuing so-called 
‘non-violent extremism’.86 Douglas 
Murray – who was founder of the Centre 
for Social Cohesion and later became 
associate director of the Henry Jackson 
Society when the latter incorporated the 
former – is infamous for having said that 
                                                     
85 Lean, The Islamophobia Industry 
86 HM Government Prevent Strategy, June 2011, p.23. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf.  
87 Mehdi Hasan ‘We mustn't allow Muslims in public life to be silenced’, Guardian, 8 
July 2012. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/08/muslims-public-life-
abuse.  
88 Jack Grove, ‘Prevent strategy: naming and shaming of universities sparks concern’, 
Times Higher Education, 1 October 2015. Available at: 
‘conditions for Muslims in Europe must be 
made harder across the board’.87 
Despite this and other patently 
Islamophobic statements, his 
organisation’s influence has continued. In 
2015, then Conservative Prime Minister 
David Cameron made a speech about 
alleged extremism at UK universities. 
Sections of the Downing Street press 
release accompanying the speech appeared 
to have been copied, virtually verbatim, 
from a report by Student Rights – the 
campus-monitory arm of the Henry 
Jackson Society.88 Such manifestations of 
influence raise serious concerns in part 
because of the highly questionable nature 
of much of the research produced by 
Islamophobia industry groups. A widely-
reported Student Rights study on gender 
segregation on campus, for example, used 
a biased sample to produce figures which 
supported its claim that a significant 
proportion of Islamic societies at UK 
universities practiced gender 
segregation.89 Another similar think tank, 
Policy Exchange, was exposed by BBC 
Newsnight for having partly based a report 
about alleged extremist material in UK 
mosques on fabricated evidence.90   
Also concerning are some of the European 
and transatlantic links that UK 
Islamophobia industry groups maintain. 
The Gatestone Institute, for example, is a 
deeply Islamophobic New-York based 
policy institute and website founded by 
Nina Rosenwald. It publishes numerous 
‘fake news’ articles with titles like ‘Islamic 
cannibalism’, ‘UK Islamic Takeover Plot’ 
and ‘Soon the Muslims will be Kings of the 
World’.91 Yet the Henry Jackson Society, 
together with Conservative Friends of 
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/prevent-strategy-naming-and-
shaming-universities-sparks-concern.  
89 Hilary Aked, ‘Student Rights “Campus Extremism” Study: Dishonest Pseudo-
Science in Support Of a Toxic Narrative’, Huffington Post, 15 May 2013. Available at: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hilary-aked/student-rights-campus-extremism-
study_b_3277503.html.  
90 Peter Barron, “Disastrous misjudgement?”, BBC News - The Editors, December 13, 
2007, accessed 20.06.2018, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/theeditors/2007/12/disastrous__misjudgement.html. 
91 “Gatestone Institute”, accessed 20.06.2018, 
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Israel, co-hosted an event with the 
Gatestone Institute in parliament in 2016.92 
It has received financial donations from 
Nina Rosenwald’s Abstraction Fund, via 
its US arm, too.93 Among Gatestone’s UK 
contributors are the author of the above-
mentioned Policy Exchange report, Denis 
MacEoin, the Henry Jackson Society’s 
Douglas Murray and Student Rights’ 
former director Raheem Kassam. Kassam 
also has close ties to the ‘alt-right’ US-
based website Breitbart and to UKIP, 
which has long harboured Islamophobic 
sentiments. 
In December 2015 at the Home Affairs 
Select Committee’s inquiry into countering 
extremism, Labour MP Chuka Umunna 
challenged another UK organisation, the 
Quilliam Foundation, on its links to 
Gatestone.94 In the past, this self-declared 
‘counter-extremism’ body has received 
millions in government funding. That it 
should associate with a body like 
Gatestone demonstrates the proximity of 
‘counter-extremism’ rhetoric and 
Islamophobia, suggesting that while 
discriminatory government programmes 
like Prevent remain in place, providing a 
respectable language for racism, the 
Islamophobia industry – which is product 
as well as progenitor of such policies – will 
continue to thrive and grow.   
The Islamophobia Industry and 
the Islamophobia Network 
The term “Islamophobia Industry” (also 
known as the “Counter-jihad movement”) 
encompasses a largely interconnected 
network of think tanks, media outlets, 
public figures, politicians, and policy-
makers that advance, disseminate and 
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perpetuate negative discourses about 
Muslims and Islam for economic and 
political gains. Commonly guided by right-
wing and neoconservative ideologies, the 
Islamophobia Industry employs the 
rhetoric of an array of “experts” in order to 
disseminate misinformation and fear about 
Muslims and Islam, primarily by 
perpetuating the myth of an Islamic 
invasion of the Western world. They 
frequently claim that the ultimate aim of 
this Muslim takeover is the 
implementation of Sharia law across all 
liberal societies.95 Through this kind of 
propaganda, the industry is able to 
influence and hijack political discourses, to 
influence voting patterns, and even to set 
the basis for legislative debates and 
drafting.96  
Grassroots organisations, often guided by 
strong nationalistic sentiments, subscribe 
to the anti-Muslim discourse advanced by 
these experts and fuelled by the statements 
of media and political figures, thus giving 
this divisive rhetoric a voice among 
broader society.  
This section explores the many facets of the 
Islamophobia industry, highlighting the 
way in which it sustains and spreads 
hatred against Muslims and Islam. 
Neoconservatives at heart 
The ideological framework underpinning 
the logic of the Islamophobia industry can 
largely be traced back to 
neoconservativism. Neoconservativism 
has often been described as “Wilsonianism 
on steroids”97 to indicate a hard-line, 
Christian crusader-like approach to protect 
western values and interests, defeat 
adverse ideologies, and export the 
American model of liberal democracy 
95 Wajahat Ali et all, “Fear, Inc. The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America”, 
Center for American Progress, August 2011, accessed 01.05.2018, 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf  
96 Lean, The islamophobia Industry 
97 Most famously in Walter Russell, Mead, Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand 
Strategy in a World at Risk, (New York: Knopf, 2004.) 
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everywhere through an interventionist 
foreign policy.  
In relation to the Arab world specifically, 
neoconservatives believe in an almost 
messianic mission to defend the interests of 
Israel and defeat Islam, which is framed 
within a Huntington-like view of a “Clash 
of Civilizations” between liberal 
democracies and Islamic societies.98 
Huntington theorised that, with the fall of 
the Soviet Union, liberal societies would be 
challenged by different civilisations in 
wars of cultures and identities, with the 
Islamic world posing the greatest threat 
alongside the Asian world.  
British neoconservativism does not differ 
greatly from the American one, yet as 
pointed out by Lee Jarvis and Michael 
Lister, British neoconservatives are far 
more careful in labelling themselves in 
such a way due to the very negative 
association of the term, in Europe 
particularly, with George W. Bush and the 
“deceptions of the war in Iraq.”99 Even so, 
they fully embrace the concept of the 
West’s struggle with “the Other”, as well as 
the domestic mission of protecting society 
from the perceived threat posed by Islamic 
ideologies, and the foreign one of ensuring 
Israel’s interests.100 
Recurrent themes such as “Islamic 
terrorism”, “Islamic threat”, and “Muslim 
invasion” are used to legitimise anti-
Muslim measures within the realm of both 
foreign and domestic politics, leading to 
the marginalisation and containment of 
Muslims, and to the justification of foreign 
interventionism in Muslim-majority 
countries. In this way, the Islamophobia 
Industry often strategically conflates 
legitimate concerns of “Islamist” 
terrorism with issues such as geopolitics, 
refugees, and economy, resulting in claims 
that Islam is inherently dangerous and 
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therefore all European Muslims are a 
threat.101 
Funding and Network 
The Islamophobia Industry is sustained by 
an intricate network of alliances and 
patronages worth over $57 million in the 
United States alone. In the United States, 
Donors Capital Fund, a non-profit 
organisation that distributes funds to 
conservative and often right-wing 
organisation, contributes with over $27 
million to the Islamophobia network, and 
is presided by prominent neoconservative 
figures such as Arthur C. Brooks, the 
president of the American Enterprise 
Institute, and John A. Von Kannon, vice 
president and senior counsellor at the 
Heritage Foundation.102  Scaife 
Foundations, a neoconservative 
organisation that contributes to, among 
others, American Foreign Policy Council (a 
strong advocate of American 
interventionism abroad), raised nearly 
$10.5 million to fund Islamophobic 
organisations such as Center for Security 
Policy, and the Counterterrorism & 
Security Education and Research 
Foundation. Other organisations, such as 
Lyne and Harry Bradley Foundation and 
Rosenwald’s Abstraction Fund also 
contribute tens of millions of dollars to 
funding Islamophobic think tanks that 
spread conspiracy theories against 
Muslims and Islam.  
In the UK, two major think tanks are part 
of this network, Policy Exchange and The 
Henry Jackson Society (HJS), which are 
renowned for their neoconservative stance 
on foreign policy, support of military 
interventionism in the Middle East, 
rejection of multiculturalism, opposition to 
Muslim agency, and portrayal of Muslims 
and Islam as antithetic to the values of 
neoliberal societies.103 As exposed by 
101 “Countering the counter-jihad”, RUSI, August 15, 2008, accessed 10.05.2018, 
https://rusi.org/publication/countering-counter-jihad  
102 “Donors Capital Fund and Donors Trust”, accessed 29.05.2018, 
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103 Tom Mills, Tom Griffin and David Miller, “The Cold War on British Muslims”, 
Spinwatch, August 2011, accessed 10.05.2018, 
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Spinwatch, their growth “has been strongly 
assisted by a number of Conservative and 
pro-Israel donors”, including a number of 
American neoconservative groups that 
have come under scrutiny for falsifying 
evidence in support of their anti-Muslim 
literature.104 HJS receives funds from US 
organisations such as the Abstraction 
Fund, presided by Nina Rosenwald. 
Famously dubbed “the Sugar Mama of 
anti-Muslim Hate”, Rosenwald is the 
founder and director of the right-wing 
Gatestone Institute. Since 2000, Rosenwald 
has used nearly $3 million to finance the 
Gatestone Institute, the Center for Security 
Policy, Project Ijtihad, the American 
Islamic Forum for Democracy, the Middle 
East Forum, the Clarion 
Fund, Commentary magazine and 
the Hudson Institute. All these institutions 
have the common goal of fanning “the 
flames of Islamophobia.”105  
Policy Exchange (rated “E” for funding 
transparency – the lowest possible score) is 
strongly associated with the British 
Conservative Party, and was chaired by 
Michael Gove, who holds, as a former 
conservative chairwoman confessed, 
“crazy” anti-Muslim views and policies.106 
Although not much is known about Policy 
Exchange funding stream, part of its 
donors include The Charles Wolfson 
Charitable Trust, which has funded other 
right-wing think-tanks including Civitas, 
the Social Affairs Unit, the Institute of 
Economic Affairs and the Adam Smith 
Research Trust.107 Policy Exchange was 
exposed by the BBC for fabricating the 
findings of its report “The Hijacking of 
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British Islam: How Extremist Literature is 
Subverting Mosques in the UK”.108  
Through this significant stream of money 
and network of international alliances and 
patronages, the Islamophobia Industry 
reaches out to journalists, politicians, and 
media outlets to spread and normalise 
narratives demonising Muslims. Both in 
the United States and in the UK, a number 
of individuals who occupy prominent roles 
in Islamophobic think tanks engage with 
policy-makers and the public by 
presenting themselves as “experts”. In the 
US, these include personalities such as 
Robert Spencer, co-founder of Stop 
Islamization of America (SIOA), and 
director of Jihad Watch, and who is 
renowned all over the world for his 
“bigoted”, “hateful” and “disgusting” 
comments aimed at “relentlessly 
demonizing all Muslims.”109 Others 
include David Horowitz, who has been 
dubbed the “godfather of the anti-Muslim 
movement”, and who is the founder and 
CEO of the David Horowitz Freedom 
Center.110  
In the UK, similar figures include Alan 
Mendoza, the Director of the Henry 
Jackson Society. In June 2011, Mendoza 
addressed AIPAC by raising fears about 
Muslim demographic growth in Europe. 
He contended that “The European Muslim 
population has doubled in the past 30 
years and is predicted to double again by 
2040” and that “it has been difficult for 
European countries to absorb immigrants 
into their society given their failure to 
integrate newcomers”.111 The argument 
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was later proven to be completely untrue, 
and nothing more than a “hyperbolic and 
inflammatory claim” largely based on data 
manipulation.112 Two years later, in March 
2013, he suggested that “the increasing 
European Muslim population was to 
blame for Europe's ‘anti-Israel feelings’”,113 
yet again demonstrating a manipulative 
narrative that distorts facts to aid a highly 
neoconservative political agenda. 
Themes and arguments of the counter-
jihad movement 
The focal point of the Islamophobia 
network is the alleged Islamisation of the 
Western world, intended as an attempt to 
overturn liberal ideologies and replace 
them with the Sharia law. Sharia is seen as 
a “totalitarian ideology committed to 
destroying western civilization”, and the 
Islamophobia network contends that its 
implementation would result in the 
establishment of “a radical Islamist 
caliphate that will subordinate and punish 
all non-Muslim adherents.”114 
The Islamic threat is characterised by an 
alleged ideological incompatibility 
between the Western world and the Islamic 
world, whereby the West is seen as liberal, 
democratic and progressive, while Islam is 
associated with submission to Allah, 
totalitarianism and ultra-
conservativism.115 In this sense, the 
Islamophobia network fully embraces the 
“clash of civilisation” theories proposed by 
Samuel Huntington.  
According to the rhetoric of the 
Islamophobia Industry/counter-jihad 
movement, in resisting the further 
Islamisation of Western countries, it is 
necessary to eliminate Muslim 
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immigration, refuse any special 
accommodations for Islam in public spaces 
and institutions, and forbid intrusive 
public displays of Islamic practices.  
Furthermore, counter-jihadists have 
adapted the meaning of “jihad” to convey 
the idea of being threatened with a 
“Muslim invasion” that is taking a variety 
of forms: 
Demographic Jihad: threat from a 
growing Muslim population. 
Stealth Jihad: the notion of insidious 
Islamic influence in society. 
Rape Jihad: the imaginary idea that 
Muslim men are responsible for rape and 
violent crime in Europe. 
Welfare Jihad: the use of state welfare and 
benefits to fund terrorist activities. 
Faecal Jihad: the idea that Muslims are 
damaging Europe through low hygiene 
standards.116 
Free Speech  
A key rallying cry of the global counter-
jihad movement is that of “free speech”,117 
with organisations such as the 
International Free Press Society and 
International Civil Liberties Alliance 
claiming that free speech is under threat 
from Islam. Since 2005, when the Danish 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten published 
derogatory cartoons of the Prophet 
Mohammad causing a global uproar, 
defending the perceived “right” to offend 
(usually by demeaning minorities) has 
become a favoured pastime of counter-
jihadists.  
Counter-jihadists present anti-racism 
campaigners’ attempts to strengthen hate 
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speech legislation and laws against 
Islamophobia as stifling critiques of Islam 
at best, and apologism for terrorism at 
worse.118 Thus, the well organised and 
well-funded Islamophobia Industry has 
pushed back with financial aid often 
stemming from the USA.  
An example of this is seen in the workings 
of Student Rights (a project of the Henry 
Jackson Society, which will be discussed 
further below). Student Rights have 
frequently been responsible to obstruct 
speakers invited to university campuses by 
Islamic or Palestinian societies on the 
grounds of accused extremism, whilst 
simultaneously utilising the arguments of 
free speech to oppose no-platform policies 
directed at far-right speakers.119  
Complicity from the State 
As previously mentioned, European 
governments do not appear to see 
members of the Islamophobia Industry as 
an inherent threat and are thus failing to 
counter them. Perhaps part of the reason 
for this is that counter-jihadists are not 
fundamentally opposed to the state. Their 
outlook on the “inevitability” of violent 
civil war is more focused on defending 
national identity, than on revolution.  
Indeed, it has been observed that members 
of the Islamophobia industry are more 
likely to engage in what may be considered 
‘pro-state violence’.120 Far right violence is 
often deemed to be ‘lone wolf’ violence and 
is rarely given a media prominence 
comparative to that of religiously inspired 
violence.  
This tacit leniency towards the 
Islamophobia Industry may also result 
from the fact that many right-wing 
Western governments actually share 
aspects of the counter-jihadist analysis to 
some extent. In two major policy areas, 
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immigration and counter-extremism, there 
are significant overlaps in approach. While 
no government has gone as far as the 
counter-jihad movement would like 
(indeed, it frequently maintains that 
political elites are naïve, complacent and 
failing to address the imminent ‘threat’ 
that Islam actually poses to the West) it 
applauds moves by some governments 
towards limiting immigration and 
institutionalising Islamophobia. For 
example, a broad range of counter-
jihadists, including Katie Hopkins, 
Melanie Phillips, Oliver JJ Lane, David 
Littman, Gerard Batten and Raheem 
Kassam, have supported Donald Trump 
and his anti-Muslim policies both 
throughout his presidential campaign and 
during his presidency. 
The Islamophobia Industry has viciously 
sought to push the centre of politics to the 
right. A unique feature of the movement 
that serves to give it some kind of 
legitimacy is that, unlike any Islamist or 
jihadist movement or any neo-Nazi 
party,121 it has supporters in influential 
positions in Western governments and 
wider circles. In the US, prominent 
examples include Steve Bannon and Walid 
Phares, (Donald Trump’s strategist and 
Middle East policy advisor), as well as 
Frank Gaffney, (from the Center for 
Security Policy and a former Reagan 
administration official, who has links to 
several Trump administration officials 
including Attorney General Jeff Sessions). 
As Spinwatch points out: 
“[h]ere lies the counterjihad movement’s 
alarming strength: it is a ‘spectrum’ with 
‘street-fighting forces at one end’ (such as 
the English Defence League) and ‘cultural 
conservatives and neoconservative writers 
at the other’ (from Daniel Pipes to Douglas 
Murray). As well as flourishing in the 
14.06.2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hilary-aked/student-rights-claims-
media-mistakes_b_3303703.html  
120 José M. Atiles Osoria (2012) ‘Pro-State Violence in Puerto Rico: Cuban and Puerto 
Rican Right-Wing Terrorism from the 1960s to the 1990s’. Socialism and Democracy, 26:1. 
121 At least in north-western Europe. 
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blogosphere, it has publishing houses (eg. 
Encounter Books) and newspapers (eg. 
Dispatch International), produces films 
(eg. Fitna and Obsession), establishes 
foundations and even ‘charities’ (eg. 
Victims Of Islamic Cultural Extremism, or 
VOICE UK).” The combined effects of 
these top-down and bottom-up forces may 
prove extremely dangerous. 
This wing of elites lends an element of 
respectability to the counter-jihad 
movement’s grassroots and allowed it to 
carve out a niche within mainstream 
politics. For example: 
 At least one counter-jihad event has 
been held in the European Parliament 
building, courtesy of an MEP from 
Belgium’s far right Vlaams Belang 
party. 
 Baroness Caroline Cox has hosted 
Anne Marie Waters of Sharia Watch 
UK in the House of Lords.  
 Together with fellow British peer Lord 
Finkelstein and former US ambassador 
to the UN, John Bolton, Baroness Cox 
also sits on the board of the New York 
think-tank, the Gatestone Institute, 
which publishes many counter-jihad 
writers cited in Anders Breivik’s 
manifesto.  
 President Miloš Zeman of the Czech 
Republic spoke at a ‘Bloc Against 
Islam’ rally in November 2015.  
 In 2016, Conservative MP Bob 
Blackman hosted in Parliament Tapan 
Ghosh, an Indian Hindu-nationalist 
who praised the genocide of Rohingya 
Muslims in Burma. 
 Conservative MP Mike Payne shared a 
“Muslim parasites article on social 
media. 
 Conservative MP Alexander van 
Terheyden called Islam a “violent 
political ideology”. 
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Across Europe, parliamentarians with 
counter-jihadist allegiances or sympathies 
have advocated anti-Islam legislation, 
often in the name of security and counter-
terrorism concerns. These policies and 
legislative developments are often related 
to sharia law, women’s clothing or mosque 
construction.  
In this manner, rather than opposing the 
state, the counter-jihad movement pursues 
its goals through official channels. Liz 
Fekete observes that the Islamophobia 
Industry is thus “using state power 
to…put into place legal and administrative 
structures that discriminate against 
Muslims”.122 
Radical right parties with close links to the 
Islamophobia network and counter-
jihadist ideologies have long been seeking 
to seize power via elections. Several have 
become significant players in European 
governments: for instance, the Danish 
People’s Party became the country’s 
second biggest party in 2015 and the PVV 
became the second largest party in the 
Dutch House of Representatives following 
elections in March 2017. In Germany, 
Alternative for Germany (AfD) boasts 97 
seats in the Bundestag, 158 in State 
Parliaments, and a membership of over 
30,000 people. 
A Transnational Movement  
Despite its strong association with 
nationalist politics, the counter-jihad 
movement is structurally organised 
through “dispersed, decentralised, non-
hierarchical networks” of blogs, think 
tanks and protest groups, with “no set 
command and control hierarchy” and few 
leaders.123 This versatility allows it to 
organise across borders and thus hugely 
increases its destructive potential. As Farid 
Hafez has argued:  
“While the main focus on an exclusive 
identity politics in the frame of nation-
states previously divided the far right and 
123 Andreas Önnerfors, cited in Nigel Copsey, “Conference Report: Fascist Ideologues, 
Past and Present”, Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies, 2013, 2:2, 268. 
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complicated transnational cooperation, a 
shared Islamophobia has the potential to 
be a common ground for strengthening the 
transnational links of right-wing 
parties.”124 
Transnational organisation of the 
Islamophobia Industry frequently occurs 
at the grassroots as the same ideas are 
mobilised across borders under different 
names. For example: 
 The Stop the Islamisation of Denmark 
movement has spawned SIO Europe, 
SIO Deutschland, SIO France, SIO 
England and Stop the Islamization of 
America, collectively known as Stop 
the Islamisation of Nations (SION) 
 The English Defence League (EDL) was 
replicated in Scotland, Germany and 
Norway, amongst others, and a 
European Defence League was 
launched in Aarhus, Denmark in 2012, 
though without much success.  
 The German movement PEGIDA has 
inspired copycat movements in many 
countries including Austria, Sweden 
and the UK.  
A blueprint of the Islamophobia 
Industry 
Aside from its considerable funding, the 
structure of the Islamophobia Industry 
makes it incredibly effective in delivering 
its message at all levels of society. The 
following section explores the primary 
elements of this structure; “experts” and 
think-tanks, reformed or “moderate” 
Muslims, politicians, media figures, and 
grassroots organisations. 
“Experts” and think-tanks 
Well-funded “experts” and think-tanks 
provide a “respectable face” to anti-
Muslim agendas and discourses. It is 
through the pseudo-research of these 
organisations and through their prominent 
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connections to political and media 
institutions that the opinions of these so-
called “experts” are capable of driving and 
influencing national policies and political 
agendas. 
The Henry Jackson Society (HJS) 
In the UK, arguably the most divisive 
think-tank is the Henry Jackson Society 
(HJS). The ideological framework 
underpinning the activities of HJS is best 
exemplified by Douglas Murray, the think 
tank’s associate director. Murray is the 
author of a book conveniently titled 
“Neoconservatism: Why We Need It”, in 
which he discussed at length the morality 
of neoconservativism and its value for 
Western societies. Neoconservativism, in 
his view, “is not a political party… but a 
way of looking at the world”, which frames 
his political orientation within the wider 
discourse on the global war on terror, the 
threat posed by Islam, and the need to 
protect “Us” from “Them”.  
In this regard, particularly concerning is 
Murray’s opinion that “A Muslim 
immigrant into the United States who 
claims the same rights as those enjoyed by 
an American whose family have lived in 
the country for generations presents an 
even greater challenge”,125 which 
unmistakably outlines his discriminatory 
views on immigration and inter-racial and 
inter-religious community relations. 
Murray was not new to controversial 
stances. During a speech in 2006, when he 
was director of the Centre for Social 
Cohesion (CSC – now part of HJS), Murray 
said that, “Conditions for Muslims in 
Europe must be made harder across the 
board: Europe must look like a less 
attractive proposition.”126 Following the 
speech, the Conservative front bench was 
duly forced to sever all formal relations 
with both Murray and CSC. 
126 “Paul Goodman: Why the Conservative frontbench broke off relations with Douglas 






In 2015, he wrote: “The claim that Islam is 
a religion of peace is a nicety invented by 
Western politicians so as either not to 
offend their Muslim populations or simply 
lie to themselves that everything might yet 
turn out fine. In fact, since its beginning 
Islam has been pretty violent.”127 
Reformed or “moderate” Muslim 
validators 
The views perpetuated by these well-
funded think-tanks are then legitimised by 
Muslim or former Muslim activists and 
validators, who accept the idea of an 
inherently dangerous side of Islam and 
legitimise anti-Muslim discourses. In the 
US, these include figures such as Nonie 
Darwish, a Senior Fellow at the Center for 
Security Policy and founder and president 
of Arabs for Israel. She was raised in the 
Gaza Strip and grew up a Muslim. Her 
opinion is that Islam “should be 
annihilated” because “is a poison to a 
society. It’s divisive. It’s hateful. ... Islam is 
going to be brought down… because Islam 
is based on lies and it’s not based on the 
truth".128 Others include Tawfik Hamid – a 
self-described “Muslim reformer” and an 
alleged former member of the Egyptian 
terrorist organization al-Gama’a al-
Islamiyya – who believes that Muslims 
“prefer this violent traditional teaching of 
Islam."129  
Perhaps amongst the most widely known 
of these figures is Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a 
Somalia-born Dutch politician currently 
employed by the American Enterprise 
Institute, who wrote in her book Infidel 
that, “Islam was like a mental cage. At first, 
when you open the door, the caged bird 
stays inside: it is frightened. It has 
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internalized its imprisonment. It takes time 
for bird to escape, even after someone has 
opened the doors to its cage.”130 In a 2015 
interview for the New York Post, she went 
as far as saying: “The assumption is that, in 
Islam, there are a few rotten apples, not the 
entire basket… I’m saying it’s the entire 
basket.”131 
In the UK, similar figures include Ed 
Husain and Maajid Nawaz, founders of the 
Quilliam Foundation – which now receives 
funds from neoconservative American 
organisations – Sara Khan of Inspire and 
now UK counter-extremism chief, Amina 
Lone, Co-Director of the Social Action and 
Research Foundation (SARF), Raheem 
Kassam, and Fiyaz Mughal, founder of Tell 
MAMA. To various degrees, they all 
shared opinions accepting that Islam has in 
fact a problematic face, or that interfaith 
and interracial relations are not working. 
For example, Nawaz openly declared that 
“multiculturalism has failed”;132 Mughal 
rejected the entire concept of 
Islamophobia;133 and Khan is one of the 
strongest supporter of the highly 
controversial counter-terror strategy, 
PREVENT.134  
Meanwhile, Raheem Kassam, former 
editor-in-chief of Breitbart News London 
and former chief advisor to UKIP 
leader Nigel Farage, said white converts to 
Islam are “the nuttiest”.135 A former 
Muslim who now holds a highly 
controversial stance on Islam, Kassam is 
the author of “No Go Zones: How Sharia 
Law Is Coming to a Neighborhood Near 
You”. 
In recent times, Ed Husain, co-founder of 
the highly controversial Quilliam 
132 “Maajid Nawaz Says Multiculturalism Is Dead”, accessed 11.06.2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mgm5XMZ5fwY  
133 “Let’s not confuse anti-Muslim hate with Islamophobia”, The Times, May 14, 2018, 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/let-s-not-confuse-anti-muslim-hate-with-
islamophobia-85977vgcg  
134 “The latest Prevent figures show why the strategy needs an independent review”, 
The Guardian, November 10, 2017, accessed 11.06.2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/10/prevent-strategy-
statistics-independent-review-home-office-muslims  
135 “Raheem Kassam: Meet The Right-Wing Ex-Muslim Who Wants To Save UKIP”, 




Foundation, has attracted criticism for an 
article published in The Telegraph, in 
which he dismissed legitimate concerns 
over Islamophobia in the Conservative 
Party calling it a “political card”. He 
further blamed Labour Leader Jeremy 
Corbyn for “pitting Britain's Muslims 
against Jews”.136 
Diversity in beliefs and practices in terms 
of faith is a natural characteristic of British 
Muslim communities and nothing to be 
concerned about. However, the problem 
emerges when individual Muslims are 
used and promoted for the purpose of 
justifying the stigmatisation and 
marginalisation of Muslims as a whole. 
Establishing themselves as spokespeople 
for “liberal Muslims”, individuals such as 
those mentioned above justify heightened 
scrutiny of Muslims and anti-Muslim 
policies “thus justifying, seemingly from a 
Muslim’s perspective, concerns about 
those Muslim communities who hold 
different views from theirs.”137  
Grassroots 
The ideas pronounced by experts and 
justified by Muslim validators influence 
grassroots movements, media, and in turn 
politicians.  
In the United Kingdom, grassroots 
organisations that subscribe to the views of 
the Islamophobia Network include the 
English Defence League (EDL), Britain 
First, PEGIDA UK, and the relatively 
recently emerged Football Lads Alliance 
(FLA). Largely through the leveraging of 
issues such as identity and British 
nationalism, the scope of these grassroots 
movements is to spread and perpetuate 
anxieties about Muslims among the 
general public. Finding consensus among 
the masses allows these groups to increase 
societal divide and potentially swaying 
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policies as politicians respond to societal 
influence.  
The English Defence League (EDL) 
The EDL is a far-right street 
protest movement which exists solely to 
oppose to Islam and what it considers to be 
a spread of Islamism and Sharia in the 
United Kingdom. It was founded by 
Tommy Robinson, a far-right activist who 
was repeatedly convicted for “breaching 
the peace” and a number of other 
offences.138  
The stated objectives of the EDL are: 
 To act, lead and inspire in the struggle 
against global Islamification 
 To stand for democracy and the rule of 
law by opposing sharia 
 To stand for English cultural norms by 
opposing sharia 
 To oppose the Islamic distinction 
between Muslims and non-Muslims 
 To demand effective action against the 
threat of terrorism in the UK 
 To educate the British public about 
Islam 
 To reject politically correct depictions 
of Islam in Britain 
 To promote an open debate about 
Islam in British life 
 To promote a balanced depiction of 
Islam as a religion and ideology.139 
Several investigations have demonstrated 
the EDL’s tactics in perpetuating and 
amplifying the divide between Muslims 
and non-Muslims in Britain. In January 
2010, an undercover investigation by The 
Guardian, revealed the group’s plan “to hit 
racially sensitive areas in attempt to 
provoke disorder over summer”.140 More 
138 “Far-Right Criminals”, accessed 29.05.2018, https://far-
rightcriminals.com/category/tommy-robinson/  
139 “About Us”, English Defence League, accessed 29.05.2018, 
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recently, in June 2017, the EDL clashed 
with police officers during a march in 
Manchester, during which supporters 
brandished a pig's head – an act aimed at 
taunting Muslims.141 
Together with marches and public 
demonstrations, the EDL maintains a 
strong presence on social media through 
which it galvanises support by fuelling 
anti-Muslim hatred online. On Twitter, 
several accounts continue to be associated 
with the EDL, despite ongoing efforts by 
the platform to shut down its leaders’ 
pages.142 Similarly, the EDL has managed 
to maintain some presence on Facebook, 
with pages such as “English Defence 
League London Division II” attracting 
thousands of people.143 These pages, which 
are filled with fake news, conspiracy 
theories and pseudo-nationalistic 
sentiments that depict Muslims as 
threatening enemies, also include 
potentially thousands of other accounts set 
up by EDL members privately.  
Tommy Robinson 
Tommy Robinson, one of the EDL 
founders and most charismatic leaders, 
was permanently banned from Twitter for 
“hateful conduct” in March 2018, after he 
wrote in a post: “Islam promotes killing 
people.”144 Robinson formed the EDL in 
2009 with the aim of sheltering Luton – and 
by extension Britain – from the “Islamic 
threat”. As he commented in an interview: 
“I always knew there was a hostility 
coming from that community, and I never 
really knew what it was. I didn’t know 
anything about the religion. It’s only when 
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I looked into the religion that I thought, 
this is what it is. It’s got to do with 
Islam.”145  
In 2012, Robinson left the EDL after a high 
profile “deradicalisation” that was 
attributed to the Quilliam Foundation. At 
the time, Robinson stated that he had 
decided to “counter Islamist ideology… 
not with violence but with better, 
democratic ideas”.146 It later emerged that 
the Quilliam Foundation had paid Tommy 
Robinson £2000 a month in order to take 
credit for his resignation from the EDL.147 
During this time, Robinson assumed a 
somewhat more conciliatory tone, 
apologising for the climate of anti-Muslim 
hatred he contributed to creating, and even 
agreed “with a vision of multiculturalism 
inclusive of a variety of ethnic and 
religious groups”.148  
However, by 2015 this conciliatory period 
seems to have ended. That year, he took 
part in an anti-Islam rally in Holland 
organised by the Patriotic Europeans 
Against the Islamisation of the Occident 
(PEGIDA). During the speech, Robinson 
declared that “he was proud’ to have set up 
the EDL”, and that his aim is to “bring 
people together and we are going to enter 
into a new era in Europe where everyone is 
going to unite against the Islamisation of 
our countries.”149 In January 2016 Robinson 
duly set up PEGIDA UK, with the 
inaugural rally attended by roughly 200 
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people – half the number expected by the 
police.150 
Robinson was sentenced to 13 months in 
prison in May 2018 for contempt of court 
proceedings after he live streamed filming 
of defendants in an active criminal trial. 
PEGIDA UK 
PEGIDA UK was born with the same 
ideological objectives of the EDL, although 
it sought to distance itself from the “loutish 
behaviour and alcohol-fuelled violence” 
that characterises EDL’s activities.151 
Through PEGIDA UK, Tommy Robinson 
hoped to attract the same demographic 
that PEGIDA had attracted in 
Germany:  middle-class, educated 
individuals able to articulate a rational 
opposition to Islam, and organise 
themselves in a sophisticated group 
capable of legitimisation. As he 
commented: “We are taking the whole 
football culture, which was embedded in 
the EDL, out of it and we are trying to 
create a safe environment”, also adding 
“After going out to Germany, I felt 
ashamed of the way we'd conducted 
ourselves as Englishmen…  I stood there in 
Dresden and spoke to 40,000 people. There 
was no aggression. They had discipline. 
There was unity.”152 PEGIDA UK does not 
have any official online presence, which 
possibly indicates the organisation has 
been dissolved.  
The Football Lads Alliance (FLA)  
The Football Lads Alliance (FLA) is a 
relatively new organisation which was 
founded by John Meighan in 2017. 
Following the attacks in Manchester and 
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London Bridge, Meighan “felt strongly 
that something needed to be done”.153 The 
group was set up as an “anti-extremism” 
movement, but soon become associated 
with far-right activists. During a FLA 
march in Birmingham in March 2018, 
witnesses reported “threatening behaviour 
towards Asian bystanders and heard 
speeches attacking Muslims in Britain.” 
Interestingly, the march was attended by 
Tommy Robinson as well.154  
As reported by The Guardian, the FLA’s 
Facebook page is filled with posts “calling 
for Khan, London’s first Muslim mayor, to 
be “hanged” and for Abbott, Britain’s first 
black female MP, to be “run over”. There 
are also posts claiming mosque attacker 
Osborne is a “scapegoat” and suggesting 
he was right to plot to kill Labour leader 
Jeremy Corbyn.”155 In April 2018, Meighan 
stepped down, justifying his decision by 
saying he needed to “re-focus my energies 
into my personal and professional life”.156 
Despite Meighan announced that the 
company would be dissolved after his 
resignation, FLA website and GoFundMe 
page remain active.157  
Britain First 
Following the nationalistic tendencies of 
other anti-Muslim grassroots 
organisations, Britain First is a far-right 
group describing themselves as a "patriotic 
political movement", which campaigns 
primarily against multiculturalism and 
against the Islamisation of the United 
Kingdom. Britain First’s leaders, Paul 
Golding and Jayda Fransen, were both 
convicted of religiously-aggravated 
harassment.158 While having a broader 
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political agenda, Britain First is as 
concerned with Islam as the EDL. Its goals 
include “the maintenance of British 
national sovereignty, independence and 
freedom”, preserving Britain’s “ancestral 
ethnic and cultural heritage, traditions, 
customs and values”, opposing political or 
religious doctrines including Marxism, 
Liberalism, Political Correctness, Euro 
Federalism and Islam.159 
These grassroots movements are 
particularly insidious for society. Their 
incessant campaign of misinformation and 
their operations at street level, combined 
with their social media presence, are 
capable of potentially influencing and 
mobilising thousands of individuals, while 
their divisive rhetoric has very real 
consequences leading to acts of violence. 
Indeed, Darren Osborne, the perpetrator of 
the terrorist attack on Finsbury Park last 
year, was reportedly radicalised to 
violence after watching a series of videos 
by Tommy Robinson, EDL and Britain 
First.160  
Media figures 
The Islamophobia Industry’s ability to 
disseminate anti-Muslim sentiments is 
furthered by a network of journalists, 
media outlets, and commentators. These 
individuals and outlets offer an echo-
chamber for these Islamophobic narratives. 
In the US, Fox News is one of the biggest 
and most influential anti-Muslim voices, 
with journalists such as Jeanine Pirro 
calling Islam a “cancer” and describing the 
Paris attacks as part of a “Christian 
genocide.”161 
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An important media outlet, which became 
world famous following the appointment 
of its chairman, Stephen Bannon, to the 
Trump administration, is Breitbart News, 
an American news, opinion and 
commentary website. The website showed 
just how far the far-right can go with anti-
Islam hysteria. In 2016, it published an 
article in which it lied about President 
Obama being Muslim;162 one year later, it 
published another fake story about an 
alleged group of Muslims setting fire to a 
church in Dortmund, Germany.163 As 
noted previously, Raheem Kassam served 
as chief editor for Breitbart’s UK branch, 
Breitbart London. 
Considering the ideological positioning of 
Breitbart, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the website is filled with references to 
Douglas Murray’s articles in The 
Spectator,164 a conservative magazine that 
has been exposed for its “purple-faced, 
pro-fox-hunting, climate-change-denying, 
insidiously Islamophobic worldview”.165 
The magazine differs slightly from 
Breitbart in its ability to hide its 
Islamophobic agenda through seemingly 
erudite writings. However, it hosts a 
variety of controversial authors including, 
together with Murray, Melanie Phillips 
and Rod Liddle, author of several highly 
controversial pieces, including one in 
which he described Muslims as 
“savages”.166 While continuing to write for 
The Spectator, Liddle went on to hosting 
equally controversial TV shows, such as 
The New Fundamentalists and 
Immigration is a Time Bomb. 
Less mainstream media outlets include 
Rebel Media (known as The Rebel), an 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/07/german-police-quash-
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online political and social 
commentary media website founded in 
February 2015 and which was described as 
“a global platform for an extreme anti-
Muslim ideology”.167 
It is interesting to note that Rebel Media 
employs Tommy Robinson as well as Katie 
Hopkins, who has made a name for herself 
through her divisive, anti-refugee and 
Islamophobic remarks. Today, Hopkins 
boasts nearly 900,000 followers on Twitter. 
In May 2017, Hopkins was fired from the 
British radio station LBC – with LBC staff 
breaking into “massive cheers and 
applause” – after her tweet called for a 
“final solution” in response to the 
Manchester bombing.168 Shortly after, in 
November 2017, Mail Online refused to 
renew her contract after her defamatory 
remarks against a teacher forced the 
newspaper to pay substantial damages and 
legal costs.169 
Katie Hopkins is well-known for several 
articles appearing in tabloids such as The 
Sun, including one that prompted the UN 
to denounce it as resembling Nazi 
propaganda. In the article, later taken 
down by The Sun, Katie Hopkins described 
migrants escaping the wars in the Middle 
East as “cockroaches”.170 In 2017, Hopkins 
took part in a far-right event organised by 
the David Horowitz Freedom Center, 
giving a speech, during which she attacked 
Muslims and urged the participants to 
“fight for their country”.171  
Through her latest endeavour, an online 
blog called Hopkins World, Hopkins 
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continues to spread far-right, poisonous 
ideas against Muslims and liberals. In a 
recent blog entry about her speech given to 
a Tea Party group in Michigan, entitled 
“We are big and bad, and liberals should 
be afraid”, she said in reference to Muslims 
in the UK, “The second thing we can do is 
to arm ourselves…I have bullets inside my 
car… we must look for our own truth”.172 
Political parties and figures 
Between the advice of the “experts”, the 
vocal pressure from far-right journalists, 
and the mass support of anti-Muslim 
grassroots movements, political 
representatives and policymakers are 
susceptible to influence from these anti-
Muslim agendas. 
However, political parties, such as the 
United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) are also conversely capable of 
purposefully fuelling anti-Muslim 
sentiment in order to further garner 
political support and legitimacy. 
At its core, UKIP maintains an anti-
establishment, Euro-sceptic stance 
founded upon a strong national identity 
that resonates well with the British 
working-class.173 UKIP was instrumental 
in the triumph of the Brexit vote of June 
2016, with an incessant campaign 
targeting, among other things, Muslim 
migrants. Nigel Farage, UKIP former 
leader, capitalised on an anti-migrant 
poster showing Muslim migrants under 
the sign “Breaking Point” to spread the 
idea that Britain had to “take back control” 
of its borders.174  What followed was the 
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highest spike in racially and religiously 
motivated hate crimes, from 40,741 to 
49,921 in the eleven months following the 
vote.175 
Although he left the party following the 
Brexit vote – even expressing concern 
about UKIP’s increasingly stronger far-
right stance – Farage is in no way 
dislocated from Islamophobic sentiments. 
In 2015, for example, he stated that there 
was “an increasing level of concern 
because people do see a fifth column living 
within our country, who hate us and want 
to kill us”.176  
UKIP is currently headed by Gerard 
Batten, a renowned Islamophobe and 
Tommy Robinson’s supporter who 
described Islam as a “violent death cult”. 
In his speech, Batten argued that non-
Muslims should have a “perfectly rational 
fear” of Islam, a “cult” that “propagates 
itself by intimidation, violence and 
conquest.”177 UKIP currently holds one 
seat in the House of Commons.178 
As discussed in a later chapter on Public 
Exclusion, Integration, and Minority 
Rights, UKIP is also responsible for 
proposing severely anti-Muslim and 
discriminatory integration policies. For 
example, in an effort to rebrand itself as 
“an anti-Islam party”, and as part of its 
new post-referendum agenda, UKIP 
suggests, among other measures, a ban on 
full face veil.179 
Fuelling Islamophobia 
Between its considerable funding and a 
structure incorporating all elements of 
society, the Islamophobia Industry is 
highly efficient in promoting and 
maintaining a perception of inter-group 
threat. Within this paradigm, Muslims 
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play the role of the insidious, backwards, 
and evil perpetrators of a degradation of 
Western physical security, economic 
wellbeing, identity, values, and norms. 
This collective network is therefore 
incredibly dangerous due to their ability to 
influence policy decisions and to drive 
political agendas to the detriment of 
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Moral Panic, Media, 
and Broadcasting 
Moral panic 
In an earlier chapter of this report, we 
discussed the concepts of collective 
prejudice and theories of integrated inter-
group threat. As previously mentioned, in 
response to real and imagined threats, 
enemies are constructed to bear the guilt 
and responsibility for the conditions under 
which society finds itself. This construction 
of scapegoats involves inciting a moral 
panic. 
Through the spreading of moral panic, 
individuals or groups emerge as a 
designated threat to societal values, norms, 
identities, security and interests. This 
moral panic is then disseminated and 
maintained by the mass media’s 
promotion of stereotypical, stylised and 
distorted representations. Meanwhile, it is 
amplified and given credence by 
politicians, public figures and those 
considered experts. The result is 
overwhelming scrutiny and media 
negativity centred around the created “folk 
devils” of society. 
According to Robin Richardson, the 
features of moral panics include: 
 The construction of folk devils who 
become the metaphorical embodiment 
of evil and deviancy from societal 
values. 
 Criticism of those who are accused of 
not understanding, appreciating or 
admitting the threats that society faces, 
in particular, officials, religious figures 
and activists (the “bleeding hearts and 
do-gooders”), and academics in their 
apparent ivory towers. 
 The connecting of a series of unrelated 
threats, with the implication that they 
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are all symptomatic of the same 
underlying problem. 
 The creation of a dichotomy between 
“us” vs “them” and the assertion that 
there are no shared interests, values or 
commonalities between the two. 
 A strengthened sense of moral 
indignation being attributed to the 
dominant group (the idealised “us” vs 
a demonised “them”). 
 Media exaggeration, sensationalism 
and distortion. 
 A pervasive sense of an almost 
apocalyptic “slippery slope” and the 
idea that cultural and societal change is 
out of control. 
 A culminating call for restrictions, 
punitive laws, and the curtailment of 
the suspect community’s civil liberties 
and freedoms.180 
It is difficult to examine the 
aforementioned elements of moral panics 
without acknowledging how all of them 
are salient features of the ways in which 
Muslims are presented, commented upon 
and evaluated within public, political and 
media discourses. 
However, nowhere is this framework of 
discourse more acutely visible than in the 
media. Editors and journalists are under 
constant pressure to meet their commercial 
responsibilities. However, they should also 
be aware of their ethical responsibilities to 
report, explain, and inform the public 
without inflaming and pandering to public 
panic and social tensions. 
The following section will examine the 
treatment of Muslims in the media and 
broadcasting and aims to explore the role 
of these institutions in the fuelling of 
Islamophobia. 
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Islamophobia and the British 
press  
In conducting research for our submission 
to the House of Lords select committee 
inquiry into citizenship and civic 
engagement,181 MEND noted that one of 
the greatest barriers faced by Muslim 
communities was felt to be a toxic 
atmosphere of hatred that is fuelled and 
maintained by the moral panic whipped 
up print and online media. 
Indeed, studies have shown that, with 21 
negative references to Muslims within 
British media output for every single 
neutral or positive reference,182  the media 
plays an integral role in spreading 
prejudice, stereotypes and xenophobic 
views of vulnerable groups, including 
those portraying British Muslims as being 
backwards and illiberal. These negative 
representations of Muslims are incredibly 
important for community cohesion and the 
subsequent ability of British Muslims to 
fully participate and engage as equal 
members of society. 
The consequences of misrepresentation on 
public understanding 
In the fast-paced world we live in, the 
majority of the public lacks the time and 
resources to go out of their way to fully 
research, critically analyse, and evaluate 
every article they read. Therefore, the 
repetitive negative misrepresentation of a 
particular community by newspapers 
inevitably results in distorted 
understandings and, ultimately, the 
fostering of prejudices.  
Indeed, a number of polls have shown that 
the British public in general are quite ill-
informed about the Islamic faith and 
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Muslims and derive much of their 
information from the media. A YouGov 
poll conducted in 2018 by the Muslim 
Council of Britain (MCB) found that of the 
1,629 Britons surveyed, 90% had not been 
inside a mosque, in recent years.183 
Another poll conducted by YouGov in 2002 
found that of the Britons surveyed, 74% 
knew “nothing or next to nothing about 
Islam” and 64% stated that what they did 
know was “acquired through the 
media”.184  
Considering the overly negative 
representation of minorities and British 
Muslims within the British press (which 
will be discussed further below), the 
media’s monopoly on public 
understanding has detrimental impacts 
which are acutely felt by minority social, 
ethnic and religious communities, and 
Muslims in particular.  
Evidence of Islamophobia in the British 
press 
The prevalence of Islamophobia within the 
British press has been highlighted by 
several studies, including that of Paul 
Baker, Tony McEnery, and Costas 
Gabrielatos.185 In conducting a discourse 
analysis on over 200,000 newspaper 
articles from 11 newspapers mentioning 
“Islam” or “Muslims”, this study 
highlighted the frequency with which 
Muslims and Islam were associated with 
conflict, with “Islam” and “terror” co-
occurring in more than one-third (37.9%) of 
the texts analysed. This led to the authors 
concluding that, “[the] most salient finding 
is that the British Press most frequently 
positions Islam and Muslims in stories or 
contexts that relate to conflict”.  
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Similarly, another study by Cardiff 
University186 found that the bulk of 
coverage on British Muslims was focussed 
on “Muslims as a threat (in relation to 
terrorism), a problem (in terms of 
differences in values) or both (Muslim 
extremism in general)”. The study noted 
that in more than a quarter of the articles 
investigated, Islam was posed as being 
“dangerous, backward or irrational” and 
being in contrast to British Values.  
This securitisation of Muslim identities 
will be further discussed in the later 
chapter on Securitising Muslim Identities: 
Security and Counter-Terror. 
Studies have also demonstrated that 
within media discourse, Muslim men and 
women are consistently presented as 
homogenous and unitary groups to fit a 
particular narrative that portrays the 
former as misogynistic, angry and violent 
extremists and the latter as passive, 
oppressed victims. Referring once again to 
the study conducted by Baker, McEnery 
and Gabrielatos,187 the authors made a 
number of interesting observations on the 
portrayal of Muslim women in the media. 
They found that the veil was the most 
frequent topic that was directly associated 
with Muslim women, with a total of 9,681 
references to the word veil. According to 
the data, the most frequent construction is 
of Muslim women being forced to wear the 
veil. Issues surrounding Muslim women 
and veiling practices will be further 
discussed later in a chapter on Public 
Exclusion, Integration, and Minority 
Rights. 
During the Salman Rushdie affair of the 
late 1980’s, Muslim men acquired the 
image of violent, book burning youths 
rioting on Britain’s streets. This 
representation has since been fuelled by 
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the high-profile terrorist attacks of Al-
Qaeda, the ensuing “war on terror”, and 
more recently, the threat of ISIS. As such, 
there has been a marked popular 
fascination with - and fear of - media 
representations of “angry”, 
“fundamentalist” and “dangerous” 
Muslim masculinities. Examples of 
Muslim masculinity has thus centred on 
figures such as Saddam Hussain, Osama 
Bin Laden, Abu Hamza, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and 
Mohammed Emwazi. As Louise Archer 
observed in the early 2000s, “Balanced and 
positive images of ‘normal’ Muslim 
masculinity appear to be rather thin on the 
ground.”188 Nearly two decades later, this 
situation has made little - if any - progress.   
This media negativity creates a hostile 
image of British Muslims and minorities, 
thus sowing Islamophobia, xenophobia, 
and racism into the milieu of British 
society. Notable tabloid publications that 
have thus developed an infamous 
reputation for publishing controversial, 
xenophobic and Islamophobic stories 
including The Sun and The Daily Mail; 
both being singled out for criticism by 
name by the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI).189  
The ECRI accused the Daily Mail, of 
playing a “prominent role in encouraging 
prejudice” against vulnerable groups, 
whilst also reporting that both the Daily 
Mail and the Sun “are responsible for most 
of the offensive, discriminatory and 
provocative terminology”. Concluding 
that “hate speech in some traditional 
media continues to be a serious 
problem”,190 the report highlighted articles 
such as the Sun’s “Rescue boats? I’d use 
gunships to stop migrants”, in which the 
columnist, Katie Hopkins, likened 
migrants to cockroaches, and also 
189 “ECRI Report On The United Kingdom”, Council of Europe, October 4, 2016, accessed 
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highlighted The Sun’s front-page headline 
“1 in 5 Brit Muslims’ sympathy for jihadis” 
which was subsequently found to be 
wholly inaccurate and a forced retraction 
and apology was issued. Furthermore, in 
2017, the Daily Mail was banned as a 
reliable source on Wikipedia due to its 
“reputation for poor fact checking and 
sensationalism”.191 
Highlighting the role of certain elements of 
the British press in fuelling moral panic, 
the United Nations Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR) pointed to the disturbing 
journalism of the Sun and the Daily Mail, 
arguing that, “The two right wing tabloids 
in our sample, the Daily Mail and Sun, 
were unlike anything else in our study… 
what really differentiated these two titles 
was their aggressive editorialising around 
threat themes, and in particular how they 
presented refugee and migrants as a 
burden on Britain’s welfare state. Both 
papers also featured humanitarian themes 
at a much lower level than any other 
newspapers in our study. Overall, this 
meant that the Sun and the Daily Mail 
exhibited both a hostility, and a lack of 
empathy with refugees and migrants that 
was unique.”192 
However, the Sun and the Daily Mail are 
reflective of a wider problem. Indeed, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, 
drew similar conclusions in 2015, when he 
noted that “decades of sustained and 
unrestrained anti-foreigner abuse, 
misinformation and distortion” were 
identified as a major problem in British 
press. He called on all European countries 
to take a firmer line on racism and 
xenophobia which “under the guise of 
freedom of expression, are being allowed 
to feed a vicious cycle of vilification, 
intolerance and politicization of migrants, 
as well as of marginalized European 
minorities”. 
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The impacts of media negativity on 
Muslim communities 
MEND’s definition of Islamophobia 
focusses on processes that work 
(intentionally or otherwise) to exclude 
Muslims from enjoying the freedoms and 
rights that come with full participation in 
all spheres of public life. As such, the 
impact of Islamophobic narratives within 
the media needs to be fully examined. 
Firstly, the level of bias, misinformation 
and distortion within reporting on British 
Muslims has fostered a sense of distrust in 
the media institutions amongst parts of the 
Muslim community, and for many 
individuals, has led to a disengagement 
from traditional media. This further 
compounds a lack of understanding of 
Muslim communities within the media as 
suspicion creates an unwillingness to 
engage even with journalists who do 
genuinely wish to honestly represent a 
nuanced understanding. Thus, even 
genuine journalists are deprived of the 
opportunity to represent diverse 
experiences.  
Secondly, this Muslim disengagement is 
often accompanied by a sense of 
frustration and insecurity with regards to 
their perceived place and value in society. 
Thus, a sense of a lack of social value 
develops in reaction to accusations of 
Muslim incompatibility with a national 
identity.  
Finally, the culmination of distorted 
images and the ultimate impact on public 
understanding of Muslims and Islam can 
only lead to severe damage to the 
relationships between Muslims and wider 
communities. Such misunderstanding has 
a variety of consequences, including, but 
not limited to: 
Hate crime: The Home Affairs Select 
Committee on Hate Crime and its Violent 
Consequences has specifically looked into 
192 “Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU: A Content Analysis 
of Five European Countries”, UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), accessed 20.12.2017, 
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the impact of media representation of 
minority communities and hate crime 
levels, recognising the unambiguous link. 
Rt Hon Baroness Warsi of Dewsbury, 
giving evidence on the impact of media 
representation on hate crime, noted “There 
is evidence to show that this does play into 
the way people react on the street, the kind 
of things people quote back when they 
engage in hate crime”.193 
Discrimination: As a later chapter on 
economic exclusion will demonstrate, 
stereotypes of Muslims and resulting 
workplace discrimination has a vastly 
detrimental impact to Muslims ability to 
fully realise their potential in the labour 
market. 
Marginalisation: As our previous 
discussion on moral panic suggests, the 
fuelling of public misunderstanding of 
Muslims often culminates in calls for 
restrictions, punitive laws, and the 
curtailment of their civil liberties and 
freedoms.194 This can readily be seen in 
issues surrounding areas such as 
integration and security, both of which are 
discussed later in this report. 
Lack of accountability and protection 
With the aforementioned negativity and 
damaging impact on British Muslims and 
minorities, it is worthwhile to briefly 
examine the role of regulation in 
upholding accountability and protecting 
minorities from press abuses. 
The Leveson Inquiry 
In July 2011, following revelations about 
phone hacking and other illegal practices 
committed by News of The World, the 
Leveson Inquiry was established to look 
into the culture, practices and ethics of the 
press. During the course of the inquiry, it 
became evident that hacking had occurred 
at various Mirror Group titles, and that 
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data breaches occurred at a number of 
other titles. 
Amongst other findings, Sir Brian Leveson 
concluded that the existing Press 
Complaints Commission (PCC) was unfit 
for purpose and complaints about the 
press were not being taken seriously 
enough. Meanwhile, even when an 
apology was agreed, newspapers pursued 
their own vengeance through "high-volume, 
extremely personal attacks on those who 
challenge them".195 As such, Leveson 
recommended the establishment of a new 
regulatory body to hold the media to 
account which was independent and free 
from both government and press influence. 
He further stated that this regulator must 
have the following: 
A group complaints position. Under the 
current regulator (which is now IPSO), 
only the individual affected by a published 
story can make a complaint about 
discrimination. In practice, this means that 
there is no protection against whole groups 
– such as Muslims or refugees – being 
demonised or stereotyped. Furthermore, in 
respect to accuracy and other code-
breaches, the individual most-closely 
affected must bring the complaint. This 
means that a person cannot defend 
themselves against inaccurate reporting if 
they are in a coma, for example. Leveson 
recommended resolutions to these 
deficiencies. 
The power to sufficiently remedy 
breaches to the editors’ codes of practice 
and enforce sanctions where necessary. 
He recommended that the new regulator 
should have the power to decide on the 
placement and size of corrections, settled 
by an independent board, the power to 
require apologies to be published, and the 
power to fine newspapers up to £1m. 
A whistle-blower hotline: Leveson further 
recommended that a whistle-blowing 
194 Richardson, “Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism…” 
195 Ibid. 
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hotline should be established for 
journalists who feel under pressure to do 
unethical things or to otherwise act against 
the editors’ code.  
IPSO failings   
Despite Leveson’s recommendations, the 
regulator which arose to replace the PCC 
was the Independent Press Standards 
Organisation (IPSO). IPSO fails to be 
Leveson-compliant and routinely fails to 
investigate articles, fails to demonstrate 
adequate professionalism in dealing with 
complaints, and fails to impose 
punishments that are proportionate to the 
significance of the story contested.  
Pointless remedies: the corrections 
demanded by IPSO for breaches in the 
Editors’ Code of Practice are typically 
severely delayed and far less prominent 
than the original inaccuracy. This is 
especially so where the whole story is false, 
or the headline is part of the breach. A case 
in point is that IPSO has never ordered a 
front-page correction for a front-page 
breach. Therefore, there is no real 
consequence for publishers who publish 
what is effectively “fake news”.  
An example of this can be found in IPSO’s 
dealing with The Sun in 2015. In November 
2015, The Sun published a front-page story 
with the misleading and inflammatory 
headline ‘1 in 5 Brit Muslims’ sympathy for 
jihadis’. This article was run 10 days after 
the Bataclan terrorist attack, during a time 
when British and European Muslims were 
experiencing increased anti-Muslim 
suspicion and hostility. The Sun’s article 
did not accurately report on the poll that it 
cited. The actual poll asked individuals 
whether they had sympathy with “young 
Muslims who leave the UK to join fighters 
in Syria”. The Sun’s reporting failed to 
point out that “sympathy” is not the same 
thing as “support” or “agreement” and 
that not all fighters in Syria are jihadis. The 
polling company itself stated, “Survation 
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do not support or endorse the way in 
which the poll’s findings have been 
interpreted.”196 Four months after 
complaints were lodged to IPSO, they 
required the publication to print a short 
piece buried on page 2 with the vague title 
“Ipso ruling upheld”, in which the nature 
of the complaint was obscured. Given the 
misleading and deeply damaging impact 
of the original headline, a more 
appropriate response would have been for 
IPSO to require a prompt front-page 
correction in The Sun. The failure to give 
the correction equal prominence in a 
timely fashion did nothing to limit the 
damage that this piece of fake news had 
already done. 
Inaction: IPSO frequently fails to act upon 
complaints in a way that seems to defy 
both common sense and their duty to 
regulation. Indeed, in February, the Home 
Affairs Committee inquiry into hate crime 
and its violent consequences heard 
evidence that since IPSO’s inception it had 
received around 18,666 complaints on 
claims of discrimination, of which only 7 
have been upheld as being a breach of 
IPSO’s Editors’ Code of Practice.197 
By way of example, in August 2017, the 
Times printed a story headlined “Christian 
child forced into Muslim foster care”. The 
article made a number of misleading 
statements and provided an inaccurate 
account of the situation. For example, the 
article falsely claimed that the child was 
fostered by a family who “don’t speak 
English”, while the London Borough of 
Tower Hamlets stated that the child was 
fostered by an “English-speaking family of 
mixed race in this temporary placement”. 
In response, MEND submitted eight 
individual concerns to ISPO regarding the 
inaccurate and distorted content of the 
article under Clause 1 (Accuracy) of the 
Editors’ Code. IPSO stated that it would 
not investigate any of these complaints due 
to its concern about the effect investigating 
197 “Oral Evidence: Hate crime and its violent consequences…” 
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the facts of the case would have on the 
child. This justification for refusal to 
investigate is unreasonable, given that the 
Times had already published stories on the 
subject, and given the extensive wider 
public debate that had subsequently 
occurred. For IPSO, taking no action to 
verify the information published is an 
abdication of its responsibility and 
demonstrates inadequate commitment to 
upholding press standards and ethics.  
Lack of impartiality: This is an issue that is 
well highlighted in the case of Fatima 
Manji. In July 2016, Fatima Manji reported 
on the Nice terror attacks for Channel Four. 
In response, Kelvin MacKenzie wrote a 
piece in the Sun attacking Channel Four for 
having a Muslim woman wearing hijab 
while reporting on a terrorist incident. 
When Manji and ITN filed an IPSO 
complaint on the basis of discrimination, 
harassment, and inaccuracy, IPSO rejected 
the complaint,198 stating that MacKenzie’s 
comment that Islam “was clearly a violent 
religion” was his opinion and could not, 
therefore, be deemed inaccurate. 
Furthermore, IPSO board member, Trevor 
Kavanagh, publicly defended MacKenzie 
and stated that Manji had “made a fool of 
herself.”199 A cross-party group of MPs and 
peers subsequently wrote to IPSO, 
expressing concern that Kavanagh made 
these comments while sitting on the 
regulator’s board. IPSO responded that 
while Kavanagh sits on its board, he is not 
a member of the Complaints Committee 
that passes judgements and therefore “has 
no involvement in any rulings made by 
IPSO. The views expressed by Mr 
Kavanagh in his column following the 
IPSO ruling on Manji v The Sun were made 
in a personal capacity and do not represent 
the view of IPSO”.200 This response from 
IPSO brings into question its ability to 
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function as a genuinely independent and 
effective regulatory body.  
Leveson and the Government’s 
failure to keep its promises to the 
victims of press abuse 
Nathan Sparkes 
Hacked Off Campaign 
The Leveson Inquiry was established 
following revelations of widespread 
illegality at the News of the World, and 
since the report of Part One of the Inquiry, 
it has been revealed that the criminality 
included other newspaper groups. 
But the inquiry exposed another scandal 
altogether: a breakdown in ethical 
standards, and a total absence of regulation 
across the British press. 
So the Leveson Inquiry was about much 
more than illegality. It was also about 
coverage and newsgathering activities 
which are not illegal, and which no one is 
campaigning to make illegal, but which 
nonetheless are abusive, unethical, 
damaging to the public interest and which 
rightfully require remedy. 
A leading example of this unethical 
conduct is the treatment of Muslims by 
some elements of the press. This consists of 
pejorative or abusive coverage based on 
race or religion, often combined with 
deliberate or reckless inaccuracy which 
goes wholly or mostly uncorrected. 
Accuracy 
Firstly, while innocent errors are made by 
journalists all the time (and no one is 
suggesting sanctions for every occasion 
some minor detail is misreported), where 
damaging inaccuracies are deliberate or 
reckless the fact of a standards breach must 
be recorded, and there ought to be 
consequences – whether that is steps taken 
https://www.thesn.co.uk/news/2035066/gary-lineker-forgets-that-were-not-racist-
we-just-dont-like-being-conned/ 




to root out malice and incompetence, or 
educating those making editorial 
decisions.  
Secondly, where inaccuracies or 
distortions are significant, they should be 
corrected with equivalent prominence and 
apologised for where appropriate.  
Thirdly, when distortions, lies, 
misrepresentations or avoidable errors 
cause harm to a specific group of people, 
such as Muslims, then investigations 
should be initiated to address the systemic 
breaches of ethical standards. 
Discrimination 
The Standards Code covering newspapers 
needs to protect vulnerable groups from 
newspaper coverage which is equivalent to 
hate speech. The Code itself should be the 
responsibility of an independent regulator 
which is capable of crafting a rule that 
balances freedom to criticise ideas 
(including religions) and groups of people 
where there is a legitimate public interest 
(such as members of organisations which 
promote violent extremism), with the need 
for vulnerable groups to be protected from 
hate speech and discrimination.  
Leveson recommended that an 
independent regulator be established for 
the press, which has; 
 The power to require published 
apologies, 
 Sufficient independence to order 
published corrections of equivalent 
prominence to the original breach, 
 The ability to mount investigations 
where breaches of the regulator’s code 
are serious or systemic,  
 And control of the Code, so that it can 
be amended to meet the public interest 
(for example in protecting vulnerable 
groups from hate speech). 
But most newspapers have rejected 
Leveson’s recommendations, and instead 
joined the industry body IPSO, which fails 
Leveson’s tests and does none of the above. 
Lacking the necessary powers and 
independence, IPSO has never ordered an 
equivalent prominence frontpage 
correction against a national title.  It has no 
power to require published apologies.  
Whereas Leveson insists that regulators 
have the power to launch investigations 
where code breaches are serious or 
systemic, IPSO allows them only where 
breaches are both serious and systemic, 
and it has never launched a single 
investigation in its four-year existence. 
In terms of discriminatory and hateful 
articles, IPSO’s rules and record are even 
worse. 
Lumbered with an ethics code which it 
does not write – a code which instead is 
written almost exclusively by newspaper 
editors – IPSO is prevented from applying 
the discrimination clause in the code to 
groups of people. The effect is that an 
article which discriminates or is pejorative 
against an individual is subject to the code, 
yet an article which smears and abuses an 
entire group, such as Muslims, is not 
covered by the Code. 
While there may be some cases where it is 
a close judgment between prejudicial and 
offensive coverage which may offend, but 
is justifiable in the public interest, and that 
which is not, there should be an 
independent regulator able to make that 
judgement as Leveson recommended. 
For example, in August 2017 Trevor 
Kavanagh used the phrase “The Muslim 
Problem” in an article linking Muslims 
with child abuse.  A clear reference to 
rhetoric used by the Nazi Party about 
Jewish people, this was not only offensive, 
it was abusive and discriminatory and 
should clearly have been subject to 
regulatory sanction. 
Yet IPSO refused to uphold any complaint. 
It could do nothing because it is subject to 
a Code written by a group of editors who 
have always refused to outlaw 
unjustifiable hate speech, while IPSO itself 
has not been sufficiently independent to 
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request a change in the Code (this is not 
surprising as Kavanagh was on the board 
of IPSO at the time). 
When the Leveson Inquiry was 
established, the Prime Minister of the time, 
David Cameron, promised to victims of 
press abuse, Parliament, and the public 
that reform would come.  Yet six years on, 
most newspapers are members of the same 
complaints-handler as before the Inquiry 
began, albeit having been renamed. An 
absence of regulation for newspapers 
persists. 
The consequences of this are not abstract or 
hypothetical. They are felt profoundly both 
by individuals who are targeted by the 
press, and by groups who suffer daily 
hostility from a powerful and 
unaccountable industry. 
Instead of standing up to the press, this 
Government has conspired with press 
owners and executives to block reform. In 
a craven act of cover-up and supplication, 
the Government has cancelled the second 
half of the Leveson Inquiry, which - in 
addition to investigating the illegality 
which gave rise to Part One of the Inquiry 
and has emerged since – could have 
investigated the rise of Islamophobic press 
coverage. 
The Government and press editors and 
executives should, in a democracy, be the 
worst of enemies. But on press regulation, 
they have operated in partnership to 
prevent reform at the expense of the public 
interest. 
To protect the public, and to support 
working journalists – who can only benefit 
from the Leveson reforms – the 
Government should implement the 
Leveson recommendations and begin Part 
Two of the Inquiry immediately. 
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Media broadcasting is crucial in nurturing 
a nation’s sense of shared identity, history, 
and social norms. It is the mirror though 
which the nation recognises and 
continually evaluates itself. With the 
consequent potential for societal cohesive 
benefit being so tremendous and indelible, 
it is essential that we construct, develop 
and maintain popular images that are 
inclusive of our highly diverse and 
multicultural nation. The lack of inclusive 
images because of a lack of minority 
representation results in a vision which 
neglects segments of society and thus 
alienates and marginalises minority 
communities. The problem is exacerbated 
with the few BAME actors who do manage 
to break through the barriers being cast in 
stereotypical roles, with the BFI Creative 
Director, Heather Stewart, noting in 2016 
that the “types of films in which they 
[BAME actors] have had leading roles 
suggests stereotyping. Colour-blind 
casting across genres does not really exist 
on the big screen…”201 Therefore, the 
simultaneous absence of minority 
representation and normalised images of 
minority communities means there is a 
persistent development of a broadcast 
narrative which at worst excludes and at 
best stereotypes minority communities.  
One historical example of this is the 
blockbuster 2017 film Dunkirk, “that told 
the story of the mass evacuation of Allied 
soldiers in World War II, contained no non-
white actors. It has thus been criticised for 
whitewashing the brave contribution of 
Muslim and black soldiers”.202 
Various studies have shown that there is a 
considerable lack of minority 
representation in the British film industry, 
with high levels of discrimination 
experienced by BAME individuals 
attempting to enter the industry and those 
202 Robert Fisk, “When you watch Dunkirk, remember that it’s a whitewashed version 
which ignores the bravery of black and Muslim soldiers”, The Independent, August 3, 
2017, accessed 20.06.2018, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/dunkirk-france-
1940-french-soldiers-algeria-commonwealth-white-wash-a7874501.html 
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within the industry. One study concerned 
with diversity within the British film 
industry and conducted by the CAMEo 
Research Institute at the University of 
Leicester,203 found that BAME workers 
comprised 4.4% of the broadcasting 
workforce, compared to 13% of the UK 
population. This figure was even lower 
when considering BAME directors which 
was limited to 3.5%. Another study, by 
Grugulis & Stoyanova (2012), found that 
“members of ethnic minorities or working 
class were less likely to secure jobs and 
were often restricted in the jobs they 
held”.204 Numerous other studies 
corroborate these findings, giving rise to 
the conclusion that BAME individuals are 
heavily underrepresented, restricted to 
particular jobs and denied progression 
within the field.  
These findings are paralleled in studies 
which have investigated minority 
representation in the television industry, 
with significant concern arising from the 
failure of broadcasters to adequately 
monitor the diversity of their workforce. A 
study by Ofcom, the UK’s communication 
regulator, found that broadcasters 
surveyed were only able to provide 
ethnicity data on 81% of the industry’s 
employees and religious data for only 33% 
of employees.205 As there is a considerable 
lack of data monitoring on the contribution 
of minorities within the field, it is difficult 
to accurately analyse the diversity of the 
industry. Perhaps the only firm judgement 
one can make is that the procedures 
through which broadcasters are currently 
organising and collating data on diversity 
and minority representation are 
thoroughly inadequate. That said, there is 
still ample evidence to suggest that BAME 
groups are under-represented at particular 
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levels within the TV industry. The study by 
Directors UK (2015), noted that of the 
programmes sampled at the time only 1.5% 
were made by a BAME director.206 
Furthermore, the study also added that 
“analysis at sub-genre level revealed there 
are a number of areas where 0% of 
episodes have been made by a BAME 
director”. This included genres such as 
sketch shows, children’s comedy, reality, 
and period drama, amongst others. 
Therefore, the question is not one of 
whether or not there is a problem, rather, it 
is an issue of how it is being monitored, 
investigated and tackled.   
A study conducted from 2006-2016 found 
that of the British films produced in the 
period nearly 60% failed to cast a single 
Black actor.207 In 2014, a number of British 
BAME actors and writers who had left the 
UK for international markets wrote an 
open letter to the heads of the British TV 
industry calling for greater diversity, with 
signatories including the likes of Idris Elba 
and David Oyelowo, who had travelled to 
the US to make their major breaks.208   
An excellent analysis of this lack of 
diversity has been produced by Campion 
who explores the reasons behind it based 
on interviews with over 100 media 
professionals and her own extensive 
experience in the industry. She argues that 
there are many factors underpinning the 
lack of cultural diversity in this area, 
including conservative commissioners 
leading to “safe” conservative 
commissioning and a lack of BAME faces 
at a senior level, especially in senior 
creative and editorial roles. She cites 
challenges at recruiting and then retaining 
talented BAME professionals, and the 
problem of them leaving due to 
206 “UK Television Adjusting the Colour Balance: Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic 
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disillusionment, especially in large 
traditional organisations such as the BBC. 
The solution to the problems, she argues, 
lies in embedding the concept of “cultural 
intelligence”, which is defined as a “way of 
valuing diverse cultural knowledge and 
experience in programme-making”, and 
which includes sensitive and intelligent the 
portrayal of marginalised groups, 
reflecting “authentic voices” from those 
groups, helping to understand others and 
therefore ourselves.  
She states that cultural intelligence needs 
to be built into each stage of programme 
making, including commissioning, 
production, scheduling, and promotion. 
She also advocates the use of cultural 
intelligence master classes to promote such 
a dialogue and instil change.209  
Taking into account the lack of minority 
representation in the industry, the problem 
of minority representation is worsened 
further by type-casting of BAME actors to 
stereotypical roles. Research conducted by 
BFI between 2006 and 2016 found that 
Black actors were highly unlikely to be 
casted into lead roles of dramas (255 out of 
387 films failing to cast any black actor, 
66%), comedies (178 out of 287, 62%) or 
thrillers (100 out of 169, 59%), but were 
very likely to be cast as lead in crime films 
(69 out of 107 films featured black actors, 
65%), fantasy (24 out of 39, 61%) and 
musicals (8 out of 15, 53%).210 The study 
stated that the most frequent themes of the 
productions in which Black actors were 
featured included “slavery, racism, 
colonialism, crime and gangs” and noted 
that this “suggests a pattern in which black 
actors are being cast mainly in 
stereotypical stories”. Another study by 
Sam Friedman and Dave O’Brien found 
that there was an “oversupply of leading 
roles for white, male, middle-class actors” 
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and BAME actors were restricted to 
“largely socially caricatured roles”.211 
Though it may be tempting to treat these 
figures as abstract and inconsequential to 
society, there is significant evidence 
highlighting the very tangible impact of 
the underrepresentation of minorities and 
the systemic inequalities prevalent in 
broadcast media. Repercussions of 
underrepresentation include the 
disenfranchisement of viewers from 
minority communities and the departure 
of actors from minority backgrounds to 
international markets.  
Research conducted by Webber, a 
specialist research and insight consultancy, 
in 2016212 found that audiences from 
minority communities were generally less 
likely to watch major TV channels 
compared to the general population, with 
the gap increasing if the particular channel 
demonstrates lower levels of on-screen 
diversity. The study found that BAME 
audiences were 14.1% less likely to watch 
BBC One’s News at Six compared to all 
individuals investigated and were 2.4% 
more likely to watch Channel Four’s News 
at Five compared to all individuals 
investigated. The difference between the 
two news channels being that the latter has 
introduced a number of BAME reporters 
including: Fatima Manji, Symeon Brown, 
Keme Nzerem, Jamal Osman, Assed Baig, 
as well as others.  
These restricted roles available to BAME 
actors which represent highly varied 
minority communities means that harmful 
and prevalent stereotypes bias the way 
society perceives these communities and 
how the community members perceive 
themselves. In 2011, a study, “Media 
Representations and Impact on the Lives of 
211 Sam Friedman and Dave O’Brien, “Resistance and resignation: responses to 
typecasting in British acting”, Cultural Sociology, 2017, 11 (3), accessed 20.06.2018, 
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212 Trevor Phillips, “British media: not quite black and white”, Open Democracy, March 
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phillips/british-tv-not-quite-black-and-white 
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Black Men and Boys”,213 looked into the 
impact of stereotypical roles of Black males 
on “their actual life chances”. The results 
demonstrated that the portrayals 
reinforced general antagonism towards 
Black males, reduced attention to 
structural and other big-picture factors, 
and exaggerated views related to 
criminality and violence associated with 
BAME communities. They further noted 
that the images resulted in BAME 
community members being “demoralised” 
and having “reduce[d] self-esteem”.  
Abstract from Riz Ahmed’s 
speech at Channel 4’s annual 
diversity lecture in Parliament214 
Now, as a lot of the politicians in the room 
might know, it’s sometimes the most 
fantastical and unrealistic stories that make 
the biggest impact. But even in those 
stories, what people are looking for is a 
message that they belong; they’re part of 
something; that they are seen and heard 
and that despite – or perhaps because – of 
the uniqueness of their experience they are 
valued.  
They want to feel represented. 
That’s really what we do, that’s what we 
have in common, that’s the game we’re in. 
We’re here to represent. It’s that simple. 
And in that task, it pains me to say we have 
failed.  
It’s been a noble failure, we’ve been taking 
large strides in the right direction, 
sometimes a bit slower than we’d like, 
sometimes a bit too incremental, 
sometimes not really seizing the bull by its 
horn but we have fallen short of the mark 
and when we fail to represent people 
switch off. They switch off on telly, they 
switch off at the ballot box and they retreat 
to other fringe narratives which are 
sometimes very dangerous.  
                                                     
213 “Media Representations and Impact on the Lives of Black Men and Boys”, The 
Opportunity Agenda, October 2011, accessed 20.06.2018, 
Now everywhere the old order is in flames, 
right? Whether in film and television with 
the advent of streaming and a globalised 
marketplace or whether at the ballot box 
with the ascendance of populism, some 
people like to call it.  
…We’re in search of a new national story. 
It needs updating. The old one stopped 
making sense to people, it stopped giving 
meaning to the complex reality and the 
new realities that they’re facing and I’m 
here to ask for your help. I’m here to ask 
for your help in finding a new national 
story that embraces and empowers as 
many of us as possible rather than 
excluding us and alienation large sections 
of the population. In this, like it or not, we 
need each other. 
Now, what’s at stake? I just want to take a 
moment to kind of reframe what we’re 
talking about. What’s at stake here, I mean, 
in this age of populism it can sometimes 
seem like talking about diversity is kind of 
swimming against the current, going 
against the grain, “is political correctness 
gone mad?” and all that kind of thing, 
right? 
It’s an added extra, it’s a frill, it’s a luxury. 
That’s what diversity can sound like. The 
very phrase actually turns me off a little bit. 
It sounds like there’s a call, a benchmark, 
against which everything is measured and 
then there’s a little bit of something you 
could sprinkle on top. A little bit of salt, a 
little bit of spice…it’s something you can 
live with, but you can also live without. 
And to me that really doesn’t put into focus 
how crucial what we are talking about 
really is.  
We’re talking about representation, not 
diversity. Representation is not an added 
extra. It’s not a thrill. It’s absolutely 
fundamental to what people expect from 
culture and from politics.  
http://racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/Media-Impact-onLives-of-Black-Men-
and-Boys-OppAgenda.pdf 
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What’s at stake isn’t just whether or not I 
get the next acting role I want (although 
that would be nice). Audience member asks 
“what do you want?”. Oh, it’d be nice to 
have a Star Wars prequel, actually.  
What’s really at stake here is much, much 
bigger than that.  
After the Brexit vote hate crimes went up 
41%, against Muslims it went up 326%. In 
the 1930s we had a very similar situation to 
what we have today: political polarization, 
economic disenfranchisement after a big 
financial crash, rising inequality, 
systematic scapegoating of certain 
minorities. 
What’s at stake here is whether or not we 
will move forward together or whether we 
will leave people behind. That’s what’s at 
stake if we don’t step up and represent.  
Now if we fail to represent, I think we’re in 
danger of losing out in three ways, the 
three Es:  
 One we’re going to lost people to 
extremism. 
 Second, we’re going to lose out on an 
expansive idea of who we are as 
individuals and as a community. 
 And thirdly, we’re going to really lose 
out on the economic benefits that 
proper representation can bring to our 
economy.  
Let me just start off this first point of 
extremism. I remember when, my mum 
and sister are here right now; I remember 
when they’d be watching TV downstairs in 
the lounge and I’d be upstairs you know, 
playing my Gameboy or whatever and all 
of a sudden, I’d hear one of them call out 
and they’re watching TV: “Asiaaaaan!”  
And you quickly press pause on the 
Gameboy, turn it off and run downstairs 
just to go and look: Sanjeev Bhaskar in 
Goodness Gracious Me; Meera Syal, Bhaji 
on the Beach; Parminder Nagra, Bend it 
like Beckham; Jimi Mistry, “East is East”. If 
you’re used to seeing yourself reflected in 
culture, you really…I really want you to 
just take a minute to kind of understand 
how much it means to someone who 
doesn’t, to see themselves reflected back.  
Every time you see yourself in a magazine, 
in a billboard, TV, film, it’s a message that 
you matter, you’re part of a national story, 
that you’re valued, you feel represented.  
Now if we fail to represent people in our 
mainstream narratives, they’ll switch off, 
they’ll retreat to fringe narratives to filter 
bubbles online and sometimes, even off to 
Syria. In the mind of the ISIS recruit, he’s a 
version of James Bond, right? In their 
mind, everyone thinks they’re the good 
guy. Have you seen some of these ISIS 
propaganda videos? They’re cut like action 
movies. Where’s the counter narrative? 
Where are we telling these kids that they 
can be heroes in our stories? That they’re 
valued?  
I saw an interesting survey recently. It was 
a Gallup poll, it was a survey of a billion 
Muslims, and it took years and years to get 
done. I’m citing Dalia Mogahed here. And 
it was really interesting, they asked a 
billion Muslims what are their key 
grievances with the “West”. I’ve problems 
with that term, but what are the Key 
grievances? And number one… the 
disconnect between the West-stated values 
and their foreign policy. We’ll talk about 
that another day (if you’d invite me back). 
But number two on the list of grievances 
was the depiction of Muslims in the media.  
I mean that’s massive. I mean, of a billion 
Muslims in the world that is a number two 
grievance. 
This isn’t just a signal to give me more 
acting work. It’s something that should 
give us pause and realise how important it 
is to feel represented. 
Now that’s extremism, it’s not just 
important to show people themselves and 
to send a signal that they are valued and 
worthwhile and represented. It’s also 
really important, I think, to show people 
characters and stories that don’t resemble 
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them at all. If we don’t, we lose out on the 
second E, an expansive idea of who we are.  
…The power of stories to allow us to relate 
to stories that don’t resemble our own is 
phenomenal and every time we see those 
experiences, it reminds us than what unites 
us is far, far greater than what divides us.  
Culture is a place where you can put 
yourself in someone else’s shoes; and a 
one-size shoe shop just doesn’t make any 
sense.  
…Just a quick aside – I think some of this is 
about history. Looking up at this beautiful 
painting over here I’m going to assume its 
World War One? World War One, maybe? 
Over a million Indians fought and died for 
Great Britain in World War One. No one 
ever told me that at school, we never 
learned about the British Empire, we never 
learned about whose blood, sweat, tears, 
hopes and fears are baked into the bricks in 
this building. If we did learn about that, 
maybe we wouldn’t think about diversity 
and throwing people crumbs out of 
politeness, maybe we’d think about giving 
people their due, and representing them.  
It was only recently that I learnt the first 
Indian MP was in the 1850s, the first black 
footballer was in the 1860s, Edward the 
Seventh had a black trumpeter, ironically 
named John Blanke, and actually even our 
England’s first border patrol force was a 
North African legion fighting for the 
Italian Roman army to keep the Scots on 
the other side of Hadrian’s Wall. So even 
our anti-immigration movement has been 
really multicultural for thousands of years. 
That’s how deep it goes, so we’re missing 
out, we’re losing people to extremism, 
we’re losing an expansive idea of who we 
are. But most importantly, given the Brexit 
bill we’re facing that we’ve got to pay, 
we’re losing out on money! 
We’re losing out on my taxes. I can tell you 
from my own experience anecdotally and 
David Oyelowo spoke about this recently 
at Black Star symposium, Idris spoke about 
this last year. We end up going to America 
to find work. I meet with producers here, 
meet with directors, I think they’re being 
honest when they say they want to work 
with me, but they say “we just don’t have 
anything for you, all our stories are set in 
Cornwall in the sixteen hundreds”.  
Never mind that Cornwall already had a 
really busy Indian takeaway at that point, 
you just don’t want to tell that story. But 
it’s weird because I mean, Asians are such 
a proportion of the population here, right? 
It’s such a small comparative proportion of 
the population in America ... And yet, it 
takes American remakes of British shows 
to cast someone like me.  
There was a report recently, I think that 
Ruby McGregor Smith turned in that Sajid 
Javid MP commissioned and it was about 
diversity in our economy as a whole. What 
it showed is that if black minority ethnic 
professional workers were afforded 
promotion at the same rate and with the 
same frequency as their white counterparts 
it could add 24 billion pounds to our 
economy each year. It’s not a zero-sum 
game, there’s room for everyone up there.  
And if you look at the box office, a study 
recently by the Bunche Foundation 
showed that the most diversely cast and 
made films are the ones that do best in the 
American box office. It just taps into 
different markets.  
…So those are the things we are missing 
out on if we fail to represent properly: 
we’re losing people to extremism, we’re 
losing out on an expansive idea of who we 
could be, and in the eyes of the world, and 
we’re losing out on the economic benefits. 
So how are we doing? 
We’ve heard some figures already, I’m not 
going to go into too much detail…I will say 
this: sometimes it’s very easy to look at the 
screen and go “oh look, things are 
changing so much…Look there’s Riz, 
there’s Idris, there’s Michaela Coel doing 
Chewing gum”. These examples are often 
prominent because they are the exception 
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that proves the rule. Prominent successes 
can mask structural problems.  
Obama was in the White House and you 
still needed the Black Lives Matter 
movement. I’m getting on a plane to LA to 
attend the Star Wars premiere and I still get 
that second search before I board the plane.  
By the way, if you’ve never had the 
experience of being asked for a selfie by 
someone who’s swabbing you for 
explosives…I’d recommend it. Really 
quite, quite thrilling. Do they love me? Do 
they hate me? Oooh not sure… 
Gains are hard won and we have to fight 
hard to keep them.  
Only 1-4.5% of directors of TV dramas are 
from black and minority ethnic 
backgrounds. For period drama which we 
love making so much of, and long may it 
continue, it’s good for our economy as 
well, the figure is 0%. So it completely 
shuts out form helping to shape our 
national narrative and the history of who 
we are.  
Meanwhile, the participation of people 
from private schools, such as myself, I got 
a government assisted place to attend a 
private school, is 14% when they’re 7% of 
the population.  
…if I look at my own journey two things 
jump out on me: one, we need to safeguard 
the opportunities and access to the creative 
industries amongst marginalised and 
underrepresented groups.  
Yes, this is about mentorship, it’s about 
skills, it’s about training.  
…We need to preserve the access and 
funding in community centres, we need to 
make sure that a hike in tuition fees doesn’t 
stop people from going to drama school 
and pursuing careers in the creative 
industries, otherwise we’ll all lose.  
Now, that’s the skills and training 
argument, but there’s another argument. 
The other argument is that actually we’ve 
got enough people who are skilled and 
well trained to hire, it’s just a hiring 
problem. A lot of people, I’m hearing this 
from a lot of people anecdotally, what I’ve 
seen, is actually this is the case. We all have 
unconscious bias. Ruby McGregor Smith’s 
report into our economy as a whole 
showed that unconscious bias is 
responsible for stopping career 
progression of minorities.  
Now we can train against unconscious bias 
or even better I propose, if you’ll humour 
me, tying public money to proper 
representation targets, so that decision-
making rooms, the rooms in which 
decisions are made are representative of 
our community, of our nation, and tell a 
story that represents us all. So that when 
everyone ends up exercising their 
unconscious bias, somewhere in the wash 
it works out being kind of representative. 
It just makes sense.  
Centre forwards are valued on how many 
goals the score, we are in the business of 
representation. If we don’t represent, 
you’ve got to go. It’s really that simple. 
That is what we’re here to do.  
I really think that Government has to step 
in. It’s only Government that’s going to 
have the long view and see the really, 
really big picture… People making 
television programmes often are trying to 
turn out a hit and worried about their jobs 
in a competitive industry. I get it. It’s only 
when government steps in to set the rules 
of the game that you will foster true 
innovation, the same way that you do in 
the arms industry, the same way you do 
when you support the Olympics and it 
brings a massive boom to how we’re seen 
around the world. They’ll thank you for it 
in the long run; you won’t be handcuffing 
them to anything, because what’s at stake 
here is whether or not we can move 
forward together. We’re really at a very 
critical moment in our nation’s history.  
We can feel it.  
If we don’t step up and tell a representative 
story, we’re going to start losing people, 
we’re going to start losing people to other 
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stories; we’re going to start losing British 
teenagers to the story that the next chapter 
in their lives is written with ISIS in Syria. 
We’re going to start losing MPs like Jo Cox, 
who are murdered in the street, because 
we’ve been sold a story that is so narrow 
about who we are and who we’ve been and 
who we should be…  
We’re at this critical moment, let’s not 
allow future generations to look back and 
judge us when centrifugal forces were 
threatening to tear us apart, because they 
really are. I can feel it, I know a lot of you 
can too.  
We need to step up decisively and act.  
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Racial and Religious 
Hate Crime 
Challenging times to be a 
Muslim 
Nazir Afzal, OBE  
Former Chief Prosecutor for North West 
England 
Not a day goes by without some overt 
show of anti-Muslim hatred in parts of our 
society. Whether it’s the conflating of the 
actions of one or more people who happen 
to be Muslims into a statement about all 
Muslims or somewhat sinister 
interpretations of Islamic culture and 
theology to generate fear or mistrust. Most 
often it’s in the day to day experience of 
Muslims and people who “look” like 
Muslims – which can be violence, abuse or 
discrimination. 
I look at my own experience. Nobody 
refers to me as the “Muslim” Pro-
Chancellor of Brunel University or Patron 
of several NGOs or Chair of an FE college, 
but contrast that with my influential 
decision-making roles such as Chief 
Prosecutor or Chief Executive of Police & 
Crime Commissioners, where the word 
“Muslim” is often pre-fixed in the media. 
Why is my faith relevant in some roles and 
not others? Why was I specifically targeted 
by Far-Right groups despite getting all the 
decisions right in the grooming gang cases 
and delivering justice when others failed 
to? Could it have anything to do with me 
damaging the Far-Right narrative, that all 
Muslims are the same? 
Despite the immense contributions of 
Muslims to civic life, to our economy, to 
our communities, there is a knee-jerk 
reaction to attack Muslims whenever 
possible and inconsistently, to rarely 
mention their faith when they’ve done 
good.  
Part of the problem is self-inflicted. There 
are issues with extremism, with perceived 
poor integration amongst some, with 
disproportionately being involved in drug 
crime, for example, which contributes 
heavily to the over-representation in 
prison. The Muslim communities are 
extraordinarily diverse but that also causes 
issues – in London, they come from more 
than 60 countries, whilst in the North they 
mostly come from two. Too often, the 
reluctance of community members to deal 
with these issues is because they feel it 
gives ammunition to the Muslim haters. 
That, in my view, is short-sighted – bigots 
don’t need an excuse to hate. 
The Hate Crime legislation does not help 
provide reassurance. Whilst Muslims are 
not considered a “race,” victims have to 
rely on religious hate crime laws that 
require a higher threshold of intent and 
harm before prosecutions can follow. Only 
violence and threats of violence trigger the 
incitement to religious hate offence and I 
remember meeting with a British National 
Party lawyer a decade ago who informed 
me that they knew where the line was and 
always pushed up to it. That’s continued 
with the advent of social media – though 
many haters don’t care about the line 
anymore and rely upon perceived 
anonymity, bots, and limited police 
resources to just keep generating hate. 
The noise is so loud that it radicalises the 
vulnerable far-right extremist but it also 
creates the atmosphere of grievance 
amongst many young Muslims that is 
often exploited by those who wish to 
radicalise them. Lose-Lose on both fronts. 
This country’s extraordinary tolerance and 
acceptance of diversity is our biggest 
weapon in minimising and ultimately 
eliminating hate.  
Hate Crime 
As MEND’s definition of Islamophobia 
goes to great pains to enunciate, 
Islamophobia is in no way limited to hate 
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crime. It does, in fact, infiltrate all realms of 
public, political and economic life, 
resulting in the exclusion and 
marginalisation of Muslim communities 
from enjoying the freedoms to which they 
are entitled. Having said that, hate crime is 
by no means an area that can be ignored. It 
is in many ways the most overt, visible, 
and undeniable symptom of the 
Islamophobia prevalent across certain 
segments of society. 
Over recent years, British Muslims have 
suffered from increasing levels of hate 
crime in conjunction with seemingly 
obsessive demonisation in the media and 
an increasing presence of online hate 
speech on social media platforms. 
This has culminated in Muslims being 
abused and assaulted in the street, being 
thrown into the path of oncoming trains, 
places of worship being vandalised by 
arson and brick attacks, and Muslims being 
deliberately run over by far-right terrorists. 
The statistics expose this increase in hate 
crime incidents. Islamophobic hate crimes 
recorded by the Metropolitan Police Force 
in London numbered 1,115 in 2015/16. The 
number of recorded incidents increased 
13% to 1,266 in 2016/17, while the most 
recent year has seen an even larger increase 
of 32%. 1,665 Islamophobic hate crimes 
were recorded in London in 2017/18, 
meaning that Islamophobic hate crimes in 
the capital have risen 50% overall in just 
two years.215 
This picture is also seen at a national level, 
where the number of hate crimes increased 
by 29% between 2015/16 and 2016/17. 
There were 80,393 offences recorded by 
police forces in England and Wales in 
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2016/17. Three-quarters of these hate 
crimes were racially aggravated, while 7% 
were religiously aggravated.216 The 
number of religiously aggravated offences 
numbered 5,949, a 35% increase from 4,400 
religiously aggravated hate crimes 
recorded in 2015/16.217  
While racially or religiously aggravated 
offences were more likely to be dealt with 
via a charge or court summons than non-
aggravated offences, the figures still 
indicate relatively low outcomes. Overall 
less than 20% of racially or religiously 
aggravated hate crimes result in suspects 
being charged or being summonsed to 
appear in court.218  
The number of racially and religiously 
aggravated cases referred by the police to 
the Crown Prosecution Service has also 
fallen over the past year, along with the 
number of completed prosecutions. 
Religiously aggravated crimes referred by 
the police to the CPS fell by 11% between 
2015-16 and 2016-17, with the number of 
completed prosecutions down 
considerably by 20% over the same 
period.219  
A recent report from Citizens UK, focusing 
on the impact of hate crime in Nottingham, 
found that 3 in 5 of the city’s Muslim 
population have been victims of hate 
crime, more than any other religious group 
in the city.220  
The study “Still No Place for Hate” 
revealed that Muslim women in particular 
were often the targets of vulgar abuse and 
criminal acts.221 Researchers revealed that 
one respondent had been told to take off 
her “f****** head scarf” in the city centre. 
Another Muslim woman said, “I wear the 
219 Crown Prosecution Service, “Hate Crime Annual Report 2016–17”, report, 
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Islamic dress and the perpetrator was 
shouting that I was hiding a bomb. On 
another incident whilst driving in my car, 
a passer-by was shouting and calling me 
Bin Laden.”222 
Other victims reported being called a 
“terrorist s***” and being spat on their 
hijab. One woman described travelling on 
the bus with her sons, aged two and four, 
and being told by a fellow passenger that 
she was raising terrorists.223  
The impacts of these hate crimes are long-
lasting, with many victims left feeling 
anxious and fearful for their safety. One 
Muslim victim who wears a hijab said she 
had been left feeling “unsafe and 
unwelcomed and scared because of the 
way I dress” while another said she 
contemplated taking her hijab off as she 
feels “very anxious at times especially 
when a national terrorist incident 
happens”. 
Victims also highlighted how being 
attacked led them to become acutely aware 
of the prejudice that exists around them, as 
well as feeling emboldened into tackling 
the injustice. One victim said, “I feel like 
something positive needs to be done to 
address the anger the white working-class 
[sic] men are feeling towards Muslim 
women. We know it’s deliberate targeting 
of a soft target.” 
The overwhelming majority (79%) of hate 
crime victims in the study did not report 
the incident to the police. Reasons victims 
gave for not reporting the crime included 
believing it would be pointless and feeling 
too traumatised in the aftermath of the 
crime to report the incident. 
Hate crime victims who did report crimes 
to the police presented a mixed picture as 
to whether this resulted in a positive 
outcome. A number of respondents had 
negative experiences with police and 
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criminal agencies, with some highlighting 
that the police did not take the incident 
seriously enough or failed to display a 
suitable level of empathy towards them. 
These responses highlight how poor police 
responses can exacerbate the level of 
suffering and trauma suffered by hate 
crime victims. 
A number of wider contextual factors were 
given by participants as driving hate crime 
in the city, including media coverage of 
terrorist events and general media bias 
against minority communities. The most 
frequently cited factor, however, was 
Brexit.224  
In the wake of the June 2016 referendum, 
in which the public narrowly voted to 
leave the European Union, there was a 
considerable increase in hate crimes 
nationally. Home Office statistics detailed 
a 44% rise in racially or religiously 
aggravated offences in the month 
following the referendum result compared 
to the same month the previous year.225  
One survey respondent elucidated how the 
referendum result “led to people feeling 
more entitled to be open about their 
racism, religious hate, and hatred towards 
anyone who is different.” Survey 
respondents explained how the political 
context was embedding an “us versus 
them” dichotomy, with Brexit fuelling the 
ability for people to express views which 
may have been challenged previously.226 
The second most common factor given for 
influencing hate crime was media coverage 
of terror attacks, with most respondents 
feeling that the reporting of events led to 
an increase in hate crime directed at 
Muslims. One participant stated that 
attacks “heightened people’s wariness of 
each other”, with the reporting of terrorist 
attacks making “ordinary Muslims feel 
blamed”.  
225 Full Fact Team, "Hate Crime in England and Wales," Full Fact, October 17, 2017, 
accessed June 20, 2018, https://fullfact.org/crime/hate-crime-england-and-wales/. 
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Crime Survey including Recommendations".  
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While the Home Office has highlighted 
several peaks in hate crime following 
events such as the Charlie Hebdo shooting 
in Paris and the Westminster Bridge attack 
in London, participants also explained that 
the sensationalised and biased coverage in 
newspapers led to Muslims being unfairly 
blamed for all terrorist attacks.  
“Muslims are always portrayed as a 
problem to society by the media as 
terrorists, rapists or traffickers. If it’s an 
offence committed by a Muslim then the 
religion is always highlighted, yet anyone 
else committing such crimes never have 
their religion mentioned. The word 
terrorist gets quickly attached to Muslims 
and not non-Muslims committing terrorist 
acts. This media brainwashing of course 
causes hate towards Muslims.” 
Participants mentioned how media 
coverage of Muslims creates resentment 
and frustrations which are then “meted out 
to Muslims women because they are 
perceived as soft targets.” This perception 
is borne out by the reports received by 
MEND’s Islamophobia Response Unit 
(IRU), amongst which the majority of 
Islamophobic hate crime victims are 
female. 
While newspaper narratives around Islam 
and Muslims contribute to the negative 
way some people perceive Muslims, this 
narrative is expounded further online 
through hate speech perpetrated via an 
array of social media streams. Researchers 
at Demos catalogued 144,000 derogatory 
and anti-Islamic tweets sent from the UK 
between March 2016 and March 2017, a 
daily average of almost 400. Half of the 
tweets analysed were derogatory anti-
Islamic slurs, often directed at a specific 
individual. Just under 2 in 5 of these tweets 
framed Muslims as the “enemy” dedicated 
towards cultural and social destruction of 
the West. Finally, around 1 in 5 of the 
tweets analysed related to derogatory 
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statements generally associating Muslims 
and Islam with terrorism.227  
Inadequate legal protections 
Current legislation that enables the 
prosecution of anti-Muslim hate crime is 
an extension of established race and 
relations legislation where ‘religiously 
aggravated’ crimes have been added to the 
existing racial motives for prosecuting 
offenders. Since Muslims do not form a 
racial group, race relations legislation 
which protects communities such as Jews 
and Sikhs, does not extend to Muslims. 
Furthermore, the Racial and Religious 
Hate Crime Act 2006, contains a disparity 
between the protections afforded on 
grounds of race versus the protections 
afforded to religious groups. In terms of 
racial hatred, a person is protected against 
abusive, insulting, or threatening words or 
behaviour. However, the protections 
afforded on the basis of religion only 
extend to threatening words or behaviour. 
This specifically excludes the protection 
from abusive or insulting words or 
behaviour that is included under racial 
hatred. 
Moreover, within the protections against 
religious hatred, there is an added 
condition that intent must be proven. In 
other words, it must be proven that the 
perpetrators intention was to stir up 
religious hatred. This differs from 
incitement to racial hatred, wherein the 
likelihood that the offence would have 
stirred up racial hatred is enough to 
prosecute; there is no need to prove that 
the perpetrator intended to stir up racial 
hatred. 
This requirement of intent makes the 
burden of proof within this legislation 
almost unachievably heavy. Indeed, the 
intention of the perpetrator is virtually 
impossible to ever prove. The consequence 
is that, since the legislation was enacted in 
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2006, only a small handful of successful 
prosecutions have occurred under 
incitement to religious hatred legislation. 
Furthermore, social media offences and 
hate speech online is a growing area of 
concern as more and more people utilise 
the anonymity of the web to share or post 
hate messages online. As such, there 
remains a great deal of scope to ensure hate 
crime is efficiently tackled on social media.  
Currently, due to the sheer scale of social 
media sites, the only way abusive posts are 
brought to the attention of social media 
companies is if users themselves report it. 
However, not all instances of online hate 
would be reported for their racist or 
Islamophobic content online. Therefore, 
much more needs to be done to tackle this 
issue head on.  
In April 2017, the Metropolitan Police set 
up a new team of specialist police officers 
to investigate abuse on social media sites 
such as Facebook and Twitter. The team of 
five officers, who will support victims and 
identify online abuse, will cost £1.7 million 
and has received £452,000 from the Home 
Office. 
More actions like these are required, and 
the Government needs to prioritise 
formulating a strategy that allows for a 
crackdown on hate speech, while 
continuing to ensure freedom of speech.  
An update from the 
Islamophobia Response Unit 
(IRU) 
Introducing the IRU 
The Islamophobia Response Unit (IRU) 
was founded by MEND in response to 
rising anti-Muslim attacks across Europe 
and a growing tide of anti-Muslim 
sentiment. The IRU is a platform for 
victims to report and share their 
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experiences and where they can receive 
advice, support and referral services.  
The IRU serves three main functions:  
 Data collection and monitoring,  
 The provision of free legal advice and 
police liaison,  
 Provision of basic emotional support, 
and signposting to further professional 
sources of emotional support if 
required.  
Exploring hate crime 
Data collection and monitoring of hate 
crime is important as it allows us to map 
instances of Islamophobia. For example, by 
recording the location of attacks and the 
profiles of typical victims and perpetrators, 
we can come to an understanding of the 
national picture of Islamophobia and begin 
to develop successful and informed 
policies for tackling it. 
Hate crime is perhaps the most overt 
manifestation of Islamophobia.  According 
to the Government’s definition, “The term 
'hate crime' can be used to describe a range 
of criminal behaviour where the 
perpetrator is motivated by hostility or 
demonstrates hostility towards the victim's 
disability, race, religion, sexual orientation 
or transgender identity. These aspects of a 
person's identity are known as 'protected 
characteristics'. A hate crime can include 
verbal abuse, intimidation, threats, 
harassment, assault and bullying, as well 
as damage to property. The perpetrator can 
also be a friend, carer or acquaintance who 
exploits their relationship with the victim 
for financial gain or some other criminal 
purpose.”228 
In its first year since opening, the IRU has 
received almost 300 reports from victims of 
Islamophobic hate crime and 
discrimination. 70% of these reports are 
hate crime related. It is common for the 
IRU to experience a surge in reports 
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following major incidents, such as last 
year’s attacks in Manchester and London 
Bridge. For example, following the 
Manchester Arena attack, the IRU 
witnessed a 388% increase in reports. This 
demonstrates the vulnerability and 
backlash received by the Muslim 
community in periods following such 
events.  
The data the IRU collects has revealed an 
interesting picture of hate crime in the UK. 
We have learned the following: 
 Of all the hate crime reports the IRU 
has received, the majority involve acts 
of verbal abuse. This includes street 
harassment, where Muslims are 
publicly called racial slurs (P**i, 
terrorist, infidel scum, etc) or even 
receive death threats. 
 The second largest form of our hate 
crime reports involve physical acts of 
aggression. Common forms are 
spitting, shoving, being thrown to the 
ground, slapping, and hijabs being 
pulled off women’s heads. 
 After terror attacks, the number of 
physical attack reports and mosque 
targeting reports rise sharply. 
 Our data also shows that incidents on 
public transport and cases of 
harassment by a neighbour are 
common areas of abuse. Indeed, 40% of 
our hate crime reports involve 
incidents on public transport and 25% 
are from victims experiencing 
Islamophobic abuse by a neighbour. 
 IRU victim and witness testimonies 
show that over 80% of Islamophobic 
hate crime perpetrators are white 
males and the perpetrators of 
Islamophobic hate crime are usually 
individual actors or private citizens. 
The gendered dynamic of Islamophobia is 
also worth exploring. 75% of reports to the 
IRU come from Muslim women. This 
number rises to 80% when just looking at 
physical attacks alone - meaning that 
Muslim women are overwhelmingly the 
targets of acts of violence and aggression. 
As the perpetrators are overwhelmingly 
males, it is clear how gender violence and 
hierarchical structures of gendered power 
are intrinsic to Islamophobic hate crime. 
Female victims are almost exclusively 
visibly Muslim, meaning they were 
wearing the hijab, niqab or abaya when 
they were targeted in public.  
The emotional impacts of 
Islamophobia 
The emotional impacts of hate crime on 
victims are vast but the effects of 
Islamophobia on mental health are largely 
unexplored in research. As such, the 
trauma associated with these types of 
crimes remain poorly understood. 
Testimonies from victims reporting to the 
IRU reveal a picture of social isolation, 
depression and anxiety. Many victims of 
Islamophobic hate crime report that they 
choose to stay indoors more, take time off 
work, and avoid public spaces – revealing 
how hate crime can impede their 
participation in public life. Many discuss 
how they avoid crowded spaces and public 
transport. Also reported is some female 
victims’ desires to remove the hijab after 
being targeted. This points to a loss in 
confidence and an underlying fear that 
displaying a symbol of their faith in public 
will make them more prone to abuse. Panic 
attacks, flashbacks, sleeplessness, and 
anxiety are also commonly observed 
psychological impacts. 
Victim Experiences 
A Muslim Convert Experience, 
Female 25, London 
I have suffered to some degree with social 
anxiety for many years, but over the past 
few years having started wearing the 
headscarf, this has become worse. I have 
never suffered from what I would describe 
as a “hate crime,” although I have been 
verbally abused. I’ve been told to “go back 
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to my own f***ing country,” I’ve had “f*** 
Allah” being screamed out a car window 
amongst other types of religiously or 
racially motivated comments – such as a 
man muttering “terrorist” under his breath 
or another saying to me “I bet you speak 
Afghanistan”. The above I have come to 
accept as normal. 
I have good and bad days, but I generally 
am hyper-aware and alert when in public 
and I am quite often anticipating being 
verbally if not physically abused. Because 
of this anxiety I have started to change my 
behaviour or take “precautions”. 
Some of the minor behavioural changes I 
have adopted to deal with anticipated 
abuse is always having headphones in 
when I am out alone as not to hear any 
comments or abuse. I try my best not to 
travel alone in the evenings and I am much 
less inclined to leaving the house alone 
unless I have to – i.e. to go to work or pick 
up groceries. It really affects the way I feel 
in the public space. On particularly bad 
days, especially when there have been 
terrorist attacks I have swapped my 
headscarf for a beanie when travelling 
which gives me a bit of peace to some 
degree, but also makes me feel angry. I 
have occasionally thought about no longer 
wearing a headscarf.  
I see my umbrella not just as something to 
protect me from the elements, but also 
something I could use to hit someone with 
if they were to attack me. (Much how many 
women think of their keys.) I started taking 
martial arts classes, and also prefer to wear 
trousers over skirts in case I am physically 
attacked and need to be able to better 
defend myself. I feel most alert and 
concerned when in train stations, or when 
I’m on the tube, or train.  
On one occasion I travelled from Cardiff to 
London on the train (there was a football 
match with a London team that has a 
particularly bad reputation.) I got a train 
that was leaving before their match ended 
and hoped there wouldn’t be too many 
fans – there were and they came into the 
carriage I was in. I wore my scarf pulled 
back (some may describe this as a turban 
style) as I anticipated there might be some 
fans and wanted to look less “visibly 
Muslim.” During the journey a man started 
ranting loudly about how Muslims were 
taking over our country, raping ‘our’ 
women, killing people and a whole host of 
other Islamophobic commentary. I was 
with my husband and I was terrified that 
he or I would be attacked. We contacted 
BTP who told us on arrival to London that 
nothing could be done as the man would 
say “he was just having a conversation 
with his mates.”  
I think the next behavioural change I will 
take to help with my anxiety is to learn 
how to drive.  
 
Spitting incident victim, 
 Female, 32, Birmingham 
“After the attack, I’ve been afraid to leave 
the house. I spend most of my time 
indoors. I don’t even want to go out and do 
the shopping. I hate being out even in my 
own local area. I don’t feel safe anymore.”  
 
Victim on public transport,  
Female, 24, London 
 “I don’t want to take the tube or buses 
anymore. I feel really anxious in public 
spaces after being targeted in this way. I 
just try to walk everywhere or get a lift 
from a family member.”  
 
Victim of physical assault,  
Female 28, London 
 “I feel so paranoid walking the streets, I 
feel like everyone is out to attack me. I’m 
super self-conscious in public now.” 
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Islamophobia and Mental Health 
Dr Shazad Amin 
Consultant Psychiatrist 
The above examples of experiences 
reported to the MEND Islamophobia 
Response Unit show that hate crimes have 
considerable negative mental health 
consequences for victims. Research has 
shown that the psychological impacts of 
hate crime are greater than for non-hate 
crime offences. Reported data from the 
Crime Surveys of England and Wales 
showed that victims of hate crimes were 
almost three times as likely (36% versus 
13%) to report being “very much” 
emotionally affected by the incident than 
victims overall and were twice as likely to 
experience symptoms such as difficulty 
sleeping, anxiety, depression, or panic 
attacks.229   
Since the Muslim community is also the 
most likely to be victims of religiously 
motivated hate crimes compared to victims 
of other religious groups, this suggests that 
there is likely to be considerable 
psychiatric morbidity arising as a result.230 
Whilst there is a considerable corpus of 
research on the impact of racism on mental 
health there is precious little on 
Islamophobia. However, in the first study 
of its kind, researchers at the University of 
Sussex examined the direct and indirect 
effects of hate crimes on both Muslim and 
LGBT communities.231  
Concerning the direct effects of hate crime, 
71% of Muslim respondents said they had 
been victim of hate crimes, predominantly 
consisting of verbal and online abuse. 
More surprising was the numbers of 
people who were victims of repeat attacks 
– 45% had been verbally abused more than 
three times over the past three years and 
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29% physically attacked more than three 
times in the same period. In terms of 
impact, the survey found a variety of 
responses. For some people it made them 
feel more vulnerable, anxious, angry and 
led to social withdrawal, but for others it 
motivated them to take positive action 
through community engagement via 
specialist groups and charities. Certainly 
anecdotally, we have witnessed this in 
MEND, with several people joining our 
organisation as a direct result of adverse 
personal Islamophobic abuse or attacks. 
Under indirect effects of hate crime, 83% of 
Muslim participants reported that they 
knew someone who had experienced hate 
crimes. The reactions were similar to those 
who had directly experienced hate crimes, 
with a cumulative effect of those who had 
experienced both. This suggests a degree of 
identification with victims by people who 
share the same characteristic. 
One of the most worrying adverse 
community consequences of hate crimes is 
that of avoidance behaviour following an 
attack, e.g. avoiding certain roads or areas 
or stopping going out altogether. In a study 
of racial discrimination on mental health 
Wallace et al found high rates of avoidance 
behaviour after incidents of racial 
discrimination.232 The rates of avoidance 
were highest in the Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani groups with rates of 10-20% 
reported. Whilst the research did not 
record the nature of the incidents, it is 
likely that some of this abuse was 
religiously rather than racially motivated, 
noting slightly lower rates in the Indian 
group. It is well recognised that 
perpetrators may conflate race with 
religion, (and indeed there may be dual 
motivations), hence in the absence of more 
religiously focussed research, ethnicity 
https://sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sussex-hate-crime-project-
report.pdf&site=430. 
232 Stephanie Wallace, James Nazroo, and Laia Bécares, "Cumulative Effect of Racial 
Discrimination on the Mental Health of Ethnic Minorities in the United 
Kingdom," American Journal of Public Health 106, no. 7 (2016), 
doi:10.2105/ajph.2016.303121.  
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may serve as a proxy for religion in this 
respect.233 
Avoidance behaviour is an important 
phenomenon since it shows how a hate 
crime against an individual can vicariously 
affect the mental health of a whole 
community. We witnessed this 
phenomenon recently with the tragic 
attempted murder of Zaynab Hussein, a 
Somalian Muslim lady in Leicester in 2017, 
for which her attacker, Paul Moore, was 
sentenced earlier this year. He ran over 
Mrs Hussain twice in an attack that left the 
local community fearful of going out, a 
classic case of avoidance behaviour by the 
local community.  
Islamophobia can thus also be viewed as a 
public health problem, and as such we 
have to look at wider factors to address it 
such as the toxic ‘Islamophobic’ political 
and media climate developing in recent 
years. The recent rise in the political far 
right across Europe and in the USA, with 
some political parties such as PEGIDA, 
AfD and UKIP espousing openly hostile 
policies towards Muslims and Islam, has 
led to a state of apprehension and fear 
across Muslim communities as a whole. In 
a qualitative study Ali (2017) found that 
marginalisation and “othering” of 
Muslims in the USA led to a variety of 
psychological symptoms including fear, 
stress, worry, and insecurity.234 
It is clear that we desperately need more 
research into the impact of Islamophobia in 
all its forms on the mental health of 
individuals, families and communities. We 
can then begin to target interventions both 
at an individual level, but also at a 
community level to help build resilience 
amongst affected Muslim communities.  
We are confident that a definitive 
understanding of what Islamophobia is, 
will provide a firm foundation for 
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stimulating mental health research in this 
neglected area. 
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Youth and Education 
Islamophobia in the education system is a 
serious problem which impacts Muslim 
children and their development in a wide 
variety of ways. From being bullied 
explicitly in reference to their faith, to 
being stigmatised and reported for views 
they may hold, Muslim children are 
struggling to navigate this complex maze. 
The impacts of these experiences can be 
long-term, damaging their ability to 
achieve success in the employment sphere 
and inhibiting their participation in wider 
civic society and the political arena.  
Bullying 
Despite praiseworthy academic 
achievements, Muslim pupils frequently 
encounter worrying levels of religiously 
and racially motivated bullying. This is 
often particularly acute following episodes 
of violence and terrorist incidents such as 
the attack on Manchester Arena in May 
2017. Childline have reported that it held 
over 2,500 counselling sessions for children 
concerned about race and faith-based 
bullying over the past three years.235 
However, they noted a sharp increase in 
calls following attacks in London and 
Manchester in 2017. Children as young as 
nine reported being called terrorists and 
enduring abuse and threats of violence. 
Meanwhile, the charity also reported that 
girls who wear the hijab had frequently 
been victimised for their religious dress, 
with some expressing a desire to self-harm 
as a result of the cruel treatment they had 
received.236 
Furthermore, a report compiled by Show 
Racism the Red Card on bullying in schools 
found that 83% of 48 teachers who 
completed a survey questionnaire said 
they had witnessed racist attitudes or 
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behaviour amongst students, including 
name calling and stereotyping. In addition, 
31% of respondents admitted to witnessing 
racist attitudes or behaviour among 
teachers.237  
Incidents of bullying, motivated by racism, 
are likely to stifle the potential of students 
in attainment and subsequently affect their 
life chances in the future. The capability of 
teachers to deal with bullying incidents is 
therefore of vital importance so that 
schools are environments in which 
children may flourish and prosper, not 
ones they fear or avoid.  
Young people are shown to be more at ease 
with diversity and are less likely to hold 
views that are intolerant or prejudicial 
towards those of other backgrounds. As 
such, schools are an important place where 
diversity, difference and prejudice can be 
discussed, and young people may be made 
aware of the dangers of hatred of 
minorities. However, the low priority 
given to religious education in the national 
curriculum inhibits the ability of schools to 
create environments in which pupils can 
learn about other religions and cultures 
and appreciate their significance to fellow 
pupils and members of their local 
communities. 
PREVENT 
These sentiments are exacerbated via the 
Government’s statutory implementation of 
the PREVENT duty, which has seen 
thousands of Muslim students 
unnecessarily referred to authorities on the 
erroneous basis of being at risk of 
“radicalisation” or “extremism”.238 
The levels of Muslim students attending 
university has risen significantly over the 
past decade, with Muslims constituting 
10% of all first year UK university entrants 
in 2016.239 The PREVENT duty, however, is 
237 The Barriers to Challenging Racism and Promoting Race Equality in England’s 
Schools, report, Show Racism the Red Card, June 21, 2011, 
https://www.teachers.org.uk/files/srtrc-barriers-final.PDF.  
238 Ibid. 
239 "Religion and Belief," Higher Education Funding Council for England, accessed 
May 15, 2018, http://www.hefce.ac.uk/analysis/opthesa/religion/.  
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having a tangible effect on students’ 
abilities to engage whole-heartedly in their 
university experience, with an NUS study 
revealing that students are hesitant to 
participate in classroom debates on topical 
issues concerning counter-terrorism and 
foreign policy for fear of being referred to 
PREVENT by their lecturers or teachers.240  
An overwhelming majority of respondents 
to a recent NUS survey disagreed that 
lecturers and education institutions should 
monitor and report students’ attitudes, 
behaviours, prayer room activities and 
email or online activity. The report also 
describes the correlation of the visibility of 
Muslim women and how they are 
impacted by PREVENT as notable, with 
those wearing hijab or niqab more likely to 
have been affected. This gives weight to 
arguments that PREVENT magnifies a 
variety of existing biases and prejudice 
among staff who are obligated to exercise 
the duty. 
Additionally, the research findings suggest 
that Muslim students who have been 
affected by PREVENT are significantly 
more likely than others to believe there is 
no safe space on campuses to discuss issues 
that affect them. These students are also 
significantly more likely to not be 
comfortable being involved in student 
debates around topical areas including 
racism, Islamophobia, Muslim student 
provision, terrorism, Palestine or 
PREVENT.  
The impact of PREVENT is explored more 
fully later in the report chapter entitled 
Securitising Muslim Identities: Security 
and Counter-Terror. 
Islamophobia and education 
Shereen Fernandez  
Queen Mary University 
Our public education systems have 
transformed greatly over the last few 
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years. Teachers more so than ever have an 
incredible responsibility to not only deliver 
outstanding teaching and learning but are 
also responsible for dealing with societal 
pressures that young children and their 
families face. This article will draw on key 
instances where Islamophobia is 
perpetuated within the education sector 
and provide pragmatic solutions to tackle 
Islamophobia within the education sector 
and beyond.  
The Prevent Duty 
The revisions made to the Prevent Duty in 
2015 meant that schools, along with other 
public institutions, are legally required to 
monitor signs of extremism and 
radicalisation amongst pupils and even 
staff members. In reality, this means that 
teachers, after receiving a few hours of 
training on the topic, are responsible for 
this task. The education sector alone has 
made the most referrals to Prevent, making 
up a third of all referrals in the year 2016-
2017 (1976 out of 6093 referrals). This is 
largely due to the fact that Prevent in 
schools is embedded within broader 
statutory safeguarding duties as well as the 
recent escalation in terrorist attacks in the 
UK which inevitably heightened anxieties. 
The number of cases discussed at the 
Channel panel is much less, with only 386 
cases examined and only 126 individuals 
subsequently receiving Channel support. 
My research so far indicates that many 
professionals within the education sector 
are approaching the Prevent Duty as a 
‘better safe than sorry attitude’, much like 
other safeguarding measures.  
It has already been widely reported 
through the media and various reports that 
Muslim students will be mostly effected by 
the Prevent Duty. The Prevent Duty is 
ultimately about power; it relies on 
teachers and other educational staff 
members to use their ‘professional’ 
discretion to make referrals. Considering 




via the education sector pertain to ‘Islamist 
extremism’, questions must be asked about 
the training provided and how they are 
evaluated. For example, does the Prevent 
Duty perpetuate an anti-Muslim climate in 
educational settings? What knowledge(s) 
are produced through the training 
materials and how do we ensure that 
students from certain backgrounds are not 
unfairly targeted because of their 
perceived culture or religion? This must be 
asked wherever Prevent operates within 
educational contexts.  
Trojan Horse 
The Trojan Horse affair in 2013, where a 
number of schools in Birmingham were 
alleged to be promoting Islamist 
ideologies, has left a lasting impact on the 
educational landscape. The subsequent 
media reporting of the affair (see figure 1 
as an example) provoked an innate fear 
amongst the public that Muslim teachers 
were capable of an ‘Islamist’ takeover of 
schools, which inevitably cast suspicion on 
visible Muslims in particular, working 
within the education sector. For Muslim 
teachers that I interviewed for my research, 
the Trojan Horse affair has left many 
feeling paranoid about their Islamic 
identities in their workplace. Some spoke 
about having to downplay their Muslim 
identities whereas others felt that along 
with the Prevent Duty, they were being 
unfairly scrutinised and watched closely. 
The Prevent Duty outlines that schools and 
other educational institutions should be 
safe spaces but what is often ignored in 
discussions around Prevent and 
hyperbolic, sensationalised media 
reporting is the impact on Muslim 
teachers. There is already a teacher 
recruitment crisis in schools and hostile 
environments like this may contribute to 
such a decline.  
                                                     




Figure 1: Cartoons from The Daily Telegraph and The Sunday 
Times via Cartoon Archive 
Ofsted Hijab Ban  
In late 2017, Amanda Spielman announced 
that Ofsted inspectors will soon be tasked 
with questioning young girls in primary 
schools who wear the hijab. Her reasons 
for doing so was allegedly to ensure that 
Muslim girls were not being forced to wear 
the hijab and that they received equal 
opportunities when it came to teaching and 
learning. The lack of consultation with 
Muslim parents and branding those who 
opposed the measure as ‘extremists’ led to 
a national debate on the role of Ofsted in 
intervening on religious issues, 
particularly when those who are at the 
receiving end of such measures have been 
excluded from such conversations and 
antagonised.241 Furthermore, such a 
measure could further alienate Muslim 
families from engaging with schools if they 
feel that their children are unfairly 
targeted. Developing solid relationships 
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with minority communities is essential and 
parents and carers must be treated as 
partners. Ultimately, families want their 
children to succeed and will work with 
whoever is able to do so, but implementing 
rash measures will further divide and 
isolate marginalised groups and achieve 
the opposite.  
Possible Solutions  
Increase the number of BME staff 
members: The Runnymede Trust has 
reported that in 2015, BME teachers made 
up 7.6% of the total teaching workforce in 
England which does not adequately reflect 
the BME student body.242 Increasing the 
number of BME staff in schools across 
geographical areas should be a priority to 
reflect diversity of British society. Schools 
will also be better prepared in dealing with 
the diversity of cultures and religions in 
their schools if their staff body mirrors this. 
Include anti-racist training as part of 
‘diversity and inclusion’ training in 
schools: Anti-racism curriculums must be 
firmly embedded within schools to tackle 
racial prejudice.  Schools have taken on 
Black History month and some have even 
adopted Islamophobia Awareness Month 
but such initiatives are reductive if the root 
causes of racism and discrimination are not 
addressed seriously. Schools in Wales have 
recently recognised the need to address 
Islamophobia in the classroom and similar 
programmes should be implemented 
nationally.243 Considering that the Prevent 
Duty has reportedly divided communities 
in recent years, anti-racist training for all 
staff members is essential in order to 
combat any preconceived ideas and to 
provide them with better understandings 
on race and religion.  
Increase access participation programmes 
for hard to reach and minority groups: 
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Funding has been severely slashed in 
schools nationally and programmes aimed 
at increasing parental engagement in 
schools are struggling. By funding 
programmes and initiatives to incorporate 
hard to reach and marginalised 
communities in primary and secondary 
schools will not only help them develop 
skills and relationships, but will improve 
parental engagement and student 
wellbeing. If parents feel like they can 
access schools freely, this will only have a 
positive impact on their children’s 
education. Schools should also be safe 
spaces for parents and carers.  
Address hyperbolic and sensationalised 
media reporting: It is of utmost 
importance that media outlets are 
responsible in their reporting and news 
coverage. In the last few years, there have 
been a number of recorded incidents where 
journalists and writers have used their 
platforms to spread divisive messaging 
and increase intolerance towards minority 
communities.244 This is then reflected in 
schools and in the playground, where 
similar discourse is regurgitated. Schools 
should be places of change which are 
dedicated to improving the lives of 
younger generations and better society as a 
whole.  
Britishness, belonging and 
Islamophobia: reflection and 
dialogue 
Dr Sadia Habib 
Times may have moved on since a teacher 
referred to an ethnic minority student as a 
‘wog’,245 but today young Muslims are 
now in fear of being branded as ‘terrorists’ 
by their teachers.246 Yet it is concerning that 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/27/islamophobia-not-
british-press-issue-got-to-be-kidding  
245 Muhammad Anwar, “Between Cultures Continuity and Change in the Lives of 
Young Asians” (Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2002). 
246 Tom Pettifor, "Teacher Sacked 'for Calling Muslim Schoolboy Terrorist after He 
Complained about Detention'," Mirror, January 28, 2016, accessed June 20, 2018, 
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teacher training and school professional 
development courses, in the UK, fail to 
give issues of multiculturalism and 
diversity due time and attention.247 A big 
challenge for schools and teacher 
education institutions then is how to 
respond to trainee teachers and existing 
classroom teachers consistently reporting 
that they are inadequately guided or 
trained to teach young people about 
multiculturalism and social inequalities.248 
Hostile racial examples, like ‘It’s our 
country meant for white people’ or ‘p**i’, 
that feature in young people’s discourses 
of belonging to Britain, highlight the 
urgency of anti-racist and anti-
Islamophobia education.249 
Islamophobia is not a new phenomenon, 
and not a new racism. It is important for 
young people to explore how 
Islamophobia has existed for hundreds of 
years.  To begin with, classroom activities 
can, for example, focus upon historical 
examples of Islamophobia. For example, 
the ways in which Islamophobia infiltrated 
narratives surrounding the crusades 
during the medieval period, or the impact 
of European colonisation on Muslims 
throughout the world. 250  By examining the 
historical dimensions of Islamophobia and 
placing emphasis on its existence pre-9/11 
and pre-7/7, young people can better 
understand that Islamophobia has been 
used ideologically for centuries. Young 
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people could examine how over time 
‘Islamophobic representations have been 
constructed as ideological tools to 
legitimate campaigns of political, social, 
economic, and military domination’. 251 
After investigating historical 
Islamophobia, young people and teachers 
can move onto drawing connections 
between what they have learned about the 
past and how this impacts the present lived 
experiences of young Muslims. How do 
young people express a sense of belonging 
to contemporary Britain? Belonging refers 
to acceptance and recognition within a 
group or society. Its multiple layers are 
illustrated by ‘the interplay of the 
subjective self, collective agency and 
structural positioning’, while its multiple 
facets mean we can ‘belong to a 
community, a locality or a nation’, but also 
experience ‘a transnational sense of 
belonging’.252  How do young people 
negotiate these multiple belongings and 
what support do they require from societal 
institutions? 
By applying a critical perspective, young 
people from all backgrounds can use the 
safe spaces of their classrooms to challenge 
‘monovocals, master narratives, standard 
stories, or majoritarian stories’ by 
contributing counter-narratives about 
Islamophobia and racism in contemporary 
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Britain.253  What are young people’s own 
experiences of Islamophobia and racism in 
British society?  What are their everyday 
lived experiences? What institutional and 
structural policies and practices do they 
deem to impact upon their identities as 
Muslims? How do they respond to racist 
and Islamophobic discourses they 
encounter through different forms of social 
media? These are some of the critical 
questions that need to be urgently explored 
in anti-Islamophobia education. 
My own research into Britishness and 
British values found that young people 
from a range of cultural, religious and 
ethnic backgrounds are keen to explore 
British identities and belongings. Teachers 
and students benefit from using the 
principles of critical pedagogy254 in the 
classroom to critically analyse what it 
means to belong to contemporary 
Britain.255 Critical pedagogy is also 
practised as liberatory, empowering, or 
radical pedagogy.256 Critical pedagogy 
empowers teachers and students to 
collaborate; they can work together to 
create a schooling space that emboldens 
students’ voices, stimulates dialogue, and 
recommends reflection and action to attain 
goals of social justice. Such potentially 
powerful outcomes make critical 
pedagogy a significant approach to 
become embedded in anti-Islamophobia 
education. 
Islamic schools 
Since the first wave of Muslim migrants 
began bringing their wives and children to 
the UK, Muslims have invested in 
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education as a means of raising the 
aspirations and opportunities for their 
families and wider community. The first 
Muslim school, Darul Uloom Al-Arabiya 
Al-Islamia was opened in Lancashire in 
1979, but it took another 18 years for the 
first state funded Muslim school, Islamia 
Primary School, to open in London in 
1997.257  
The progress of Muslim schools in recent 
years has been noteworthy, with a number 
of schools achieving excellent results and 
nationwide accolades. Tauheedul Islam 
Boys and Girls Schools in Blackburn, run 
by the Tauheedul Educational Trust, were 
ranked 1st and 2nd in the country in 2016 by 
the Government’s Progress 8 measures. 
This means the schools were the highest 
rated for improving pupils’ attainment 
across the whole country.258   
Despite the overwhelming achievements 
of many of these schools, Islamic schools 
have frequently been the topic of intense 
scrutiny. This has intensified in the wake of 
the infamous Trojan Horse affair. 
The Birmingham Trojan Horse 
Affair 
Professor John Holmwood  
University of Nottingham  
The Birmingham Trojan Horse affair began 
in early 2014 with sensationalist media 
reporting of a supposed Islamic plot to take 
over schools in Birmingham, Bradford and 
Manchester. This was apparently 
evidenced by a leaked letter and document 
sent to Birmingham City Council naming 3 
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schools.259 This gave rise to the Secretary of 
State at the Department for Education 
(DfE) ordering Ofsted reports on 21 
schools in Birmingham all with a high 
proportion of pupils from Muslim 
backgrounds. An Education Funding 
Agency review was instigated into Park 
View Educational Trust (and its 3 schools) 
and two reports were commissioned, one 
reporting to Birmingham City Council 
(Kershaw Report), the other to Parliament 
through the Secretary of State (Clarke 
Report).260 These reports investigated 14 
schools and claimed to find evidence of 
undue religious influence, with the Clarke 
Report claiming evidence of extremism 
and actions to undermine British values.   
The latter recommended that professional 
misconduct cases be brought against 
teachers. In the event, proceedings were 
brought against 12 teachers in 4 separate 
hearings by the National College of 
Teaching and Leadership (NCTL), the 
agency of the DfE responsible for teacher 
standards. The teachers were all connected 
to Park View Academy which had 
emerged as the school at the centre of the 
plot, although by now its tentacles were 
considerably retracted.  The case against 
the leaders of Park View Education Trust 
collapsed in May 2017 when serious 
improprieties were discovered in the 
conduct of the case by NCTL, including 
giving misleading statements and failing to 
disclose exculpatory evidence that had 
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been gathered by the Clarke inquiry but 
not reported by him.261   
The background to the affair was Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s speech to the 
Munich security conference in 2011 when 
he declared that ‘multiculturalism had 
failed’ and that the country had tolerated 
the growth of “segregated communities 
behaving in ways that run completely 
counter to our values”.262 No evidence for 
this claim was provided – indeed there was 
and is none - and, under the constraints of 
the then coalition government, no 
legislative action was taken to modify 
regulatory requirements on schools.263 
However, schools had been required to 
teach shared values under a Duty to 
Promote Community Cohesion (effective 
from 2008).264 The Clarke Report, however, 
treated the Munich speech as providing the 
context of its inquiry and regarded a 
concern with community cohesion not as a 
regulatory requirement but as a form of 
political correctness which had prevented 
Birmingham City Council from 
intervening (as it should have done, or so 
Clarke believed).  
In 2015, under a Conservative-majority 
Government, a new Counter Extremism 
strategy was outlined where the only 
example of the problem it was to address 
was that of the Birmingham Trojan Horse 
affair.265 In addition, a new requirement on 
schools to promote ‘fundamental British 
values’ was introduced.266 The most 
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significant aspect of the affair, however, 
was that there was neither fire nor smoke 
and no basis to the claims made against the 
teachers and the schools, all of which were 
hearsay. 
The Clarke Report was deeply and self-
evidently flawed, yet no media outlet 
addressed those flaws, not even after the 
cases against the teachers had collapsed. 
Nor did the Parliamentary select 
committee that reviewed the Trojan Horse 
affair.267 For example, there was no 
discussion in the report of the statutory 
requirements on schools for religious 
education and compulsory daily acts of 
collective worship. While the latter is 
required to be Christian in character it can 
be varied under a determination provided 
by the local Standing Advisory Committee 
on Religious Education (SACRE). Park 
View had had such a determination since 
1996, which had lapsed in 2012 (they are 
renewable every five year) at the time it 
became an academy, when responsibility 
passed to the DFE. It made no provisions 
for this part of its duties toward academy 
and free schools. The school had also 
continued to teach the locally agreed 
religious education curriculum.  
Nor did the Clarke Report establish what 
the responsibilities of schools were under 
Prevent (there were none), yet Ipsos Mori 
had conducted a review of schools for the 
DfE which showed that most schools 
understood it as part of their duty to 
promote community cohesion.268 Indeed, if 
Clarke – or his advisers from the DfE - had 
referred to this review they would have 
discovered that Park View was doing 
more, and had more teachers trained in 
Prevent, than was typical for schools in 
England.  
Finally, the shrinking nature of the ‘plot’ 
from 21 to 14 to 4 schools, all associated 
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with Park View Academy is significant to 
understanding what had in fact been 
taking place. The school was a failing 
school in 1996 (the beginning of the plot’s 
timeline according to Clarke) yet by 2012 it 
was in the top 14% of all schools in England 
for academic achievement, 
notwithstanding that 72.7% of pupils were 
in receipt of free school meals, just 7.5% 
had English as a first language and its 
pupil intake was below the national 
average in academic performance on entry. 
It is for this reason, that it was asked by the 
DfE working together with the school 
improvement team at BCC to takeover two 
other schools, to become a multi-academy 
trust and ultimately incorporate other 
failing schools.  
The ‘takeover plot’ that Clarke discovers, 
then, was at the behest of the DfE and 
directly under its supervision to extend its 
good practices to other schools. Evidence 
associated with the involvement of DfE 
officials and evidence provided by 
Birmingham SACRE was not presented in 
the report, but it was its disclosure that 
caused the NCTL hearing to collapse. The 
‘Islamic plot’ to takeover schools in 
Birmingham, then, is better described as a 
moral panic engendered by the 
Government’s attack on multiculturalism 
and its promotion of unevidenced claims 
that British Muslims are at odds with 
British values. It also indicates a failure by 
media and Parliament to discover the truth 
behind an injustice visited on teachers and 
a calumny against a community, its values 
and the success of its local school. 
The current HM Chief Inspector of Schools, 
Amanda Spielman, continues the hostility 
toward schools with an Islamic ethos 
(reflecting their communities). In a recent 
speech,269 she praised the religious ethos of 
Church of England (and Catholic) schools 
268 Chris Phillips, Daniel Tse, Daniel and Fiona Johnson, ‘Community Cohesion and 
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writing that one of ‘British values’ is, 
“‘mutual respect for and tolerance of those 
with different faiths and beliefs and for 
those without faith’. It is a happy fact that 
almost every Church of England school we 
visit takes that value seriously.” However, 
she went on, “tolerance and respect does 
not mean that we should privilege all belief 
above criticism. Ofsted inspectors are 
increasingly brought into contact with 
those who want to actively pervert the 
purpose of education. Under the pretext of 
religious belief, they use education 
institutions, legal and illegal, to narrow 
young people’s horizons, to isolate and 
segregate, and in the worst cases to 
indoctrinate impressionable minds with 
extremist ideology.” Finally, she stated, 
“there should not, indeed cannot, be a 
trade-off between school ethos and school 
outcomes... Sadly, I am afraid that it does 
not match with the reality in all of our 
schools today.” 
The real lesson of the Birmingham Trojan 
Horse affair is that Park View School was 
undermined despite its successful 
outcomes because of hostility to its Islamic 
ethos. Yet it is precisely those outcomes 
that served the integration of its pupils.  
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Economic Exclusion: 
Islamophobia and the 
Labour Market 
Numerous studies in recent years have 
researched the failure of Muslims to 
progress and reach levels of success in the 
workplace which their non-Muslim 
counterparts enjoy. These studies have 
pointed to a combination of Islamophobia, 
racism and discrimination as reasons for 
Muslims to be less likely to be in work, less 
likely to be in skilled and professional 
occupations, and less likely to break 
through the glass ceiling to access top level 
executive positions. Indeed, only 6% of 
Muslims in the workplace were in higher 
managerial, administrative and 
professional occupations, compared to 
10% of the overall population.270 
Studies also show that Muslims have been 
disproportionately confined to unskilled 
professions or those jobs with limited 
opportunities for progression.271 Census 
data shows that, while a fifth of people are 
employed in the highest category of socio-
economic classifications, such as higher 
managerial and higher professional 
occupations, this proportion falls to just 1 
in 8 for Muslims. More jarringly, while 
only 4% of the adult population had never 
worked, this figure was five times higher 
for Muslims, with 21.3% of Muslim adults 
having never worked.  
The Government’s Social Mobility 
Commission, chaired by former Labour 
minister Alan Milburn, cited a number of 
barriers to success for Muslims in the 
employment sphere, including ethnic 
minority sounding names being less likely 
to be offered interviews and Muslims 
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feeling forced to work “10 times as hard” 
as their white counterparts in order to 
achieve equivalent levels of success.272 
Employer attitudes have also been given as 
a reason for failure to progress in the 
workplace in research by BBC “Inside 
Out”, which found that CVs submitted 
under a non-Muslim name were three 
times more likely to be offered an 
interview than those with a Muslim 
name.273  
The findings are particularly galling given 
that academics found a strong work ethic 
and high resilience among Muslims which 
“resulted in impressive results in 
education”. These achievements are not 
translated into the workplace 
unfortunately, with previous data showing 
that only 20% of Muslim adults were in 
full-time employment, compared to 35% of 
the general population.274  
Research has also found that Muslim 
women face greater difficulty in being 
accepted in the workplace. The Social 
Mobility Commission noted how this 
adversity was amplified for Muslim 
women wearing headscarves. Researchers 
found that women were confronted with 
situations ranging from “assumptions they 
were forced to wear the headscarf to jokes 
and casual comments in the workplace 
about Muslims”. Muslim workers were 
also hit with “a feeling of a need to 
apologise and explain” every time a terror 
attack occurred.275  
In 2016, the House of Commons Women 
and Equalities Committee stated that 
Muslim women face a triple penalty in the 
employment sphere, due to being women, 
being from an ethnic minority background 
and for being Muslim. Another study 
found that 1 in 4 employers admitted to 
being reluctant to hire Muslim women, due 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/sep/07/islamophobia-holding-back-
uk-muslims-in-workplace-study-finds.  
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to concerns they would prioritise their 
family commitments above professional 
duties.276  
One of the more disturbing revelations 
from research into the difficulties ethnic 
minority women face in entering 
employment was that 1 in 8 Pakistani 
women had been illegally asked about 
marriage and family aspirations in job 
interviews, compared to 1 in 30 White 
women, demonstrating the levels of 
preconceived bias and racially and 
religiously shaped assumptions that 
Muslim women face.277  
Discrimination for Muslim women also 
continues once they enter the workplace. 
Research conducted by MEND in 2016 
revealed that more than 60% of Muslim 
women who wear a hijab felt they had been 
treated differently at work due to religious 
discrimination.278  
The Government published its Race 
Equality Audit in late 2017, amalgamating 
research and data from various sectors to 
shine a light on the disparities ethnic 
minorities face in the UK. The employment 
audit showed that people of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi ethnicity suffered the most 
with regards to unemployment and low 
pay.279 
Amongst all minorities, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi workers were more likely to 
be concentrated in the three lowest-skilled 
occupation groups, with more than 2 in 5 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers in 
these lower-skilled occupations, compared 
to 1 in 4 of White workers. Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani employees also earned the 
lowest average hourly pay, £11.42, 
compared to £13.75 per hour received by 
their White counterparts. Finally, Pakistani 
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and Bangladeshi people were also the most 
likely to be unemployed. Indeed, 11% of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi people were 
unemployed in 2016, almost three times 
the rate (4%) of unemployment amongst 
White British people.280 
Alongside this, the National Equality Panel 
previously found that Muslims receive, on 
average, 13-21% less pay than their White 
Christian counterparts with equivalent 
qualifications.281 
The Race Audit showed that while 74% of 
people from White ethnic groups were 
employed in 2016, only 64% of those from 
other ethnic groups were similarly 
employed. This means that the difference 
in the employment rate for ethnic 
minorities compared with the overall 
population, also known as the 
“employment rate gap”, was 10 percentage 
points.282 This represents a slow 
improvement from the 15-percentage point 
gap recorded over ten years previously, in 
2004, but highlights how much 
intervention is still required to give people 
from BME backgrounds the opportunity to 
both enter and then succeed in fulfilling 
their potential in the workplace. 
Given the younger age profile of the BAME 
and Muslim demographic than the wider 
population, there are serious opportunities 
for Government and businesses to harness 
the growth in the BAME population and 
tap into the high levels of talent available. 
With more BAME students going to 
university, there should be no tolerance for 
employers excluding people based on their 
religion or the colour of their skin rather 
than on their merits and achievements. 
The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 
published a survey in 2017, in which 10,000 
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Muslims in Europe were questioned on 
how religious discrimination impacts their 
everyday lives. Workplace discrimination 
had the largest impact, but plenty of other 
forms of discrimination emerged from the 
survey, including: access to public and 
private services, housing, accessing 
healthcare, being turned away from school 
for wearing the niqab and being asked to 
remove the niqab for meetings and when 
dropping children off to school.283 
An update from the 
Islamophobia Response Unit 
(IRU) 
MEND’s Islamophobia Response Unit 
(IRU) deals with not only hate crime, but 
discrimination as well. The unit is 
fortunate to benefit from the invaluable 
skills and experience of a team of dedicated 
legal professionals from leading law firms 
across London who offer pro-bono legal 
advice and support to those affected by 
Islamophobic discrimination. This team of 
talent provides the IRU with the 
intellectual capital it needs to challenge 
those institutions who oppress and 
discriminate against Muslims.  
Employment based discrimination is the 
largest area of our discrimination work at 
the IRU. 60% of our Islamophobic 
discrimination reports are from those who 
have been mistreated at work because of 
their faith. 
In the IRU’s data monitoring of reports we 
have discovered that, while 60% of our 
hate crime reports come from Muslim 
women, the data we have collected on the 
discrimination side reveals that over 70% 
of our discrimination reports come from 
Muslim men.  
We have received a variety of employment 
discrimination reports at the IRU. Some 
include: 
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 A Muslim teacher who was falsely 
accused of gender segregating a 
classroom. 
 A Muslim candidate in a job interview 
is asked “How he feels working under 
women.” 
 A Muslim woman who was asked to 
remove the face veil in an interview. 
The IRU has played an active role in many 
of these cases. We have participated in 
many employment tribunals where we 
have won thousands of pounds worth of 
settlements for employment 
discrimination victims. 
For example, in one case dealt with by the 
IRU a Muslim teacher was unfairly 
dismissed from his role after being falsely 
accused of introducing gender segregation 
into the classroom. The IRU supported him 
and helped him take the case to an 
employment tribunal. We helped prove 
that the allegations were wholly incorrect 
and secured him £5,000 as a settlement. 
The impacts of this form of discrimination 
on victims can be long lasting. Many 
victims report to us that they suffer a loss 
of confidence in the workplace, poorer job 
prospects, and a desire to work in more 
diverse work settings. 
It appears clear that in order for Muslims, 
and Muslim women in particular, to 
progress with their careers, clear changes 
are required at both employer and 
government levels in order to remove 
barriers and give Muslims the 







Identities: Security and 
Counter-Terror 
MEND has no intention of undermining 
the severity of security threats that our 
nation currently faces and wholeheartedly 
commend those who dedicate their lives to 
ensuring the safety and security of each 
and every citizen.  
However, we also believe that the lens 
through which Muslims are repeatedly 
and forcefully portrayed as security threats 
is a narrative desperately in need of 
recalibration. The damaging consequences 
that result from misguided policies 
predicated upon Islamophobic 
assumptions and discourses is an area that 
is in need of immediate address. Therefore, 
this chapter focusses on the process of 
securitisation and resulting legislation that 
serves to marginalise and demonise British 
Muslims.  
Labelling the threat 
It is difficult to ignore the level to which 
Muslim communities and individuals have 
come to be seen through the lens of 
security and counter-terror. It is not 
uncommon to hear the wildly inaccurate 
adage that “not all Muslims are terrorists, 
but all terrorists are Muslim”. Such public 
misconceptions create the impression that 
security concerns are solely in the domain 
of Muslim aggression, while other forms of 
violence are frequently overlooked, 
minimalised or at least framed in a very 
different and de-prioritised manner.  
Perhaps a reason for this should be seen in 
an amalgamation of identity and intent. 
Recalling earlier discussions surrounding 
race, ethnicity, and identity, it is not 
uncommon for xenophobic sentiments to 
(consciously or unconsciously) influence 
the public evaluation of a Muslim 
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perpetrator, resulting in an attitude of "us" 
vs "them". The intent of religiously 
motivated attacks further reinforces the 
mindset of a division between the believer 
and the dominant non-believing 
population.284  
The act, as a consequence, is not only an act 
of violence but is also assault on the 
dominant group identity. However, when 
it comes to incidents such as the murder of 
Jo Cox (which was also designated an act 
of terrorism), the identity of the attacker 
means that he was already part of the "us" 
of the dominant group and the intent was 
not an overt assault upon the interests of 
this dominant group. 
Therefore, within the above framework, 
religiously inspired terrorism is an attack 
on society and state and, by extension, an 
attack on freedom and a way of life. 
Meanwhile far-right, white-supremacist, 
or ultra-nationalist terrorism is an attack 
on a minority and not society as a whole. 
Within the public (and often political) 
imagination, this leads to a perception that 
religiously inspired terrorism is a matter of 
security, while far-right, white-
supremacist, or ultra-nationalist terrorism 
is a public order concern. 
It is also worth remembering previous 
discussions of moral panic. As mentioned, 
the perpetuation of moral panic leads to 
calls for restrictions, punitive laws, and the 
curtailment of the suspect community’s 
civil liberties and freedoms. The 
culminating effect is a process of 
securitisation wherein Muslims become 
transformed into subjects of security. 
Processes of securitisation 
Securitisation is the process through which 
state actors transform subjects into matters 
of security. In the case of British Muslims, 
this is the way in which politicians, 
policymakers and public figures (state 
actors) construct public narratives, 
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legislative recommendations, and policies 
which permanently frame Muslims within 
the lens of counter-terror (thus, 
transforming them into matters of 
security). 
Due to the emotive nature of security, the 
result of an individual or group being 
predominantly framed and referenced 
within debates of security is that they 
receive disproportionate amounts of 
attention and resources. For example, 
terrorism committed by Muslims affects 
far fewer people than the numbers killed 
by car accidents, heart disease, breast 
cancer, smoking, or alcohol. Indeed, 
studies in the US have shown that you are 
more likely to be killed by brain-eating 
parasites, texting whilst driving, toddlers, 
lightning, furniture, falling out of bed, 
alcoholism, food poisoning, choking on 
food, prescription medication, a financial 
crash, obesity, medical errors or autoerotic 
asphyxiation than by Muslim terrorists.285  
While security threats are a real and crucial 
concern, the attention given to the dangers 
presented by Muslims in the Western 
context, particularly the attention afforded 
by the media, far outweighs that of any of 
the aforementioned issues that pose equal, 
if not greater threats. Reflecting back to the 
mechanics of the media industry and the 
dynamics of moral panics, perhaps a 
reason that the above dangers are not 
afforded the same emotive reaction is 
because they are not considered as 
newsworthy as terrorism committed by 
Muslims. Consequently, the level of media 
coverage affects the average member of the 
public’s perception of levels of importance. 
Thus, they become unable to accurately 
weigh relative risks, and therefore 
overinflate the risk of terrorism compared 
to other threats.  
A case in point is that a recent study of the 
New York Times revealed that Muslims 
are presented more negatively than cancer 
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or cocaine. One really must question how 
much positive coverage is being given to 
cancer and cocaine to make them be seen 
more positively than Muslims.286 
Once a subject has been securitised within 
public, political, and media discourses, it 
becomes necessary for policies to be 
created to mitigate the security risk they 
are claimed to pose. In the UK landscape, 
this has led to a series of questionable 
counter-terror legislation, including the 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
and the Terrorism Act 2006. 
However, such securitised rhetoric is not 
limited to counter-terror strategies, it has 
also infiltrated the Government’s approach 
to integration and community cohesion as 
well. Indeed, the Ministry of Housing, 
Communities, and Local Government’s 
“Integrated Communities Strategy Green 
Paper; Building Stronger, More United 
Communities” is littered with references 
and allusions reminiscent of counter-terror 
strategies. This conflation between 
integration and security is then furthered 
within the Home Office's updated counter-
terror strategy "CONTEST: The United 
Kingdom's Strategy for Countering 
Terrorism", which explicitly mentions this 
Green Paper in outlining its strategy. It is 
imperative that strategies of community 
integration and of counter-terrorism do not 
overlap, as this can only result in the 
further securitisation of an already 
problematic tripartite relationship between 
government, society, and minorities. The 
Government's integration strategy will be 
discussed further in a later chapter on 
Public Exclusion, Integration, and 
Minority Rights. 
286 "Study: 'NYT' Portrays Islam More Negatively than Alcohol, Cancer, and Cocaine," 
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In a BBC One television interview in 2015, 
then Business Secretary Sajid Javid insisted 
British Muslims have a special 
responsibility to “combat the poisonous 
ideology” fuelling Islamist terrorism. 
Refusal to do so, insisted Javid, would be 
equivalent to leading Muslim children “to 
the door” of terrorists.287 That same year, 
Prime Minister David Cameron accused 
some British Muslims of “quietly 
condoning” an extremist ideology that 
helped the Islamic State to recruit and 
spread its message.288 
Asking Muslims to condemn terrorism, or 
insinuating Muslims are guilty of 
condoning terrorism unless they prove 
otherwise, has become a permanent fixture 
in public and political discourse. But there 
are three important reasons why we 
should avoid calling out Muslims and 
asking them to condemn terrorism.  
The first reason is that the question 
wrongly assumes Islam is the driving force 
behind terrorism. Most social scientists 
argue that politics factors heavily into the 
motives behind Islamist terrorist 
organizations, from the Islamic State to al-
Qaeda to Hamas. Most of these 
organizations are responding to Western 
imperialism or to the real or perceived 
occupation of territory by foreign 
powers.289  
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What we also know from scholarly 
examinations of young people in Britain 
and other Western nations who end up 
joining terrorist organizations is that few of 
them are literate in Islam. In Britain, this 
religious illiteracy was first brought to the 
public’s attention after a classified study 
from MI5’s Behavioural Science Unit was 
leaked. This study found most terrorist 
recruits were novices concerning Islam and 
were not observant practitioners.290 The 
Oxford scholar, Lydia Wilson, had similar 
findings in her study of imprisoned Islamic 
State fighters in Iraq.291 We’ve even seen 
evidence of this in the news. When two 
young men from Birmingham, Yusuf 
Sarwar and Mohammed Ahmed, made 
plans to travel to Syria to join a terrorist 
organization in 2013, they logged on to 
Amazon and ordered books to help them 
prepare for the ensuing jihad, including 
Islam for Dummies and The Koran for 
Dummies.292 Their choice of literature 
speaks volumes about what little they 
knew about Islam even after they had 
made their decision to travel to Syria.  
A second reason to stop asking Muslims to 
condemn terrorism is that Muslims 
condemn terrorism all the time, in word 
and in deed. A simple Google search yields 
countless links to news releases, videos, 
and social media posts with Muslims 
speaking out against terrorism. From the 
7/7 and London bridge attacks in the UK, 
to 9/11 in the US, to the Paris attacks of 
2015, Muslim individuals and 
organizations have routinely condemned 
terrorist attacks.  
Muslims go beyond making public 
statements. Plenty of Muslims have taken 
the fight to terrorists abroad by serving in 
the armed forces of Western nations and 
Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
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dying in the line of duty for this cause. This 
was the case with Lance Corporal Jabron 
Hashmi, a British Muslim soldier who died 
at the hands of the Taliban in Afghanistan 
in 2006.293  
Muslims have also become police officers 
charged with protecting their nations 
against terrorist threats. Some 2,000 
Muslims constitute Britain’s National 
Association of Muslim Police. Ordinary 
Muslim citizens help the police and other 
intelligence agencies in their work against 
terrorism. In the years leading up to the 
2017 Manchester attack, members of the 
Muslim community reported the future 
perpetrator, Salman Abedi, to law 
enforcement on multiple occasions, while 
the Didsbury Mosque banned Abedi from 
attending the most because of his extremist 
views.294  
Muslims have raised money for victims of 
terrorist attacks. Muslims United for 
London raised over £25,000 in 48 hours for 
victims of the Westminster Bridge attack in 
2017.295 Similar fundraising efforts took 
place after the Orlando and Manchester 
attacks.296 
The evidence is overwhelming. Muslims 
are speaking out and taking action against 
terrorism all the time. Why so many 
politicians and journalists are unaware of 
these actions is perhaps a more relevant 
question to ask.  
The final reason to stop asking Muslims to 
condemn terrorism is that the question is a 
distraction. It puts Muslims on the 
defensive so that Western nations need not 
come to terms both with their violent past 
and their ongoing complicity in a violent 
world order.  
Pretty much every category of violence 
attributed to the Islamic State – persecution 
of religious minorities, rape, torture, 
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genocide – has characterized Western 
nations. The Crusades, the Inquisition, the 
European witch trials, slavery, lynchings, 
Jim Crow, colonial violence, torture, 
genocide – all of this is a part of “our” 
history, and much of it has been justified 
within a Christian framework. Some of 
these episodes, moreover, are not stuck in 
the distant past but are very much a part of 
the present. During the war on terror, for 
example, Amnesty International 
documented instances in which the UK 
was complicit in the torture of suspects 
held abroad.297  
What ties these three reasons together is 
the presumption of guilt. Muslims as a 
whole are presumed guilty of harboring 
terrorist sympathies until they prove 
otherwise (if that’s even possible). Asking 
Muslims to condemn terrorism is a form of 
racist scapegoating that allows Western 
nations to avoid coming face to face with 
the complicated political factors driving 
terrorism and the need to recognize and 
make amends for their own record of 
unjust violence. As a manifestation of 
Islamophobia, the question ultimately says 
more about the questioners than Muslims 
themselves.  
Understanding the terminology 
of security 
It is important to clarify certain 
terminologies used within security 
discourses. Much of the terminology used 
has the potential to become politicised or 
applied incorrectly thus disadvantaging, 
victimising or stigmatising individuals if it 
is not used in a critical and reflexive 
manner. This is especially concerning 
when certain words, such as “extremist” 
become absorbed in the public imagination 
as being exclusively applicable to Muslims. 
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Such a unilateral positioning serves to 
distort and misrepresent vital issues of 
security, whilst simultaneously 
marginalising and demonising Muslim 
communities within discussions. 
Extremism and “fundamental British 
values” 
Turning to dictionary definitions, 
extremism means “the quality or state of 
being extreme” or “advocacy of extreme 
measures or views”. In the context of the 
current discussion, the term is mostly used 
in a political or a religious sense, usually 
referring to an ideological stance that is 
deemed outside of the currently accepted 
mainstream attitudes of society.  
Since extremism is a relational concept, in 
discussing and defining what it is to be 
“extreme”, one needs a benchmark, 
something that is more “ordinary”, 
“centrist”, “mainstream” or “normal” for 
relative comparison. As such, the labelling 
of activities, people, and groups as 
"extremist", and the defining of what is 
"ordinary" in any setting is always a 
subjective and political matter. Therefore, 
while the term "extremist” can be used in a 
purely descriptive, academic and non-
condemning way, it is usually used 
pejoratively and with the intention of 
expressing great disapproval.  
Indeed, we all have a tendency to 
overestimate the extent that others think 
like we do; this is a social bias known as the 
“false consensus” effect.298 We therefore 
have a tendency to assume that others 
should also think like we do and, therefore, 
tend to assume that our own position is 
shared by the majority of other 
“reasonable” individuals. However, what 
one person considers to be “reasonable” 
will substantially differ from others 
depending on the observer's values, 
politics, moral scope, and the nature of 
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their relationship with the issue under 
examination.  
It is also useful to remember that various 
points in history have seen different 
positions labelled as “extremist” 
depending upon the majority social 
sentiment of the time. For example, those 
who advocated for women’s and LGBTQ 
rights were once considered outside the 
mainstream and “extreme”. In this way, 
while some may regard choosing to wear a 
hijab and religious dress as an indicator of 
“extremism”, others view it as a 
mainstream religious norm. 
Since 2011, the Government has defined 
extremism as: “vocal or active opposition 
to fundamental British values, including 
democracy, the rule of law, individual 
liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of 
different faiths and beliefs. We also include 
in our definition of extremism calls for the 
death of members of our armed forces, 
whether in this country or overseas.”299 
Within this framework for extremism, 
“fundamental British values” become the 
yardstick against which views are 
measured and evaluated. The obvious 
problem with this is that “fundamental 
British values” remains ill-defined and 
open to interpretation. With no explicit 
guidance on what constitutes “British 
values”, the terminology implies that it is 
the Government’s prerogative to set a 
threshold for acceptable cultural, religious, 
and social values. This raises questions 
surrounding how one measures and 
identifies ideologies relative to British 
values, particularly considering that the 
concept appears to be a nebulous and 
elastic yardstick. For example, aside from 
religious dress, how does religious 
slaughter, personal sexual ethics, or fasting 
fit into this evaluation? 
In absence of reliable guidance on which 
values are to be supported and which are 
to be deemed at odds with the views of 
299 UK, HM Government, The Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation 
and Extremism, Tackling extremism in the UK (2013). 
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mainstream society, this approach 
ultimately exposes minority communities, 
and Muslims specifically, to the risk of 
being subject to increasing scrutiny and 
marginalisation, not for potentially violent 
behaviour, but for not conforming to the 
Government’s views on what should be 
mainstream society’s values.  
Radicalism and non-violent extremism 
Another clarification to be made is the 
difference is between “extremist” and 
“radical”. These two terms are often used 
interchangeably, particularly by 
politicians, but even by political scientists 
who should know better. It is tempting to 
define radicals as “non-violent extremists” 
under the banner of “extreme by goal but 
not by method” – “acceptable” extremists, 
as it were. However, a more accurate 
distinction between “extremism” and 
“radicalism” can be gleaned through 
examining the history of ideas 
surrounding these terms. From this point 
of view, extremists tend to be closed-
minded supremacists and radicals tend to 
be open-minded egalitarians.300 
The term violence is often a taken for 
granted category, therefore, we often 
assume non-violence to be simply the 
absence of violence. However, violence 
itself is by no means a clear-cut 
terminology. Violence by organs of the 
state may be labelled as "force", thus 
constituting a "defensive" form of violence 
and ascribing an aura of legitimacy to the 
infliction of physical harm. A closer look at 
violence reveals a multitude of nuances 
and meanings, especially in combination 
with adjectives like physical, 
psychological, structural, cultural, direct or 
indirect, criminal, political, non-lethal and 
lethal.301 
Non-violence in the Gandhian tradition 
refers to an activist and at times even 
militant mode of conflict waging, based on 
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sanctions other than the threat of violence. 
Such non-violence as an activist strategy 
goes beyond passive, peaceful resistance: it 
involves an array of direct individual and 
collective political actions, such as hunger-
strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins, blockades, 
acts of civil disobedience and other 
persuasive and even coercive tactics (such 
as non-cooperation in the form of strikes) - 
but all falling short of the use of violence 
against persons or objects (other than one’s 
self). Both means and ends of adherents of 
this political philosophy are non-violent.  
In the sense of the above, “non-violent 
extremism” is, therefore, a misleading 
term. Gandhian non-violence is radical but 
not extreme. However, even such a 
statement hinges on where we draw the 
line between the concepts of “radicalism” 
and “extremism”, which many use 
interchangeably – particularly in the 
manner in which such terms are used in 
political discourse, as both terminologies 
indicate a position at some distance from 
“centrist”, “mainstream” or “moderate” 
positions.  
Correct appreciation for the nuances 
contained in terms such as “non-violent 
extremism” is, therefore, of vital 
importance. Acts such as letter writing, 
petitioning, organising or participating in 
peaceful demonstrations, and various 
other forms of campaigning are integral 
strategies within peaceful activism for 
social change within democratic systems. 
However, for many, a problem occurs 
when Muslim individuals and 
organisations use these “non-violent” 
methods to advocate for causes considered 
“outside” of mainstream views.  
A particularly acute example of this can be 
seen in the treatment of Muslim 
organisations that criticise elements of 
counter-terror strategies. A great deal of 
campaigning has been undertaken by both 
Muslim and non-Muslim organisations 
301 Schmid, Alex P. Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin. The 
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and individuals to highlight problems 
within the UK's stance on counter-terror. 
However, Muslims who do engage with 
peaceful advocacy work in this area are 
frequently labelled as "non-violent 
extremists" because their views are at odds 
with the current status-quo, but their 
methods are within the realms of 
democratic engagement. 
This has culminated in the Government’s 
disengagement policy with Muslim 
organisations that it considers “non-
violent extremists”. The ultimate 
consequence is that Muslims who wish to 
fully participate in the democratic system 
are stigmatised and excluded from having 
their views and interests heard.  
The political exclusion of Muslims (as 
discussed in a later chapter of this report) 
is a fundamental consequence of 
Islamophobia. Therefore, it is imperative 
that the terminologies of security are fully 
understood in both their meaning, usage, 
and their implications. 
Radicalisation 
One of the issues with defining 
radicalisation is the importance of context 
in determining what is perceived as 
radicalisation. Therefore, radicalisation 
can mean different things to different 
people. As such, there is no universally 
accepted definition of radicalisation in 
academia or Government.  
On a basic level, radicalisation may be 
considered to be the process by which an 
individual or group comes to adopt 
increasingly extreme political, social, or 
religious ideals and aspirations that reject 
or undermine the socio-political status 
quo. In other words, it is the process 
through which individuals are drawn to 
extremist ideologies and methodologies. 
Within discussions on counter-terrorism, 
the UK Government defines radicalisation 
as “The process by which people come to 
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support terrorism and violent extremism 
and, in some cases, then join terrorist 
groups.”302 
Although most political discourse and 
academic literature focus on radicalisation 
to "violent extremism", radicalisation can 
be both violent and non-violent. As 
previously discussed, attempting to 
restrict progression to non-violent 
extremism has potentially problematic 
applications and consequences. 
Specifically, there is a danger that 
focussing on "non-violent extremism" 
could be used as a tool to restrict legitimate 
debates and criticism within democratic 
engagement which could disrupt current 
status quos. Once again, the Islamophobic 
implications of excluding Muslim political 
engagement are of great concern. 
The impacts of counter-terror 
legislation on Muslim 
communities 
Current counter-terror legislation is 
centred upon the idea that, because the 
magnitude of the terrorist threat is too 
great to rely on traditional post-crime 
jurisprudence, measures and policies need 
to exist that pre-empt violent acts of terror 
and criminalise individuals who are 
believed to be in the process of committing 
such acts. This transition was one of the 
key consequences of the War on Terror, 
which has effectively resulted in the 
implementation of legislative systems that 
blur “the boundary between foreign and 
domestic and between law enforcement 
and military action.”303 However, due to 
the inherent difficulty in preventing and 
pre-empting crime, the application of pre-
criminal legislation results in an often 
arbitrary and over-conjectural application 
of the law, whereby individuals perceived 
to belong to a community at risk are 
increasingly problematised and even 
criminalised on the basis of acts that would 
303 Jude McCulloch and Dean Wilson, Pre-crime: Pre-emption, Precaution and the Future, 
(London, New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 631. 
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not be considered criminal in different 
circumstances.   
In other words, attempts to predict crime 
inherently involve subjective judgements 
and hypotheses, ultimately culminating in 
issues of racial profiling and overt scrutiny 
on one “suspect” community – Muslims. 
Within this subjective framework, it is, 
therefore, inevitable that innocent 
individuals will become suspect and 
caught up in the apparatus of security 
measures, purely on the basis of their 
religious, cultural, or ethnic identities. 
The following discussion examines the 
impacts of two elements of counter-terror 
legislation on Muslim communities – 
PREVENT and Schedule 7.  
PREVENT 
What is Prevent? 
PREVENT is one part of CONTEST, which 
is the UK’s overarching counter-terror 
strategy involving intelligence agencies 
and counter-terrorism policing. It is built 
upon four pillars: 
Pursue: Stopping terrorist attacks by 
detecting, prosecuting and otherwise 
disrupting those who plot to carry out 
attacks against the UK or its overseas 
interests through intelligence gathering 
and surveillance. 
PREVENT: Stopping people becoming 
terrorists or supporting terrorism by 
detecting those vulnerable to 
radicalisation. 
Protect: Focusing on areas such as border 
security, the transport system, national 
infrastructure and public places in order to 
protect them and reduce their vulnerability 
to terrorist attack.  
Prepare: Mitigating the impact of a 
terrorist attack where that attack cannot be 
stopped. This includes work to bring a 
terrorist attack to an end, and to increase 
                                                     
304 Home Office, “Response to Freedom of Information request from M Norris”, 
September 11, 2014, accessed 11.06.2018, 
https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london
_report.pdf  
resilience in order to help with effective 
recovery in its aftermath. 
PREVENT is delivered nationwide with a 
particular focus on areas considered to be 
at greatest risk, such as Newham, 
Redbridge, Tower Hamlets, Birmingham, 
Cardiff, and Manchester.304 Each priority 
area then receives funding for a PREVENT 
co-ordinator, who is supported by the 
Home Office to develop delivery plans 
relating to PREVENT objectives. Work 
includes disrupting extremist speakers, 
removing material online, intervening to 
stop people being radicalised, and 
dissuading people from travelling to Syria 
and Iraq and intervening when they 
return.305 
What does PREVENT mean in practice? 
Ultimately, PREVENT enforces a statutory 
duty on certain public bodies to have due 
regard to signs of potential radicalisation. 
In other words, staff within schools, 
universities, the police, the NHS, probation 
services, local authorities, councils, 
prisons, colleges and other public 
institutions have a compulsory duty to 
report anyone they suspect may be 
vulnerable to becoming radicalised. 
Once individuals have been identified by 
staff within these public bodies, they are 
referred to a program called CHANNEL 
and a support plan is created if it is deemed 
necessary. 
Guidance is provided by the Home Office 
on how each body should implement the 
PREVENT duty. For example: 
Local authorities should ensure that 
publicly owned premises are not used to 
disseminate extremist views. 
Frontline school staff should understand 
PREVENT, be able to recognise 
vulnerability to radicalisation, and know 
where to go to seek further help. 





Universities should have policies and 
procedures in place for the management of 
events on campus, and the use of all 
university premises, that apply to all staff, 
students, and visitors.  
Police should support individuals 
vulnerable to radicalisation, for example 
through the CHANNEL programme, and 
support partner organisations to deliver 
PREVENT objectives.  
Prisons should offer support to 
individuals vulnerable to radicalisation or 
move them away from other individuals of 
concern. Those who are at risk of 
radicalising others should face the removal 
of privileges and segregation from 
others.306 
Problems with PREVENT  
PREVENT has been heavily criticised by 
experts, academics, activists, and 
politicians across all sectors of public life. 
The concerns primarily centre around its 
lack of evidentiary basis leading to 
inadequate training, discriminatory 
application and the marginalisation of 
Muslims. Ultimately, many have 
condemned the strategy as 
counterproductive, with the 
ineffectiveness of de-radicalisation 
programmes being illustrated by a 2018 
study conducted by the Behavioural 
Insights Team (BIT), which found that 95% 
of these programmes were ineffective and 
counter-productive.307 
PREVENT has no evidentiary basis 
The list of characteristics that PREVENT 
requires practitioners to look out for is 
called the ERG22+ risk factors. The 
research underpinning the ERG22+ risk 
factors was research conducted on a small 
group of prisoners convicted of terrorism 
offences. The use of this tiny sample of 
people – criminals who are 
unrepresentative of British Muslims – in 
order to draw conclusions about the 
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general Muslim population in the UK has 
been repeatedly criticised and has not 
undergone the standard independent peer-
review process to give the research any 
validity.  
The PREVENT strategy focuses heavily on 
ideology without consideration of other factors 
influencing radicalisation 
There is wide agreement amongst experts 
and academics that people are drawn into 
terrorism for a huge variety of reasons. 
However, PREVENT's heavy focus on 
ideology does not properly account for the 
impact of mental health issues, foreign 
policy, individual isolation, 
unemployment, socio-economic 
deprivation or a whole host of other factors 
that could lead an individual to become 
radicalised. 
PREVENT has no workable definitions 
As explored earlier in this chapter, the 
Government presently has no clear 
working definitions of extremism, non-
violent extremism, British Values nor 
radicalisation. With roughly 600,000 
WRAP-trained staff attempting to identify 
radicalisation with a view to tackling 
extremism, this lack of objective 
understanding causes confusion in 
PREVENT’s application. If a person 
doesn’t know exactly what extremism or 
radicalisation are, how can they identify 
them? 
PREVENT officers must rely on inadequate 
training 
Considering that counter-terror is such an 
important component of public safety and 
that it possesses a potential to impact 
people in severe ways if not applied 
correctly, it is imperative that the training 
provided is of the highest quality. 
However, at present, PREVENT delivery 
officers receive only 45-60 minutes of 
training to identify signs of radicalisation 
(which, as previously mentioned, are 




based on flawed science in themselves). 
Such basic training is only capable of a 
generic overview of what radicalisation at 
best. This, in turn, creates a misleading 
framework through which nurses, 
teachers, and other public body employees 
are required to attempt to identify 
radicalisation.308  
Indeed, this lack of effective training was 
highlighted by the Home Affairs 
Committee who noted “We are concerned 
about a lack of sufficient and appropriate 
training in an area that is complex and 
unfamiliar to many education and other 
professionals, compounded by a lack of 
clarity about what is required of them.”309 
Equally worrying is the fact that there 
appears to be no formative examination 
nor on-going assessment for PREVENT 
officers. Such a lack of unregulated quality 
assurance for procedures would never be 
tolerated as good practice in any other 
workspace.  
Taking the NHS as an example, research 
conducted by Warwick University has 
found that 70% of the respondents “were 
‘likely’, or ‘very likely’” to refer someone 
for the “possession of Islamic/Anarchist 
philosophy books”. This is important as 
the PREVENT training programme does 
not indicate this as a factor indicative of 
radicalisation. The authors of the research, 
in line with the overarching concerns 
surrounding the PREVENT duty, conclude 
that “respondents are drawing their 
attitude from popular culture rather than 
official training or academic research”.310 
Such findings are therefore concerning as 
they are demonstrative of the lack of 
standardisation and reinforcement of 
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correct practice across the PREVENT 
training. 
Unacceptable levels of collateral damage 
The lack of an evidentiary basis combined 
with poor training has led to a situation 
where, everyday normative practices of the 
Islamic faith (for example, wearing the 
hijab) or taking an interest in politics 
(criticising foreign policy) can be seen as a 
sign of radicalisation. Indeed, there have 
been numerous to dozens of cases where 
individuals have been falsely implicated as 
being at risk of radicalisation. Indeed, of 
the 7,361 individuals referred to PREVENT 
in 2015/16, 4,997 were referred for 
“Islamist extremism”, but only 5% went on 
to receive CHANNEL support for de-
radicalisation – meaning that the 
remaining 95% were eventually not 
considered to be at risk of radicalisation.311 
In 2016/17, of the 6,093 individuals 
referred, 3,704 (61%) were again referred 
for Islamist extremism, but only 184 (4.9%) 
went on to receive CHANNEL support.312 
Some of these case studies will be 
discussed further below. 
There is a paucity of research on the effects 
of a false referral on these individuals, but 
it is likely that the stigmatising effects of 
being flagged as a “security risk” will be 
adverse, and affect individuals from a 
psychological, social, educational, and 
employment perspective. 
Targeting Muslims as a suspect community 
Home Office data indicates that 5,000 
individuals were referred to PREVENT for 
“Islamist extremism” in 2015-16. 
Assuming all of those referred for “Islamist 
extremism” were Muslim, this means that 
roughly 1 in 500 Muslims were referred to 
311 “Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2015 
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PREVENT during the year. A conservative 
estimate of the proportion of the White 
population referred for far-right concerns 
is less than 1 in 60,000, making the 
likelihood of a Muslim being referred for 
“Islamist extremism” more than 110 times 
the likelihood of a White individual being 
referred for ‘far-right extremism’ to the 
programme. 
As a consequence, numerous critics have 
condemned the PREVENT strategy as 
being inherently discriminatory. Beyond 
issues of equality and social justice, such a 
discriminatory application may also prove 
to be counterproductive. Indeed, MI5 has 
concluded that “experiences of inequality, 
marginalisation, or victimisation, 
particularly racial or religious attacks, both 
physical and verbal” play a direct role in 
the radicalisation of individuals.313 
PREVENT, unfortunately, seems to do 
exactly that.  
Indeed, Andy Burnham has described the 
PREVENT strategy as contributing to 
“creating a feeling in the Muslim 
community that it is being spied upon and 
unfairly targeted. It is building a climate of 
mutual suspicion and distrust. Far from 
tackling extremism, it risks creating the 
very conditions for it to flourish”.314   
Regarding PREVENT in the NHS, a senior 
NHS whistleblower recently revealed that 
“I have never, ever had a concern raised to 
me about a white, non-Muslim or far-right 
person,” said the whistleblower. 
“Concerns have only ever been raised 
about Muslims. This is a shockingly bad 
and damaging piece of legislation and in 
my view it has no place in an advanced 
democratic country.”315 
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Conflicts with safeguarding 
PREVENT causes grey areas in 
safeguarding. Ordinarily within 
safeguarding, it is the welfare of the 
individual person in question that is of 
concern because you're trying to protect 
that person; whereas, with PREVENT, 
you're protecting the state from that 
person. This creates confusion in how to 
approach safeguarding needs. 
As concluded by the civil rights 
campaigners, Liberty, “while everyone in 
society has moral and ethical obligations to 
report suspected criminality, requiring 
teachers and others in sensitive positions of 
trust to report those with dissenting views 
risks undermining professional obligations 
of confidentiality, sewing mistrust and 
pushing those with grievances further 
underground.”316 
The Impact of PREVENT 
Within the confines of this report, space 
does not allow a full examination of the 
impact of PREVENT in every area in which 
it operates. However, the following 
discussion seeks to briefly highlight some 
of the key concerns arising from the 
application of PREVENT in three key areas 
– schools, universities, and the NHS. 
In Schools 
With the majority of referrals to PREVENT 
coming from the education sector (32% of 
all referrals in 2016/17),317 the impact of 
PREVENT in schools and on the learning 
and development of children is of primary 
concern. 
A lack of trust in the classroom: The 
classroom environment is predicated upon 
trust. If students feel that they are being 
spied upon by their teachers, this destroys 
316 “Liberty’s Second Reading briefing on the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill…” 
p. 25. 
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the relationship of trust that is so 
important. Aside from the obvious damage 
this has upon the student's ability to learn, 
if students do not feel that they can ask 
questions to their teachers, there is a 
danger that they may resort to finding 
answers online, where any kind of 
distorted information can be found.  
Creating a pre-criminal space: Children 
require encouragement and nurturing to 
flourish and achieve their potential. 
However, the pre-criminal space that is 
created by PREVENT stigmatises students, 
thereby potentially damaging their self-
confidence and their confidence in societal 
structures and institutions. 
Schoolyard bullying:  The previous 
chapter in this report on Youth and 
Education outlined the levels of racially 
and religiously motivated bullying that 
Muslim children are confronted by. 
Schools should not enact policies that serve 
to further securitise and stigmatise 
students. Counter-terror strategies 
infiltrating the school environment can 
only result in furthering the bullying 
narratives of “bomber” and “terrorist”. 
Hindrance to learning and development: 
Schools should be environments where 
students feel safe, confident and 
supported. Therefore, the aforementioned 
concerns obviously have a great potential 
to severely impact the way in which 
children perceive and interact with their 
education.  
In Universities 
In 2017, the National Union of Students 
(NUS) launched a report into the 
experience of Muslim students in British 
universities.318 The report concluded that 
                                                     












“Prevent is a key issue for respondents’ 
ability to engage meaningfully with the 
structures of their institutions, unions and 
NUS, in particular around democratic 
engagement. It is particularly notable that 
being affected by Prevent has a negative 
impact on respondents’ engagement with 
political debates. This negative impact 
persists whether or not respondents 
articulated that fear around Prevent was 
the cause. This correlation demonstrates 
the chilling effect of Prevent, and that 
being affected by Prevent accompanies an 
erosion in trust of institutions who have 
responsibility to combat Islamophobia.”319  
Thus, this highlights several key problems 
with the implementation of PREVENT in 
university settings: 
Impact on free-speech: Universities are 
intended to be centres of critical debate and 
learning. As such, the freedom to express 
ideas and explore arguments is integral to 
this mission. Indeed, universities’ duties 
with respect to free speech are reflected in 
the Education Act 1986,320 the Education 
Reform Act 1988,321  the Human Rights Act 
1998,322 and the Equality Act 2010.323 
However, the requisites of the PREVENT 
duty undermines these principles as 
speakers and topics of discussion become 
regulated. Moreover, Muslim students 
have reported a reluctance to engage with 
certain discussions due to a fear they will 
be referred to PREVENT. According to the 
NUS report, one-third of surveyed 
students reported being negatively 
affected by PREVENT. This included 
having been referred to authorities under 
the scheme, having organised events that 
were cancelled or significantly changed 
because of it (30 percent of those affected) 
or having disengaged from political debate 
320 “Education Act 1986”, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/40  
321 “Education Reform Act 1988”, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/40/contents  
322 "Human Rights Act 1998", available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42  
323 “Equality Act 2010”, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/contents  
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specifically due to concerns around being 
reported under PREVENT.324   
Limiting political engagement: The NUS 
report noted the potential of PREVENT to 
deter students from political engagement. 
According to the findings, 43% of those 
who reported being affected by PREVENT 
felt unable to express their views or be 
themselves and 30% do not feel 
comfortable attending NUS events. 
Islamophobia as a mechanism of political 
exclusion is a topic that will be returned to 
in a following chapter on Political 
Representation and Exclusion.  
Being used as a tool to shut down 
opposing voices: According to the 
Department of Education at the University 
of Oxford, “Criticising government policy, 
expression of support for specific groups, 
identifying causal relations between 
policies, processes and events, subjecting 
public arguments to evaluation and 
critique — these are all legitimate aspects 
of academic work. They also contribute to 
public and political debate.”325 Therefore, it 
is clear by all academic standards that, in 
voicing and debating concerns, students 
perform their duty both as academics and 
as engaged members of civic society.   
However, there are organisations such as 
Student Rights (incidentally, a project of 
the Henry Jackson Society),326 who present 
the criticisms of Muslim students – 
especially those in connection with 
counter-terror or Palestinian rights – as 
threats to security. Furthermore, Student 
Rights has been accused of performing 
“witch hunts” against Islamic societies and 
using the arguments of PREVENT to attack 
societies and events that host speakers 
with whom they disagree and 
subsequently label as “extremist”. At the 
same time, Student Rights have 
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accessed June 20, 2018, http://www.education.ox.ac.uk/about-us/academic-
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simultaneously opposed no-platforming 
policies directed at far-right speakers, such 
as the BNP. Again, the role of Student 
Rights in excluding Muslim voices from 
legitimate debates will be discussed 
further in the later chapter on Political and 
Public Exclusion. 
In the NHS 
Alongside schools, the NHS comes into 
contact with some of society's most 
vulnerable citizens. Therefore, they have a 
duty of care towards all patients. The 
pressures of PREVENT, therefore, put 
undue strains on this duty of care, 
particularly in terms of safeguarding. 
Indeed, the research conducted by the 
University of Warwick also noted that 
there is “evidence to suggest that the 
mentally ill are being inappropriately 
stigmatised as terrorism risks”.327 This 
revelation has been further compounded 
by the use of PREVENT to monitor 
terminally ill people and dementia patients 
in hospices and palliative care units.328 
Unclear guidelines: The unclear 
guidelines laid out create a risk of ‘intuitive 
reporting’ and unconscious bias. 
Ultimately, it is unavoidable that popular 
culture stereotypes will influence staff 
perception of radicalisation. 
Conflicts with safeguarding: PREVENT 
causes grey areas in safeguarding. It is not 
transparent, there is no audit, and no 
clinical governance. Ordinarily within 
safeguarding, it is the welfare of the 
individual person in question that is of 
concern because you are trying to protect 
that person; whereas, with PREVENT, you 
are primarily protecting the state from that 
person. This creates confusion in how to 
approach safeguarding needs. As 
previously mentioned, an NHS 
326 The Henry Jackson Society are discussed in the chapter on the Islamophobia 
Industry of this report. 
327 Charlotte Heath-Kelly and Erzsébet Strausz “Counter-terrorism in the NHS: 
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whistleblower recently condemned the use 
of PREVENT in the NHS, accusing the 
Home Office of hijacking the term 
“safeguarding” and redefining it in the 
context of PREVENT. Safeguarding duties 
only apply to adults deemed vulnerable, 
with care and support needs, who are 
experiencing, or are at risk of, abuse or 
neglect and are unable to protect 
themselves against such treatment. The 
whistleblower stated that, “Local 
authorities will dismiss a safeguarding 
concern if the individual does not meet 
those criteria…What is happening here is 
‘thought police’; concerns are usually 
raised about people who have made 
comments about ongoing politics such as 
overseas wars.”329 
There is little doubt that repackaging or 
framing PREVENT as an issue of 
safeguarding has stifled dissent in the 
public sector, since very few professionals 
would dare to question the notion of 
safeguarding. 
No place in healthcare: the majority of 
NHS staff (52%) do not think PREVENT 
belongs in healthcare.330 Criticising 
PREVENT’s operation in the NHS the 
recent whistleblower stated that “Patients 
who don’t trust their doctor or nurse may 
not seek advice from them, which could be 
potentially life threatening. Prevent moves 
people’s focus away from care, treatment 
and support into areas that are police 
business: counter-terrorism and 
surveillance… This is a system that is 
designed and run by the Home Office, 
which oversees it and to which 
organisations are accountable. My belief is 
that the Home Office has no place being 
involved in day-to-day NHS work, or 
indeed education. In essence, this is ‘soft’ 
surveillance.”331 
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Islamophobia, Prevent and 
University 
Hareem Ghani  
NUS Women’s Officer 2016 – 2018 
Ilyas Nagdee 
NUS Black Students Officer 2017 – 2019  
Hareem Ghani and Ilyas Nagdee are also coordinators of 
the Students Not Suspects Campaign 
Earlier this year, the NUS Black Students 
and NUS Womens’ Campaign released the 
Muslims in Education Report which 
looked at the experiences of Muslim 
Students in Education. It was the first 
report of its kind and some of the headline 
results are below. 
 One in 3 Muslim Students felt 
negatively affected by Prevent and half 
of those felt unable to express political 
opinions and/or disengaged from 
political discussion altogether 
 One in three respondents reported 
having experienced some type of abuse 
or crime at their place of study and over 
a half experienced some form of online 
abuse.  
 The responses were heavily gendered; 
women who wear a traditional Islamic 
garment (e.g. a hijab, niqab or jilbab) 
were significantly more likely to be 
very worried about being abused or 
attacked. 
We will expand on some of the findings 
around Prevent below. 
One-third of survey respondents felt 
negatively affected by the Prevent strategy. 
This included participating less in political 
activity or debate; having events they have 
organised being restricted or cancelled; or 
being reported through Prevent. Whether 
a Muslim student has been affected by 
Prevent is a significant indicator of 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/counterterroris
minthenhs/project_report_draft_60pp.pdf  
331 “Hospice staff ‘trained to report dying patients as part of terror strategy’” 
 118 
whether they are involved in a wide 
variety of student activities and their 
opinions on a variety of matters. As such 
we noted throughout the survey where 
these answers significantly differed from 
the rest of the respondents, had they been 
affected by Prevent.   
Students affected by Prevent highlighted 
that their experience of Prevent has led to 
them taking part in less political activity. 
Muslim students feel strongly about what 
Prevent entails. An overwhelming 
majority of respondents disagreed that 
lecturers and education institutions should 
monitor and report students’ attitudes and 
behaviours, prayer room activities and 
email/online activity. Three in five 
respondents disagreed that lecturers 
should report on their views and opinions. 
Having personal experience of the impact 
of Prevent heightens these responses. 
Significantly more women who wore 
religious coverings disagreed with facets of 
the duty compared with those who do not. 
For example, women wearing religious 
garments are more likely to disagree that 
lecturers should be reporting to the 
government on their students’ views and 
opinions (69 per cent of women who wear 
a garment versus 53 per cent for those who 
did not), or that institutions should be 
monitoring recording student emails and 
internet/web usage (72 per cent versus 56 
per cent respectively). 
Two out of five respondents (43 per cent) 
who reported having been affected by 
Prevent told us that this experience made it 
harder to express their opinions or views. 
Nearly a third of students (30 per cent) who 
have been affected by Prevent reported 
experiencing barriers to organising 
speakers and events on campus. 
“In lessons I found myself not speaking my 
true opinion because of fear of being 
misreported as a result, just for saying my 
opinion, and I worry that others will just 
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comment.” (Woman, aged 22–23, Master’s 
student) 
“[When I was] getting a certain speaker for 
an event, Prevent were involved and had 
to be present for the talk, in addition to 
police as well, shockingly.” (Man, aged 22–
23, higher education student) 
Muslim students most likely not to have 
been affected by Prevent include those not 
involved with their students’ union, 
international students and women who do 
not wear religious garments (eg hijab or 
niqab). Muslim women who wear a 
covering are significantly more likely to be 
affected by Prevent during their time in 
education than those who do not; 40 per 
cent compared with 26 per cent. This kind 
of correlation may raise further questions 
regarding how the Prevent duty functions 
to highlight specific Muslim students 
relating to their demographics, rather than 
their behaviour, and in turn amplifies 
existing biases and stereotypes of Muslims. 
Our research findings suggest that Muslim 
students follow a similar pattern to other 
students in terms of their general levels of 
participation (both passive and active) in 
student union activities, including a small 
percentage who have no involvement 
whatsoever. Respondents who reported a 
complete lack of involvement in these 
activities are more likely to have reported 
being unaffected by Prevent. Conversely, 
students who reported an acute awareness 
of their students’ union’s work are more 
likely to have reported being affected by 
Prevent. Muslim students affected by 
Prevent are more likely to disagree that 
their students’ union understands their 
needs or reflects their views. 
PREVENT Case Studies 
Prevent Watch332 and Rights Watch UK333 
have detailed a number of cases where 
PREVENT has been used to identify and 
333 Preventing Education? Human Rights and UK Counter-Terrorism Policy in Schools, 
publication, July 2016, http://rwuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/preventing-
education-final-to-print-3.compressed-1.pdf.  
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question students outside of standard 
protocols and in unwarranted 
circumstances.  
Staffordshire Textbook case – March 
2015334  
Mohammed Umar Farooq was a 33-year-
old postgraduate student enrolled on the 
Terrorism, Crime and Global Security 
Master’s program at Staffordshire 
University.335 On 23 March 2015, he was 
approached by two female staff while in 
the library (Farooq initially assumed these 
staff members to be fellow students). 
According to Farooq, he was questioned 
about attitudes to homosexuality, ISIS, and 
al-Qaida. He said his replies were "largely 
academic but he stressed his personal 
opposition to extremist views". The tense 
conversation ended, and after a short 
while, a security guard approached 
Farooq, confirming that he had received a 
complaint from staff members. The staff 
told the security guard that "there is a man, 
who is Asian and with a beard, who is not 
a student and is reading a book on 
terrorism”. The staff went further to say, 
“check him out”, as she suspected he is a 
“radical terrorist”. The security guard 
approached and recognised Farooq and 
did not take any further action. 
Farooq filed an internal complaint for 
discrimination; he asked why the staff had 
chosen to question him, the only Muslim 
with a beard, holding books on terrorism. 
The teachers refused to answer any of the 
questions.  
In response to the complaint, the Academic 
Registrar and Director of Student 
Experience responded by acknowledging 
that the university has “a commitment to 
secure freedom of speech and to prevent 
people from being drawn into terrorism.” 
They further described the PREVENT duty 
as “very broad, devoid of detail” and 
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containing “insufficient detail to provide 
clear practical direction in an environment 
such as the University’s.” 
Farooq received a letter of apology from 
the teacher that wrongfully questioned 
him. The teacher said, "I do not possess any 
particular knowledge or experience of 
terrorism and radicalisation, and I have 
only attended a short training session on 
how to identify students who might be at 
risk of being radicalised." She further 
asserted that a "combination of the content 
of our discussion and my lack of 
experience in this arena caused me to 
consider whether this was something that 
may fall within the ‘Prevent agenda’.”336 
The incident resulted in Farooq being so 
unsettled that he chose not to return to the 
course, stating that he had been “looking 
over his shoulder” ever since.  
There are many stories like this one where 
the individual was not referred to a 
PREVENT officer and, therefore, it is not 
technically recorded as a PREVENT 
intervention. However, the strategy itself 
and the training of those charged with 
enforcing it has led to a situation where 
individuals like Farooq are at risk of 
stigmatisation. 
The Eco-Warrior (May 2015) 
A Muslim pupil was investigated by 
PREVENT officers for discussing 
deforestation campaigners, eco-warriors, 
and their tactics during a class debate 
about deforestation. The entire class 
partook in a debate about eco-warriors, 
which was a topic they had researched for 
the debating society at school. During the 
investigation, the pupil explained the 
context in which he used the word "eco-
terrorism", but things took a turn for the 
worse when the PREVENT officers asked 
the pupil if he was affiliated with ISIS. 
Following the event, the young pupil 
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/sep/24/student-accused-being-
terrorist-reading-book-terrorism.  
336 "CAGE releases exclusive video interview with student accused of terrorism," 
CAGE, September 29, 2015, https://cage.ngo/article/cage-releases-exclusive-video-
interview-student-accused-terrorism/.  
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became concerned that he could be 
separated from his family and became 
reluctant to participate in class debates or 
express his opinions.337 
Free Palestine (February 2016) 
16-year old Rahmaan Mohammadi was 
questioned by anti-terrorism police at 
home for wearing a “Free Palestine” badge 
to school and for trying to raise money for 
humanitarian aid for Palestinians. 
Bedfordshire police visited Mohammadi’s 
house with a folder of information about 
his activities at school, and after consulting 
with the young student and his parents, 
concluded there was no sign of 
radicalisation.338 Mohammadi alleges that 
the police warned him "not to talk about 
Palestine in school", and that school staff 
approached his brother and pressured him 
to tell Rahmaan to "stop being 
radical".339 “My education was being 
ruined”, recalled Mohammadi some 
months later, “PREVENT is doing more 
harm than good.”340 
The cucumber cooker bomb (March 2016) 
A four-year-old child drew a picture of his 
father cutting a cucumber and was referred 
to PREVENT by the nursery staff who, on 
questioning the child about what he had 
drawn misheard “cucumber” as “cuker-
bum”, thus believing the picture showed 
his father making a “cooker bomb”. 
Eventually, no referral was made, but the 
child’s mother recalled how tragic the 
experience was: “Initially I was so upset 
and distraught that I told him not to do any 
more drawings … God bless him, he said: 
‘I won’t draw anything ... I’ll just draw a 
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house, or the remote control. And I said: 
‘Don’t draw the remote!’”.341 
Trip to Saudi Arabia (Undated) 
A recent study conducted by Warwick 
University over the application of the 
PREVENT duty in the NHS revealed 
misguided referrals made purely on a 
conjectural basis. One referral involved "an 
Asian man" who was considered a risk 
because he was planning a "future trip to 
Saudi Arabia", which was interpreted by a 
healthcare as a cause for concern. In truth, 
the "Asian man" was planning a Hajj trip to 
the holy city of Mecca, a pillar of Islam 
which all capable Muslims are expected to 
complete at least once during their 
lifetime.342 
Watching Arabic news (Undated) 
Another referral highlighted by the 
Warwick University research was made 
when a healthcare professional considered 
a child watching an “Arabic televised news 
channel” at risk of radicalisation. On a 
home visit to the patient, a healthcare 
professional noticed a child watching TV in 
Arabic, as well as Arabic literature lying on 
the floor. The family was “reported to 
social care as a potential case of 
radicalisation”.343 
Critics of PREVENT 
PREVENT has been criticised by Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike. These critics 
include (but are not limited to) three 
special rapporteurs to the UN, the NUT, 
the NUS, the former Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Rights 
Watch UK, the Open Society Justice 
Initiative, and more than 140 academics, 
11.06.2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/video/2016/aug/26/prevent-
anti-radicalisation-muslims-london-video  
341 “Nursery 'raised fears of radicalisation over boy's cucumber drawing'”, The 
Guardian, March 11, 2016, accessed 11.06.2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/mar/11/nursery-radicalisation-fears-boys-cucumber-drawing-cooker-
bomb   
342 Charlotte Heath-Kelly and Erzsébet Strausz “Counter-terrorism in the NHS 
EVALUATING PREVENT DUTY SAFEGUARDING IN THE NHS”, Warwick 
University, p. 26, accessed 11.06.2018, 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/irs/counterterroris
minthenhs/project_report_draft_60pp.pdf  
343 Ibid. p. 25 
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politicians and experts in a single letter 
alone. 
The National Union of Teachers (now the 
NEU) 
The NUT voted overwhelmingly to reject 
PREVENT because it causes “suspicion in 
the classroom and confusion in the 
staffroom.”344 The NUT claims that the best 
role schools can play in countering 
extremism is by encouraging discussion, 
which is in fact inhibited by some aspects 
of the Prevent strategy. Consequently, the 
NUT has called for a review of the 
strategy.345 
Maina Kiai, UN Special Rapporteur on the 
rights to freedom of assembly and 
association 
Maina Kiai stated that PREVENT has 
“created unease and uncertainty around 
what can be legitimately discussed in 
public”.346 He goes on to argue that “the 
spectre of Big Brother is so large, in fact, 
that I was informed that some families are 
afraid of discussing the negative effects of 
terrorism in their own homes, fearing their 
children would talk about it at school and 
have their intentions misconstrued.”347 
Furthermore, he concluded that “by 
dividing, stigmatising and alienating 
segments of the population, Prevent could 
end up promoting extremism rather than 
countering it.”348 
Ben Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur 
on the protection and promotion of 
human rights while countering terrorism 
Ben Emmerson, has previously said, 
speaking on domestic counter-terrorism 
strategies, “some states have misused these 
poorly defined concepts to suppress 
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The Guardian. March 28, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/mar/28/teachers-nut-back-motion-
calling-prevent-strategy-radicalisation-scrapped. 
345 "Prevent Strategy." National Union of Teachers. March 28, 2016. Accessed March 
17, 2017. https://www.teachers.org.uk/news-events/conference-2016/prevent-
strategy. 
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political opposition or ideological dissent 
from mainstream values…legislation 
against extremism has in some instances 
been used against journalists, religious 
groups or critics of state policy and this is 
not acceptable”.349  
Tendayi Achiume, UN Special Rapporteur 
on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance 
Concluding her recent visit to the UK, Prof. 
Tendayi Achiume, singled out PREVENT, 
slamming it as being "inherently flawed” 
and noting that there was “no evidence 
that PREVENT actually prevents 
extremism”. She added that the “vague 
criteria” to identify individuals or groups 
that are somehow “predisposed to terrorist 
ideology and violence” and the “lack of a 
clear, workable definitions of “extremism” 
and “British values”” had led to “horrific 
consequences”.350 
Diane Abbott, Shadow Home Secretary 
The Shadow Home Secretary, Diane 
Abbott, recently condemned the use of 
PREVENT.  
Speaking about its use in hospices and 
dementia wards, she stated that, “The 
public will not understand what business a 
counter-terror programme has monitoring 
dementia patients or people dying in a 
hospice… Ministers wax lyrical about how 
Prevent is focused on a need for 
‘safeguarding’… If the government has 
finally realised woeful inadequacies in 
social work and social care provisions, they 
need look no further than their own 
scathing cuts. The Prevent strategy is 
losing credibility and is not making the 
348 "Prevent strategy 'could end up promoting extremism'" 
349 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. “Do not 
criminalise extreme views – UN Special Rapporteur on counterterrorism”. Accessed 
June 11, 2018. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=1722
9#.  
350 Tendayi Achiume. “End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance at the Conclusion of Her Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland”. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High 




public any safer. It urgently needs a 
fundamental rethink and a complete 
review.” 
Rights Watch UK 
A report from Rights Watch UK states that 
“Muslim children across the United 
Kingdom are self-censoring for fear of 
being reported under Prevent. Their fear is 
not unwarranted. We have uncovered a 
number of instances where children have 
been referred to Prevent for legitimately 
exercising their right to freedom of 
expression in situations where they pose 
no threat to society whatsoever.”351 
The Justice Initiative  
According to The Justice Initiative report 
"Eroding Trust", the PREVENT strategy 
risks human rights violations, including 
the right against discrimination, as well as 
the right to freedom of expression.352 It 
concludes that “Being wrongly targeted 
under Prevent has led some Muslims to 
question their place in British society.”353 
David Anderson QC, the former 
independent reviewer of terrorism 
legislation  
Prevent has been heavily criticised for 
sowing mistrust and fear in Muslim 
communities. While he is not anti-
PREVENT per say, the former independent 
reviewer of terrorism legislation, David 
Anderson, QC did stipulate that the duty 
on schools to identify radicalisation has 
become a “significant source of grievance” 
among British Muslims, encouraging 
“mistrust to spread and to fester”.354 
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The Guardian. February 03, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. 
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The National Union of Student (NUS) 
The NUS claims that their opposition to 
PREVENT rooted in the fact that the 
strategy is “fundamentally racist and 
Islamophobic, targeting the Muslim 
community whilst eroding civil liberties for all 
as part of a clampdown on political dissent and 
undermining the space for critical discussion in 
our universities, colleges and schools.”355 
Andy Burnham, Mayor of Greater 
Manchester  
Andy Burnham has described the 
PREVENT strategy as contributing to 
“creating a feeling in the Muslim 
community that it is being spied upon and 
unfairly targeted. It is building a climate of 
mutual suspicion and distrust. Far from 
tackling extremism, it risks creating the 
very conditions for it to flourish”.356   
Hundreds of academics and experts 
The Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University, 
Louise Richardson has stated that the 
Government strategy is "wrong-headed” 
because it prevents freedom of speech on 
university campuses and inhibits students 
from confronting speech they may find 
objectionable.357 Similarly, numerous 
academics signed an open letter criticising 
the ERG22+ and for PREVENT’s focus on 
Islamist extremism and fixation on religion 
as the primary driver of terrorism, which 
has led to overwhelming attention on 
religious observance as an indicator of 
radicalisation.358 More recently, over 140 
experts and academics signed an open 
letter criticising the PREVENT 
programme. Amongst those voicing 
concerns are prominent academics 
355 "Preventing Prevent - We are Students Not Suspects @ NUS connect." NUS Connect. 
Accessed March 17, 2017. http://www.nusconnect.org.uk/campaigns/preventing-
prevent-we-are-students-not-suspects. 
356 “Andy Burnham calls for 'toxic' Prevent strategy to be scrapped”, The Guardian, June 
9, 2016, accessed 01.02.2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/09/andy-burnham-calls-for-
toxic-prevent-strategy-to-be-scrapped  
357 Rob Merrick. "Oxford University vice-chancellor says Prevent strategy 'wrong-
headed'" The Independent. September 22, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. 
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including Professor Noam Chomsky, 
Professor Humayun Ansari, and Professor 
Tariq Ramadan, as well as numerous 
psychiatry experts.359 
Instead of being cast as a threat, 
Muslim solidarity could show us 
all how to live together 
Rob Faure Walker 
 PhD candidate at UCL Institute of Education 
I became aware that there was a problem 
one morning in March 2014. As the 
children in my classroom sat down for 
morning registration, gasps rose across the 
room as some of them noticed that the girls 
sitting in front of them had saliva on the 
backs of their headscarves. This was the 
morning that the since discredited 
allegations that the schools in Birmingham 
had been taken over by so-called ‘Islamic 
extremists’ were on the front page of every 
national newspaper. This supposed 
‘scandal’ that became known as the ‘Trojan 
Horse’ would more recently be confirmed 
as unfounded by a Parliamentary 
Committee who reported that ‘no evidence 
of extremism or radicalisation, apart from 
a single isolated incident, was found by 
any of the inquiries and there was no 
evidence of a sustained plot nor of a similar 
situation pertaining elsewhere in the 
country’. 360 After the girls had washed 
their Hijabs and returned to class, the 
children told me that being Muslim made 
them feel unsafe. They told me that this 
was in part because headlines like ‘City 
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Guardian. September 28, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2017. 
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May 3, 2014, accessed 21.06.2018, 
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363 Kathryn Riley, Whose School Is It Anyway?, (London: Falmer, 1998). 
364 Rob Faure Walker, "By casting teachers as informants, British counter-extremism 
policy is promoting violence." The Conversation, December 20, 2017, accessed 
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Preventing Terror is Promoting Violence."  Discover Society (41), February 1, 2017, 
fights new Trojan Horse Islamic schools 
plot’361 made them feel judged for their 
faith. 
I had always tried to make the kids feel 
welcome in our classroom. Working in a 
predominantly Muslim community, this 
meant discussing the importance that the 
children placed on fasting, prayer and 
pilgrimage. I did my best to accommodate 
religious practice by supervising the 
school’s prayer room and had even read 
some Muslim teen fiction362 at the behest of 
my students. After all, as Riley has 
explored in her book of the same name, 
whose school is it anyway? 363 Though I 
had previously tried to understand my 
students’ experience, this was the first time 
I learned that the children felt unsafe 
because of their faith. The concerns that the 
children expressed led me to carry out 
research into the ‘Trojan Horse’ and the 
policy that has emanated from it. 364  Like 
others, I have seen how the Government 
have contributed to the fear that my 
students described and how the situation 
has since become worse. Many more 
Muslims now feel unsafe, not only on the 
street, but in their schools, doctor’s 
surgeries and homes. 365 This means that, at 
a time of austerity, Muslims are being 
disproportionately denied access to social 
and civic activities, blocking them from 
political engagement. Muslim students in 
schools and universities report 
withdrawing from political debate366  and 
barriers to mental health services for 
Muslims have been shown in recent 
accessed 21.06.2018, https://discoversociety.org/2017/02/01/how-preventing-
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academic research.367 Both of these 
situations have been fuelled by the 
PREVENT Counter-Terrorism Strategy,368  
a strategy that is based on flawed evidence 
that is no less racist than early theories of 
criminology that tried to identify criminals 
from the shape of their heads.369 
 
While this targeting of Muslim 
communities is unacceptable, the Home 
Office’s recent focus on Far-Right groups 
does not obfuscate the harm done by 
PREVENT. As stated by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on racism, “The Prevent duty 
is inherently flawed, and expansion of a 
flawed program to cover more groups is by 
no means curative”.370 In spite of the 
continued criticism of PREVENT from the 
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UN, Parliamentary committees,371 
NGOs,372 and civil liberties 
organisations,373  the Government 
continues to expand the policy.  
The earlier mentioned anti-Muslim stories 
in the media are not solitary incidents, they 
represent a continuing Islamophobic 
narrative; recently the Times has been 
criticised by the Independent Press 
Standards Organisation (IPSO) for 
presenting a “misleading” and “distorted” 
picture of a Muslim foster family374 and the 
editor of the Daily Express told a 
Parliamentary committee that his 
newspaper had created “Islamophobic 
sentiment”.375 These observations suggest 
that the media has contributed to 
Islamophobia. At a time when the 
Government are mired in the Windrush 
scandal over immigration targets and the 
deportation of legal immigrants to former 
British colonies, we might surmise that 
they care more about looking tough than in 
effective policy. And, this might explain 
why the Government continue to roll out 
strategy that alienates Muslims of all 
ages.376 
PREVENT’s efforts to look tough are 
demonstrated by the strategy’s targeting of 
political activism in young Muslims, 
Rights Watch (UK) reporting the case of 
Rahmaan Mohammadi who became a 
subject of the counter-terrorism strategy 
when he wore a Palestinian scarf to 
school.377 In my own professional life as a 
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Figure 1: Early attempts to classify criminals 
(Lombroso [1876] 2006) 
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secondary school teacher, I have also seen 
Muslim children steered away from 
political activism by school authorities 
when they have not been allowed to collect 
money for Muslim Aid to support Syrian 
refugees and I have heard other Muslims 
school children criticised for raising money 
and awareness of the plight of the 
Rohingya in Myanmar, years before the 
mainstream media caught up with this 
tragedy. 
As scenes from Gaza, Syria and the vast 
camps for Rohingya refugees in 
Bangladesh are beamed live to us via our 
TVs and phones, the global solidarity 
demonstrated by Muslims could show us 
how we should respond with compassion 
and affirmative action. Though this 
solidarity might point the way to a more 
harmonious future, Muslims who express 
a concern for recent British foreign policy 
and for the plight of Muslims abroad are 
often represented as a threat to Western 
values, resulting in referrals via 
controversial strategies like PREVENT, or 
in more insipid self-censoring of school 
children and university students.378 Such 
oppression of any community should not 
be tolerated. It is a bitter irony that the 
compassion that Muslims show for one 
another is being cast as a threat, rather than 
as a model for how we could all be living. 
Schedule 7 
Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act and the 
powers to stop and search at ports and 
airports without “reasonable suspicion” 
have been another major source of 
antagonism in minority communities with 
the issues of racial profiling and 
disproportionality resurfacing in studies 
assessing the impact of the powers on 
Muslims.  
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An experimental analysis conducted by the 
EHRC on Schedule 7 powers assessing the 
prevalence of racial disproportionality in 
stops and examinations found that Asians 
and individuals of “other” ethnic groups 
were 11.3 times more likely than White 
people to be stopped and questioned. 
Comparatively, Black people were 6.3 
times more likely and those of mixed 
ethnicity were 3.6 times more likely to be 
stopped and searched.379 The study further 
concluded that although the total 
proportion of examinations of Asians or 
“other” ethnic minorities at all ports and 
airports was 46.6% in 2010/11, an analysis 
of airports indicated that 63.5% of total 
examinations were of Asians and “other” 
ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, 65.2% of all 
port and airport examinations and 
detentions lasting over an hour were of 
Asians or other ethnic minorities.  
This level of disproportionality in Schedule 
7 stops has continued to grow over recent 
years. While the overall number of 
Schedule 7 examinations has fallen since 
2011/12, the proportion of those stopped 
who are from Asian or “other” ethnic 
backgrounds continues to grow. Despite 
individuals of Asian ethnicity comprising 
of just 8% of the overall population, 
2015/16 marked the first year where those 
stopped of Asian ethnicity (30%) 
outnumbered those stopped of White 
ethnicity (27%), with those of Asian or 
Asian British ethnicity being most likely to 
be detained under Schedule 7 powers.380 
The former Independent Reviewer of 
Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson 
QC previously said that the use of 
Schedule 7 powers has “given rise to 
resentment among some Muslim groups 
who feel they are being singled out” by 
authorities.381 He further noted that 
380 Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, financial year ending 
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Schedule 7 detentions and examinations 
were imposed upon members of ethnic 
minority groups to a greater extent than 
“their presence in the travelling population 
would seem to warrant”,382 suggesting 
evidence of disproportionate use. 
However, in his December 2016 report, 
Anderson concluded that as Schedule 7 is 
not supposed to be a randomly-exercised 
power, the continuing disproportions of 
Asians being stopped “do not constitute 
evidence that Schedule 7 powers are being 
used in a racially discriminatory 
manner”.383 
Following consultation, Schedule 7 powers 
were amended in the Anti-Social 
Behaviour, Crime, and Policing Act 2014. 
Changes included reducing the maximum 
examination period in detention from 9 to 
6 hours; granting individuals detained 
access to legal counsel; and repealing 
powers to take ‘intimate samples' of 
biometric data. The Independent Reviewer 
further called for the introduction of a 
"suspicion threshold" in the exercise of the 
powers, along with a statutory bar 
rendering answers given under Schedule 7 
questioning inadmissible in criminal trials. 
While changes introduced in the 2014 Act 
are a positive step towards addressing the 
encroachment on the civil liberties of 
minority communities, the changes do not 
go far enough. For example, 
recommendations by the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights to collate data on the 
self-declared religious identity of 
individuals stopped have yet to be 
adopted. With the broadening of powers at 
the disposal of border officials, including 
passport seizure powers, collecting data 
that enables evaluation of compliance with 
equalities legislation is of paramount 
importance, as is the proper training of 
officers to ensure racial and religious 
stereotyping is avoided at all cost. 
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PREVENT, and Schedule 7 
As our definition of Islamophobia argues, 
Islamophobia may be articulated and 
maintained through policies, legislation, 
and structures which serve to exclude, 
restrict, or discriminate against Muslims, 
and which have the effect of nullifying or 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal footing, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural or any 
other field of public life. 
As this chapter attests, processes of 
securitisation have the natural effect of 
excluding, restricting, and discriminating 
against Muslims in every area of public 
life. Meanwhile, this securitisation has 
culminated in legislation which, through 
its application, specifically targets Muslims 
on the basis of their ethnocultural and 
religious identities, and thus impairs their 
abilities to fully enjoy their fundamental 
freedoms on an equal footing with other 
members of society. 
It is for this reason, that MEND urges for 
the immediate need to conduct an 
independent review of PREVENT and all 
counter-terrorism legislation enacted since 
2000 with a particular attention afforded to 
the manifestations of Islamophobia within 
their development, scope, training 
procedures, and application. 
 
  




Crime, Policing and 
the Criminal Justice 
System 
While Islamophobia is often associated 
with blatant acts of violence or aggression 
against Muslims, its manifestations can be 
much more subtle and difficult to detect 
and include institutionalised practices of 
discrimination and structural racism. 
Institutional Islamophobia relating to 
discriminatory practices ingrained within 
the Criminal Justice System is particularly 
significant because of both its disruption to 
the lives of many Muslims and for its long-
term consequences to their future social 
engagement as equal members of society.   
Institutional racism is not a new concept in 
the analysis of the modus operandi of the 
Criminal Justice System. The 1999 
Macpherson Inquiry, which was 
established to scrutinise the Metropolitan 
Police Service’s investigation into Stephen 
Lawrence’s murder, produced a critical 
report accusing the Metropolitan Police 
Service of “institutional racism” and 
advanced 49 recommendations to improve 
policing and its impact on racial minorities. 
The Macpherson report found that ethnic 
minorities were “over policed... and under 
protected” 384 with encounters between 
race groups and police forces influenced by 
a high incidence of stop and search. The 
Macpherson report proposed priority 
measures to “increase trust and confidence 
in policing among minority ethnic 
communities” through policy directives 
regulating the use of stop and search 
procedures and improvements in the 
recruitment and retention of ethnic 
minority officers in the police force.385 
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While noteworthy and commendable steps 
have been made to improve equalities in 
the Criminal Justice System since the 
publication of the Macpherson report, 
Muslims and ethnic minorities remain 
over-represented. Therefore, Islamophobia 
must be examined as a mechanism 
potentially maintaining inequalities at all 
levels of the Criminal Justice System.  
Overrepresentation of Muslims 
and minorities in the Criminal 
Justice System 
In 2016, the Lammy Review exposed a high 
level of discrimination and 
disproportionate representation of British 
Muslims in the Criminal Justice System. 
Indeed, despite making up just 14% of the 
population, BAME individuals constitute 
25% of prisoners, while over 40% of young 
people in custody are from BAME 
backgrounds. Over the past decade, the 
number of Muslims in prison increased by 
nearly 50%, from 8,900 to 13,200. As such, 
Muslims make up 15% of the total prison 
population, while only amounting to 5% of 
the general population.386 Interestingly, as 
Lammy pointed out, this dramatic rise in 
the number of prisoners is not linked to 
terrorism offences, as only 175 Muslims 
were convicted of terrorism-related 
offences between 2001 and 2012.387  
Today, ethnic minorities are 
disproportionately more likely to be 
stopped and searched than at the time of 
the Macpherson report, with the ratio of 
Black to White stops increasing from 5 to 1 
in 1999 to 8 to 1 in 2002.388 Meanwhile, 
figures published by the Equalities and 
Human Rights Commission in separate 
reports in 2010 and 2013 found that the 
ratios steadily increased, demonstrating a 
growth in the degree of disproportionality. 
387 Ibid.  
388 Ben Bowling, Alpa Parmar, and Coretta Phillips, ‘Policing ethnic minority 
communities,’ Handbook of Policing, 2003, http://thinkethnic.com/ wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/Policing%20ethnic%20minority%20communities.pdf   
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In its 2010 “Stop and Think!” report, the 
EHRC found that Black people were at 
least six times as likely to be stopped and 
searched as a White person and an Asian 
almost twice as likely to be stopped and 
searched.389 In 2013, the EHRC concluded 
that during 2010/11 and 2011/12 Black 
people were 29 times more likely to be 
stopped and searched in some areas when 
stops and search were assessed by police 
force area and the respective size of the 
BAME population. Similar findings were 
seen in 2015/16, with Black people being 
over six times more likely to be stopped 
than White people. Overall, those from 
BAME groups were three times more likely 
to be stopped and searched than those who 
are White. Figures showed that just 16% of 
stops led to an arrest, with 76% of stops 
resulting in “no further action”.390  
The detrimental impact of the stop and 
search powers can be observed in their 
effect on Muslim males. As the EHRC 
noted in a report in 2011, “For many young 
Muslim men on the streets, stop and search 
under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act (s44) 
has become their most frequent and 
regular contact with the police… Such 
measures were seen to add to perceptions 
of racial and religious profiling and 
discrimination.”391 Meanwhile, a survey by 
the HMIC of 391 BAME people revealed 
that police officers may not be following 
stop and search procedure in all 
cases: 44% of respondents said the police 
did not treat them with respect; 42% said 
they did not understand why they were 
stopped and searched; 47% felt they were 
not treated with respect; and 37% said they 
were not told the reason why there were 
stopped and searched.392 
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As noted above, the current political 
climate that identifies Muslims as 
individuals belonging to a community ‘at 
risk’ contributes significantly in their high 
level of representation in the Criminal 
Justice System. However, there are a 
number of structural issues that also 
contribute towards creating the conditions 
for Muslims, and the BAME population 
more generally, to suffer from 
disproportionate representation in the 
Criminal Justice System.  
Cultural stereotypes 
According to Dr Zubaida Haque, a 
researcher on race disparity for the 
equalities think-tank, the Runnymede 
Trust, the increase in the representation of 
Muslims in the Criminal Justice System can 
only be explained as a result of “cultural 
stereotypes” and poverty. Indeed, she 
suggests that the widespread 
Islamophobia that has developed 
throughout the 21st Century has had an 
impact on the Criminal Justice System and 
the unconscious bias against Muslims 
across the whole spectrum of the justice 
system.  
The stigmatisation of Muslims further 
contributes to widening the divide 
between Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities, whilst having a profound 
impact on the Criminal Justice System and 
its approach to Muslim individuals. 
Indeed, over the past decade, the public 
discourse on Muslim has been almost 
exclusively associated with crime, 
terrorism and issues of integration, which 
creates the impression that young Muslims 
are less integrated, have less in common 
with their non-Muslim peers, and possess 
ambivalent loyalties.  
391 Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick, The impact of counter-terrorism measures 
on Muslim communities, report, Equality and Human Rights Commission, May 12, 
2011, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-
72-the-impact-of-counter-terrorismmeasures-on-muslim-communities.pdf.  
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Furthermore, there is an issue of 
discrimination occurring in the Criminal 
Justice System, with harsher sentences, or 
at the very least a different judgement, 
being passed on the basis of an individual 
ethnicity/religiosity. Indeed, the last major 
study published on the subject and 
covering decisions made in five Crown 
Court Centres in the West Midlands in 
1989, showed that substantially longer 
sentences were given to both Black and 
Asian offenders than White offenders. A 
more recent study published in 2005 also 
showed that Asian males, were more likely 
to receive a custodial sentence.393  
Socio-economic challenges 
Considering the severe economic 
deprivation experienced by Muslims (with 
nearly half living in the 10% of the poorest 
areas in England and Wales), the increase 
of Muslim inmates should in fact be seen as 
the result of discrimination, both socio-
economic and within the justice system 
itself.394 Indeed, the Race Disparity Audit 
showed that 31% (or around 343,000) of the 
Pakistani population and 28% (or roughly 
113,000) of the Bangladeshi population 
lived in the most deprived 10% of 
neighbourhoods in England. All Black 
ethnic groups were also disproportionately 
likely to live in the most deprived 
neighbourhoods.395 Research has further 
demonstrated that living in deprived 
neighbours has a negative spill-over effect 
on multiple aspects of life, including 
general well-being, education, 
employment, and crime.396  
The socio-economic issues faced by BAME 
individuals, and Muslims particularly, are 
critical to understand and tackle 
criminality, but are also pivotal in an effort 
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to provide a fair and less discriminatory 
justice service. 
Homogeneity in the Criminal Justice 
System 
Another issue affecting the treatment and 
judgement of BAME individuals within 
the Criminal Justice System is a potential 
lack of understanding of the experiences of 
minorities. At the core of this problem is 
homogeneity and a lack of diversity within 
the system itself. 
Although the judiciary are independent 
office holders, they provide a significant 
public service and were, therefore, 
included within the Government’s recent 
Race Disparity Audit. In 2016, 6% of court 
judges who declared their ethnicity were 
from non-White ethnic groups. 
Representation of those from non-White 
ethnic groups was more than twice as high 
among tribunal judges and non-legal 
members of tribunals combined, at 14%. 
Asian people made up the largest non-
White ethnic group in these roles, with 
around 3% of court judges and 8% of 
tribunal judges and non-legal members. 
Around 16% of court judges and 12% of 
tribunal judges and non-legal members did 
not disclose their ethnic group.397 
As pointed out by the research conducted 
by T2A Alliance, a senior probation officer 
emphasised the importance of accounting 
for the background of magistrates: “I 
would argue whether you could even say a 
magistrate has been through any type of 
formal training. They are people from a 
particular background who won’t 
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Lack of understanding of British Muslim 
diversity 
Another issue concerns the fact that 
Muslims are often perceived as having a 
homogenous identity. Those within the 
Criminal Justice System lack the 
understanding of the different Muslim 
communities, whether they are Somali or 
Pakistani, Shia or Sunni, or how their lives 
are affected if they live in different areas in 
the country. It is in fact crucial to 
understand the rich diversity within 
Muslim communities if appropriate 
services are to be provided. As pointed out 
by the Runnymede Trust, “Muslim 
communities are constructed as ‘suspect’ 
through the frequent implicit and explicit 
juxtaposition of the terms ‘law-abiding 
majority’ and ‘extremist minority’ when 
discussing both sets of communities”.399  
The issue of the Criminal Justice System’s 
perceived homogeneity of British Muslims 
is significant for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, because it frames Muslims within 
the war on terror narrative, thus making 
the simplistic distinction between “bad” 
and “good”. In the Criminal Justice 
System, this can result in discrimination 
occurring on the simple basis of prejudice 
deriving from the mainstream 
interpretation of what constitutes an 
acceptable interpretation of Islam.400  
Moreover, such a simplistic 
characterisation disregards other key 
factors that can lead to a more equitable 
understandings and just conclusions 
within the Criminal Justice System, such as 
ethnicity, education, class, place, gender 
and political outlook. The failure to 
acknowledge the inherent difference 
among the many Muslim communities 
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thus results in the inability to understand 
the proclivities and aspirations of young 
Muslims living in the UK. This not only 
results in a broad-brush application of the 
law, but also in difficulties in addressing 
the root cause for criminality among these 
communities.401  
In addition, and as mentioned earlier in 
this report, simplistic characterisations 
inherently contain the seeds of 
Islamophobia. Indeed “when others 
assume all Muslim individuals share the 
same experiences, religious practices, or 
behaviours, they make a judgment that 
there are no differences between members 
of a certain group, that an entire religious 
group is completely homogenous.” 402  This 
results in the belief that there is no 
flexibility to the practice or tradition and 
that every single person of the group must 
engage in such a behaviour. Therefore, a 
homogeneous view of Muslims through 
the lens of counter-terror has the 
unavoidable consequence of pre-
criminalising all Muslims.  
In short, “to ensure that everyone receives 
fair and equal treatment, it is critical to 
understand the needs of equality and 
minority groups and identify what 
separate provision may be required. This is 
likely to be different not just across different 
protected characteristics but within them. 
Indeed, one of the key things highlighted… 
was the importance of not assuming 
homogeneity amongst the needs of all 
individuals from a particular group.”403 
Mistrust  
These issues create a mutual feeling of 
mistrust that has a profound impact on the 
lives of Muslims,404 and has unavoidable 
repercussions in the relations between 
402 Kevin L. Nadal et al., “Subtle and Overt Forms of Islamophobia: Microaggressions 
toward Muslim Americans”, Journal of Muslim Mental Health, Volume 6, Issue 
2, 2012. 








Muslims and the Criminal Justice System. 
For example, the justice system provides 
incentives for those who have committed 
crimes to admit guilt, such as potential 
reductions of sentences or access to 
interventions that keep them out of prison 
altogether. Yet, pleading “guilty” implies a 
level of trust between the accuser and the 
accused that BAME individuals simply do 
not have, due to a real or perceived 
disparity in the way they are treated.  
As the Lammy Review suggested, “Many 
BAME defendants neither trust the advice 
that they are given, nor believe they will 
receive a fair hearing from magistrates” 
and are thus instinctively more prone to 
plea “not guilty” than their White 
counterparts.405 However, this means that 
BAME defendants face harsher sentences if 
found guilty. The punitive treatment 
reserved to BAME individuals who plea 
“not guilty” cannot be addressed 
overnight but is critical nonetheless. While 
a concerted and durative effort to build up 
trust between BAME groups and the 
Criminal Justice System needs to become a 
priority, the Criminal Justice System also 
needs to put in place a system that allows 
interventions to be set up prior to the 
plea.406 
Furthermore, the climate of mistrust that 
has characterised the relationships 
between Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities in British society has 
produced a spill-over effect in the way 
Muslims are judged within the Criminal 
Justice System at virtually every stage. 
Several Muslims who took part in 
interviews conducted by the T2A Alliance, 
a charity organisation that deals with 
discrimination and fair treatment in the 
Criminal Justice System, lamented the 
existence of prejudice in the way their 
criminality (whether it being alleged or 
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real) is perceived in the Criminal Justice 
System.407  
Some, for example, felt they had been 
discriminated against by judges on the 
basis of the records of their brothers, older 
cousins, or even uncles. One man reported 
that, “I don’t know what it is about our 
family but we never seem to get bail – you 
get people nicked on big conspiracy 
charges who get bail.” Others went as far 
as saying: “they give excuses and say 
things like oh we think you’re going to 
commit further offences”.408 Overall, the 
research showed a high degree of mistrust 
of British Muslims in relation to the way 
they are sentenced. One example of this is 
the testimony of a young man, who said: 
“We know a lot of it has to do with our 
religion. I’ve met people in jail who have 
been scared to grow a beard because 
they’re worried they will get a high-end 
sentence.”409 
A study published by The European Journal 
of Psychology Applied to Legal Context 
showed that White individuals had a 
higher degree of satisfaction with the 
outcomes received from the justice system, 
as well as with the legal processes and 
procedures. Conversely, citizens belonging 
to ethnic minorities perceived more 
unfairness in both cases.410 This is due to 
the fact that societal discrimination and 
even more so, discrimination within any 
area of the Criminal Justice System, 
reduces the level of confidence that 
individuals have in the Criminal Justice 
System. Finally, the underrepresentation of 
minorities groups can lead to a lesser 
degree of sympathy for the complexities 
and diversity of the BAME individual, 
particularly for individuals belonging to 
communities already considered “at risk”, 
or communities often misunderstood and 
409 Ibid. 
410 Estefanía Estéveza , Marina Rachitskiy, and Carla Rodríguez, “Is perception of the 
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misrepresented across broader segments of 
British society. 
The issue of trust in the Criminal Justice 
System is important because people can 
accept decisions and outcomes from the 
justice system more willingly when they 
believe that the authorities are using fair 
procedures based on trustworthy 
motivations.411  
Recruitment of BAME in the 
Police Force  
For many people, the police form the most 
visible representation of the state. As such, 
it is incredibly important that the 
relationship between minority 
communities and their local police are 
characterised by trust and understanding. 
Therefore, recruitment and adequate 
representation of minorities within the 
force is an important asset in nurturing 
understanding, trust, and a feeling of 
representation within this relationship. 
The “Police Diversity” report prepared by 
the House of Commons found that while 
there has been a steady increase in the 
overall proportion of officers and staff who 
are of a BAME background, particularly 
since this issue was brought to the 
attention of the Government in 2013. 
However, progress remains somewhat 
slow and there is wide variation between 
forces and increased numbers of BAME 
police officers remain overwhelmingly in 
the most junior rank. Even allowing for 
appropriate career progression, the 
number of BME officers above the rank of 
Inspector remains very low. These results 
were thus deemed “unacceptable” by the 
committee.412 
The issue of BAME representation at junior 
levels is particularly problematic. Indeed, 
the lack of senior BAME representation in 
the police service affects its leadership, 
culture and understanding of the 
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community it serves. People of a BAME 
background wishing to develop their 
careers within the police service often lack 
role models, encounter barriers when 
trying to access necessary training and face 
selection panels which are almost always 
lacking in diversity.413 
It is crucial that steps are taken to ensure 
that police forces are representative of the 
many segments of British society and the 
communities they serve. This need is 
evidenced by the recent Race Disparity 
Audit, published by the Government in 
late 2017, which found a significant 
disparity in the representation of 
minorities in both the police force and the 
wider Criminal Justice System. In 2016, 
94% of prison officers in England and 
Wales who disclosed their ethnicity were 
White. The same year, around 1 police 
officer in every 17 was from a non-White 
ethnic minority group. While this ratio 
differed greatly according to rank, type of 
work and geography, there has been a 
slight increase in the proportion of officers 
from a non-White background over the last 
10 years, indicating promise. 
It is crucial that police forces are equipped 
with the necessary tools to understand the 
cultural intricacies of the communities they 
serve. This can not only result in a more 
nuanced understanding of the incidents 
they investigate, but can also help the 
building of a more positive relationship 
between them and the communities they 
serve. Indeed, police forces are seen as a 
representation of the state, and a positive 
relationship with them can result in an 
increased sense of belonging of 
communities that often find themselves at 
the outskirts of society.  
413 Ibid. 
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Case study: Bijan Ebrahimi, 
victim of institutional racism in 
the police force 
Bijan Ebrahimi was murdered on July 14, 
2013 by his neighbour Lee James, who 
punched and kicked him to death, before 
setting fire to his body outside his house in 
Bristol. It emerged that, prior to his death, 
Mr Ebrahimi had contacted the police 
several times in light of Lee James’s 
behaviour, but the force had regarded him 
as a nuisance. Following the incident, a 
report was prepared by the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC), revealing that police officers may 
have been biased against Mr Ebrahimi and 
failed to protect him. A total of seventeen 
officers and staff were interviewed, and 
IPCC Commissioner Williams determined 
to refer the files concerning three police 
officers, a control room supervisor, a call 
taker, and a police community support 
officer to the Crown Prosecution Service, 
for consideration of offences of misconduct 
in public office. It was additionally 
determined to refer the offence of 
perverting the course of justice for 
consideration against the police 
community support officer. 
Mr Ebrahimi, 44, was born in Iran in 1969 
and lived there during his formative years. 
His parents both died when he was a 
young man and he was their full-time carer 
for some time before their death. He had 
moved to a new neighbourhood in Bristol 
after his previous home was set on fire by 
his neighbours.  
The report prepared by the IPCC reveals 
that Mr Ebrahimi was a vulnerable man, 
whose first language was not English and 
who was subject to numerous unfounded 
allegations against him. He had turned to 
the police for help several times in the 
months leading to his death. Mr Ebrahimi’s 
final call to a police officer occurred just 
one hour before he was murdered.  
Between 2007 and 2013, Mr Ebrahimi 
experienced a number of issues with 
neighbours, who repeatedly accused him 
of being a paedophile and threatened to 
kill him. On one occasion, Mr James saw 
Mr Ebrahimi filming him and his children 
as they were walking around the estate and 
believed him to be a paedophile. However, 
the IPCC report revealed that Ebrahimi 
told police officers that he had taken the 
photographs as evidence that Mr James 
was drinking in the public areas of the 
estate whilst in charge of children. He said 
that this was a regular occurrence, which 
resulted in “a mess”. 
Indeed, the report reads, “There was 
evidence, not least from Mr James himself, 
of Mr Ebrahimi taking a great deal of 
trouble over the appearance of his flat, by 
cultivating plants and flowers in pots 
outside. He plainly considered the 
behaviour of Mr James and his associates, 
drinking in the public areas and discarding 
cans, to be anti-social behaviour, with 
which many people may agree. It was 
possible, even likely that as a result of 
previous complaints, and he had been 
advised to take photographs or video to 
evidence this behaviour.”  
In the days before his death, Ebrahimi 
called the police to say his neighbour Lee 
James had barged into his home and 
attacked him by punching him in the face. 
Rather than arresting Mr James, the police 
officers handcuffed Mr Ebrahimi, who was 
escorted into the police car before a crowd 
of cheering neighbours.  
A neighbour said that she saw Mr James 
stood by the washing line and heard him 
shout either “I’ll f*****g kill you” or “I’ll 
f*****g get you” towards Mr Ebrahimi. She 
saw that both female police officers were 
present but neither reacted or did anything 
in response to these shouted threats. The 
IPCC also found that one of the officers, PC 
Helen Harris, approached Mr James and 
told him “off the record I would have done 
the same thing”. She also told him that they 
were going to arrest Mr Ebrahimi for 
breach of the peace.  
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The IPCC noted that by arresting Mr 
Ebrahimi and not Mr James, PC Harris and 
PC Winter undoubtedly “discriminated” 
between them. Indeed, the officers could 
have been in no doubt about the danger 
that Mr Ebrahimi was in, having heard the 
remarks about “firebombing” him out and 
Mr Ebrahimi being labelled as a 
“paedophile”. PS Hill’s remark that the 
“pitch fork and burning torch brigade are 
after him”, provided an indication of how 
serious they knew the situation to be. 
However, instead of protecting Mr 
Ebrahimi, they mistreated him, humiliated 
him, and even intimidated him before 
releasing him back “without any 
meaningful risk assessment”.  
The evidence from CCTV in the Custody 
Suite showed PC Harris’ treatment of Mr 
Ebrahimi to have been rude and 
unprofessional, including striking him on 
the back of his hand with the folded sheets 
of paper, an action which can only be 
described as indicative of contempt.  
Mr David McCallum, independent chair of 
the review process, accused Bristol City 
Council and Avon and Somerset police 
officers of institutional racism, intended as 
“The collective failure of an organisation to 
provide an appropriate and professional 
service to people because of their colour, 
culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or 
detected in processes, attitudes and 
behaviour which amount to discrimination 
through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, 
thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping 
which disadvantage minority ethnic 
people”. 414 
Article 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) places an 
obligation on the state not to take life, 
except in very limited and defined 
circumstances, and to take reasonable steps 
to protect life where there is a real and 
immediate risk. If there is an indication 
that a death may be the result of police 
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action, or failure to act, Article 2 requires 
there to be an independent and effective 
investigation to determine the 
circumstances and causes of the death. The 
IPCC found that “from the outset, there 
were serious breaches of Avon and 
Somerset Constabulary hate crime 
policy.”  
Two men, beat manager PC Kevin Duffy, 
and community support officer Andrew 
Passmore, were both jailed over how they 
dealt with Ebrahimi after being found 
guilty of misconduct in a public office. 
They and two other constables, Leanne 
Winter, 38, and Helen Harris, 40, who 
arrested Ebrahimi, have been dismissed 
from the force.415 In all, 18 police staff and 
officers, including sergeants and 
inspectors, face disciplinary proceedings.  
415 “Police officers jailed over Bijan Ebrahimi murder case”, The Guardian, February 9, 






Developing Civic Sensibilities 
Aman Ali  
Head of Community and Development, 
MEND  
Growing up as a teenager living in 
London, I gave very little thought to my 
civic responsibilities in my early 
adolescence. I guess, like most people my 
age back then, I had my own individual 
plan that I hoped to follow, which included 
typical things like getting a good 
education, a good job and having a family 
one day. 
Being a British Muslim of Bangladeshi 
origin, I went through life not seeing 
myself represented very much in society. I 
didn’t see other British Muslims of 
Bangladeshi origin feature prominently in 
public life. Whether that be on the news, 
watching sports or going about my daily 
life such as going to school or to the 
hospital.  
Hence, I guess, I just went through my 
teenage years with my head down and got 
on with life. It was only after having had 
my eyes opened up to certain realities 
around me, that I began lifting my head up 
and taking notice of the world around me.  
Often it can be a tragic incident that forces 
a person to take notice. For me, the first eye 
opener was in college when the Gaza War 
broke out in 2008. Witnessing the massacre 
that was inflicted upon the Palestinians left 
me enraged and fuming. I took to the 
streets like many others and joined protests 
calling for the end of the massacre of the 
Palestinian people.   
But something within my conscience told 
me I hadn’t done enough by just marching 
on the streets. I wanted to do more. So, I 
approached the Head of the college and 
asked her permission to raise money for 
charities assisting Palestinian children 
affected by the conflict. She gave me the go 
ahead and told me I could bucket collect in 
the college for an entire week. With the 
help of some friends, we raised over £1000.  
The point I want to focus on, however, is 
not the achievement but more so on the 
decision made by the teacher.  She could 
have easily decided otherwise, citing 
reasons such as it would distract me from 
my upcoming exams, or let the teachers 
organise something you don’t worry about 
it, or any number of logistical concerns. But 
she didn’t. She heard me out, saw that I 
had a plan and let me run with it.   
The morale of the story being always give 
young people a chance to make a 
difference.  
Many young people I am sure have had the 
urge to change something around them but 
may have never had the right person 
around them to enable them or encourage 
them. Our collective failure to provide 
support to young change makers risks 
excluding them from being civically 
engaged in the future, thereby losing their 
contribution to society.  
A second significant incident took place 
during my time at University. I was in a 
guest lecture where a speaker made a very 
profound point that really reshaped my 
outlook on civic responsibility. Addressing 
what was a very diverse audience which 
included people from various walks of life, 
young and old, and various ethnic 
backgrounds. Pointing to everyone in the 
audience he said “You have just as much 
right to shape the future of this country as 
any other person living in the UK. That 
responsibility is not reserved for a 
privileged few but a right that should be 
exercised by every citizen, including 
you!” 
It was such a powerful point the speaker 
made. Never had I thought about my 
personal responsibility towards society in 
such a manner. Never for a moment had I 
thought this responsibility was even mine 
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in the first place. Never did I think such a 
responsibility was meant for people like 
me.   
Remember, I grew up not seeing myself 
represented much in public life. So, for 
someone to tell me I had such a big 
responsibility was very much a cognitive 
paradigm shift. 
After that speech, I went searching for 
further opportunities to try and be more 
active. I took part in more charitable 
initiatives, got involved with local 
campaigning and came across this 
organisation called MEND one day. They 
were addressing an issue which was close 
to me, the issue of Islamophobia. Having 
had unfortunate experiences involving 
myself or family members in the past, I 
wanted to play an active role in combatting 
Islamophobia in the UK.  
Alongside the work of tackling 
Islamophobia, I came to realise MEND 
were actively encouraging greater civic 
involvement on the part of the Muslim 
community in the UK. They provided 
training courses on how to engage 
effectively with politics and media and had 
a big focus on empowering communities to 
become active citizens through their 
working groups set up across the country.  
I’ve been with MEND now for a number of 
years and my work revolves around 
reaching into communities and finding 
like-minded people who have realised 
their civic responsibility and want to make 
a difference.  
Together we are creating a movement in 
the UK of British Muslims who are playing 
a vital role in promoting active citizenship 
amongst Muslims in the UK. Our desire is 
to see a UK very different to the 
unrepresentative one most people in my 
generation grew up in. And, finally our 
aspiration is to shape society where 
                                                     
416 Esmat Jeraj, ed., The Missing Muslims: Unlocking British Muslim Potential For The 
Benefit Of All, Report by the Citizens Commission on Islam, Participation and Public 
Life, 2017, p46, https://www.barrowcadbury.org.uk/wp-
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417 Michael, Lucy. 2009. “Securing civic relations in the multicultural city”. 164-186, in 
Krause, W. (Ed.) Citizenship, Security and Democracy: Muslim Engagement with the 
discrimination based upon ethnicity, 
religion, sexual orientation, and gender no 
longer plagues our society.  
Political representation and 
exclusion 
Islamophobia should be understood as a 
mechanism which marginalises and 
excludes Muslims from being able to fully 
participate in social, political and civic life. 
While data shows a growing trend of 
Muslim engagement in the field of politics, 
this chapter addresses the challenges 
Muslims face when operating within the 
political sphere and the barriers to 
engagement that still exist.  
It concludes that our political institutions 
need to reflect the communities they serve 
and encourage Muslim representation 
within Parliament. In these efforts, political 
parties need to address structural barriers 
that exclude Muslims and other minority 
groups.  
Moreover, it is essential that the 
Government’s policy of disengagement 
with credible mainstream Muslim 
organisations and leaders be urgently 
reversed so that the relationship between 
Government and Muslim communities 
may be recalibrated.  
Muslim representation 
Forming one of the most diverse Muslim 
communities in the world, British Muslims 
are an integral part of the social fabric of 
the nation through their significant 
contribution to the economy (valued at £31 
billion) and their presence across a wide 
range of professions in the public and 
private sectors, most notably the NHS.416  
According to Lucy Michael, the 
“integration of minority groups in equality 
terms” can be measured by engagement in 
party politics and governance.417 To some 
West, Surrey: Association of Muslim Social Scientists (UK) and Foundation for 
Political, Economic and Social Research, 177 – 197. Cited in p.22 of Mustafa, Anisa. 
2015. "Active Citizenship, Dissent And Power: The Cultural Politics Of Young Adult 
British Muslims.". Ph.D, University of Nottingham. 
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extent, this can be demonstrated by the 
election of the first Muslim MP, 
Mohammad Sarwar, in 1997. In two 
decades since this historic landmark, the 
number of Muslim MPs has risen to 15, 
eight of whom are women. Also, 
politicians who identify as Muslim or are 
of Muslim heritage have served as 
ministers in the past three governments 
under Gordon Brown, David Cameron and 
now Theresa May - with Baroness Warsi 
becoming the first Muslim female minister 
under the Cameron administration in 2010.  
While barriers have been broken by 
individuals such as Mohammad Sarwar, 
Sayeeda Warsi, Naz Shah, Yasmin 
Qureshi, Shabana Mahmood and 
Rushanara Ali, to name but a few, Muslim 
representation of 2% of the House of 
Commons still lags far behind what is 
proportional considering the population of 
British Muslims, which stands at 4.4% 
according to the 2011 census. This 
highlights the lack of equitable 
representation of Muslims in public life 
and, therefore, according to Michael’s 
assessment of integration and equality, one 
may argue that Muslims are far from equal. 
The reasons for this underrepresentation 
ranges from political parties fearing a 
backlash for fielding more Muslim 
candidates, discrimination against 
Muslims within political party structures, 
the centralised nature of the party system 
and Muslims feeling alienated from the 
democratic system.418 
Barriers to political engagement 
Experiences of discrimination and 
Islamophobia are rife at all levels of 
political engagement. Baroness Warsi, for 
example, remarked that “being a Muslim 
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in public life has been brutal”, adding that 
“Muslims who engage with politics or any 
other institutions are to be viewed as 
suspicious and Muslims who don’t engage 
are to be treated as suspicious for being 
separatist”.419 Adding to this notion of 
suspicion, Muslim MPs, Rupa Huq and 
Tulip Siddiq, recently spoke out about 
being disproportionately stopped by 
security staff within Parliament and 
having their credentials questioned, with 
Huq stating that “[b]ecause of our 
pigmentation we are treated 
differently”.420 
Scepticism towards Muslims engaging 
within the political realm is further 
evidenced in the fact that 14 out of 15 
constituency Labour parties (CLPs) placed 
under “special measures” have sizeable 
Muslim populations, varying from 11% 
(Brentford & Isleworth) to 50% 
(Birmingham Hodge Hill).421  “Special 
measures” refers to the administrative 
mechanism introduced first in the 1980s to 
prevent “hostile takeovers of constituency 
parties and local councils”.422 When 
imposed on constituency groups, members 
are vetted and selection processes are 
centrally controlled. While special 
measures may be the appropriate cause of 
action in a few extreme situations, it is only 
meant to be a short term measure, as 
highlighted by the Chakrabarti Report into 
anti-Semitism and other forms of 
racism within the Labour Party.423 
However some CLPs had been under 
special measures for more than two 
decades before being reinstated under 
Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership.424 Craig, in a 
piece about Birmingham Hall Green CLP, 
points out that the four Birmingham CLPs 
in special measures are in areas with a high 
421 Mark Ferguson, "The Kafkaesque Farce of the Labour Party "special measures" 
Revisited...," LabourList, July 03, 2013, https://labourlist.org/2013/07/the-
kafkaesque-farce-of-the-labour-party-special-measures-revisited. 
422 Radhika Sanghani, "Labour Reveal Constituencies Under Central Control," The 
Telegraph, July 03, 2013, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/10156596/Labour-reveal-
constituencies-under-central-control.html. 
423 Hattie Craig, "23 Years in "special measures"," The Clarion, October 01, 2016, 
https://theclarionmag.org/2016/10/01/23-years-in-special-measures/. 
424 "Labour Reveal Constituencies Under Central Control." 
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Muslim or Pakistani population, and 
emphasises that there is “a feeling of 
injustice from members of these groups 
that they are under suspicion, that having 
lots of members from these communities in 
the party is regarded as a bad thing”.425 
Islamophobia in politics is also 
characterised by discourse which is 
divisive, fuels hate and promotes hatred 
and fear of Muslims. The dog-whistle 
politics displayed during the London 
mayoral election against Sadiq Khan, 
where he was branded an “extremist” by 
opponent Zac Goldsmith was arguably the 
most high-profile example of what is a 
regular experience for Muslims 
participating in electoral politics. Coming 
from the political establishment and being 
led by senior CCHQ officials gave the 
episode an added gravity. In the eyes of 
Muslims, it translated fundamentally into 
a message that the Muslim community 
may be accomplished in their education 
and professional careers, but they will 
never be fully accepted into mainstream 
society. Seeing high-profile Muslim 
politicians being subjected to a vilification 
campaign with racial and Islamophobic 
undertones reaffirmed the feeling of 
disillusionment with the political process 
that many Muslims felt, and has 
undoubtedly negatively impacted the 
aspirations of young Muslims in pursuing 
public office.  
Obstructing political engagement 
in universities 
The fear of being labelled “extremist” is 
pervasive within the context of Muslim 
students at British universities. What 
should be spaces of empowerment for 
young Muslims have become more heavily 
securitised under the PREVENT duty, 
particularly impacting the work of Islamic 
societies and pro-Palestine societies. 
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Student events have become subject to 
increased bureaucratisation, and at times 
even shut down outright. We note that the 
findings of a recent report by the NUS 
Black Students’ and Women’s Campaign, 
echoed these concerns and experiences, 
identifying PREVENT as contributing 
towards a deficit in civic engagement for 
Muslim students; impacting their ability to 
engage in certain discussions and deterring 
them from running for elected positions.426 
The Henry Jackson Society and Student 
Rights 
An organisation that exemplifies the 
attempts to shut down the voices of 
Muslim students is the Henry Jackson 
Society, through the guise of its project 
Student Rights.  Student Rights claims to 
support “equality, democracy and 
freedom from extremism on university 
campuses”.427 However, despite these 
claims to equality, it is striking that Student 
Rights appears to focus almost exclusively 
on Muslim students and student groups 
and has repeatedly used the language of 
counter-extremism to demonise Muslim 
students and societies. It has especially 
targeted students who are vocal about their 
support for the Palestinian cause and those 
critical of counter-terror strategies. 
Furthermore, far from living up to its 
name, Student Rights has no basis as a 
representative body for students and has 
no affiliation with any student union and 
has frequently attracted severe and 
widespread criticism for its agenda-driven 
narratives and activities.428  
Student Rights has been accused of seeking 
to pressure universities to “impose 
restrictive measures on Muslim students 
that would, in effect, institutionalise 
Islamophobia” and its work has been 
described as seeking “to narrow the space 
for all radical political dissent on 
427 "Student Rights - About Us," Student Rights, accessed June 21, 2018, 
http://www.studentrights.org.uk/about_us. 
428 Hilary Aked, "Muslim and LGBTQ Students Unite Against 'Student Rights' in Run 
Up to NUS Conference," HuffPost UK, May 19, 2014, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hilary-aked/nus-conference_b_4986437.html. 
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campus.”429 Student Rights has also been 
condemned by the NUS for its use of 
flawed methodologies and has 
subsequently been widely criticised for its 
“dishonest pseudo-science in support of a 
toxic narrative”.430 Meanwhile, the 
conclusions of Student Rights’ reports have 
been discredited and labelled as “a witch-
hunt which makes sweeping judgments 
about student Islamic societies”.431 
Interestingly, Student Rights claims to 
protect free speech and has expressed 
opposition to student unions’ no-platform 
policy for the BNP.432 However, it has 
simultaneously severely criticised 
speakers it sees as “extremists” who have 
been invited by Islamic and Palestinian 
societies,433 as well as Muslim students 
who criticise the current PREVENT 
strategy.434 
Moreover, the Institute of Race Relations 
has noted with concern that Student 
Rights’ work and reporting has been used 
by far-right groups to target Muslim 
student events.435 Indeed, several British 
universities have been forced to cancel 
events after material from SR has resulted 
in threats of violence from far-right groups, 
including the EDL.436 
This group represents just one in a network 
that seeks to monitor and police Muslim 
political engagement, going far beyond the 
realm of legitimate critique into brazen 
discrimination.  
Policies of disengagement 
At the heart of Islamophobic rhetoric, what 
we see is a concerted effort to regulate, 
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exclude, and marginalise Muslims within 
civil society and political life. Indeed, 
Muslim organisations have been 
progressively isolated and excluded from 
the realm of legitimate political discussion, 
as highlighted by the Government’s 
current policy of non-engagement with 
organisations such as the Muslim Council 
of Britain.  
Levied against such organisations are 
accusations of “extremism” that are 
frequently baseless but accompanied by 
long-lasting stigma. In turn, accusations of 
“segregation” and “refusal to integrate” 
are used as justification to enact increased 
surveillance and securitisation of Muslim 
communities.  
Meanwhile, attempts to engage with 
political life lead to smears and suspicion, 
thus creating a damaging and inescapable 
cycle. As demonstrated by Sayeeda Warsi’s 
earlier quote,437 Muslims become restricted 
between two very uncomfortable positions 
of “isolationism” and “entryism”. 
Rather than engaging with a broad 
spectrum of Muslim organisations and 
voices, the Government has traditionally 
insisted in dealing with a handpicked 
minority who already support their policy 
positions, particularly on issues such as 
counter-terror, media regulation and 
Palestine. Consequently, think-tanks and 
NGOs which do not possess the confidence 
of British Muslims have exercised 
considerable influence in shaping public 
policies, thus resulting in widespread 
feelings of alienation and frustration 
amongst Muslim communities. As 
434 "Salford Student President who opposes Prevent reveals troubling views on social 
media," Student Rights, accessed August 08, 2017, 
http://www.studentrights.org.uk/article/2466/salford_student_president_who_op
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recommended by the 2017 Citizens UK 
report entitled “Missing Muslims”,438 it is 
of pressing urgency that the Government 
reassesses its engagement with Muslim 
communities and seeks to mend the 
“broken relationship” by taking steps to 
end this impasse. The Government must, 
therefore, urgently reconsider its policy of 
disengagement with credible Muslim 
organisations that have the trust and 
support of mainstream British Muslim 
communities. Engagement does not mean 
agreement on every issue but facilitating 
the exchange of ideas and perspectives is 
an integral component of a democratic 
society. 
However, far from seeking to mend the 
broken relationship, it appears that the 
Government is set on continuing to 
distance itself from segments of the British 
Muslim population. This was recently 
illustrated by the Home Secretary, Sajid 
Javid, when he dismissed allegations of 
Islamophobia in the Conservative Party 
and reiterated the Government position 
that it would not enter into a dialogue with 
the Muslim Council of Britain, the biggest 
Muslim umbrella group in the UK, with 
over 500 affiliates.439 The fact that the 
Conservative Party Chair subsequently 
met with the “moderate” Muslim group 
Tell MAMA, reiterates the Government’s 
intention to maintain the “good Muslim”, 
“bad Muslim” dichotomy. This 
dichotomous narrative is, in itself, a good 
example of institutional Islamophobia in 
that is seeks to regulate Muslims and 
exclude those who disrupt the institutional 
status-quo. 
Moreover, discourse that seeks to 
dehumanise, stigmatise and spread hatred 
of Muslims must be called out by 
politicians across the party spectrum. In 
doing so, political parties should conduct 
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independent investigations into claims of 
institutional Islamophobia – as recently 
demanded of the Conservative Party by 
the Muslim Council of Britain. The fact that 
such a call has gone unheeded contrasts 
sharply with the vociferous calls for an 
inquiry into anti-Semitism in the Labour 
Party. Such a refusal creates the perception 
of a hierarchy of acceptable intolerances. In 
reality, hatred against all minorities should 
be confronted with equal vigour. 
The Benefits of Participation 
Dr Joe Greenwood 
Barriers to political participation restrict 
who can get involved, and this places 
limits on both the individual and societal 
benefits of participation, which take at least 
three forms. First, participation contributes 
to the quality of representation and policy 
outcomes; second, it helps overcome 
divisions between groups; and third, it 
offers personal rewards to individuals. 
Together, these benefits have the capacity 
to contribute to individual happiness, 
community integration, and improved 
societal outcomes 
In the first case, research has shown that 
limits on participation can reduce both 
descriptive and substantive 
representation.440 This means that if certain 
social groups face barriers to participation 
then, concomitantly, they are likely to be 
underrepresented at various levels of 
government.441 This can create a divide in 
which excluded social groups see elected 
representatives as distant and 
disconnected from them, and has 
implications for the quality of policy 
outcomes. Indeed, research has shown that 
elected representatives tend to reflect the 
views of the groups that are represented 
and are able to participate.442 This means 
that, counter to the principle of an open 
441 Richard L. Fox and Jennifer L. Lawless, ‘If Only They’d Ask: Gender, Recruitment, 
and Political Ambition’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Apr., 2010), pp. 310-326. 
442 Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded 
Age (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008). 
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democratic discourse, the policy-making 
process is not based on a diverse set of 
views and the resulting policy outcomes 
may be sub-optimal. 
The representation of diverse views in the 
policy-making process is also indicative of 
the capacity for participation to build 
bonds between groups. There is classic 
academic work showing the ease with 
which humans form group identities, and 
subsequent research has developed these 
findings by showing that group identity 
can be context-specific and thus primed.443 
This means that if contexts are created in 
which people from various social groups 
can all participate in then it is possible to 
build more inclusive group identities. 
Thus, an inclusive participatory system can 
not only increase the diversity of voices 
that contribute to policy making but can 
also create bridging social capital between 
communities. 
Increased social capital can also be an 
important individual benefit that results 
from participation, which enables people 
to make new acquaintances. As such, it 
constitutes a selective incentive for 
participation alongside motivations such 
as the desire to seek office and rewards 
such as reduced prices for other services. 
Selective incentives are one of three sets of 
reasons for political participation that are 
identified by the general incentives 
model.444 Collective goods are the second 
motivation for participation, and offer the 
opportunity to help a party or organisation 
achieve particular policy outcomes. 
Finally, there are the expressive benefits of 
participation, in the form of the 
opportunity to support a cause that one 
believes in. Taking all of these potential 
benefits together, we can see political 
participation as an opportunity for 
individuals meet new people and achieve 
personal goals, influence policy-making, 
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and gain the psychological reward of 
standing up for what they believe in. 
In light of the above, an inclusive 
participatory system has the capacity to 
reduce divides between groups and their 
representatives, and to ensure diverse 
voices are reflected in policy-making. 
Further, open participatory contexts allow 
communities to meet each other, construct 
new group identities, and bridge divides. 
Finally, participation offers an array of 
personal, collective, and expressive 
benefits to those who get involved. Thus, 
the many benefits of participation can be 
felt by both individuals and society.   
444 Paul F. Whiteley, Patrick Seyd, Jeremy Richardson, and Paul Bissell, ‘Explaining 
Party Activism: The Case of the British Conservative Party’, British Journal of Political 





As MEND’s definition of Islamophobia 
highlights, Islamophobia incorporates any 
exclusion, restriction, or preference against 
Muslims that has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, 
of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life. 
As such, this chapter seeks to examine the 
ways in which Muslims become 
discriminated against or excluded from 
public life. It pays particular attention to 
the Islamophobic discourses present 
within discussions surrounding 
integration and the rights of minority 
communities in public life. 
Assimilation, Integration and 
Multiculturalism 
For decades, fierce debates have raged 
surrounding the best strategies and 
frameworks through which to manage the 
differences between dominant and 
minority groups, the most cited 
frameworks for which are assimilation, 
integration and multiculturalism. 
Despite their common usage within 
political and social discourse, the 
differences between these three concepts 
are often only vaguely understood. This 
imprecise understanding is due largely to 
the fact that the strict application of one or 
the other strategy is practically impossible, 
and governments have frequently used a 
combination of both assimilation and 
integration methods in their social policies. 
For the large part, the difference between 
these three methods lies in the scope 
individuals possess to manifest their socio-
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cultural differences in the private and the 
public sphere. 
Assimilation 
Assimilationist policies attempt to erode 
the cultural differences between groups, 
both in the public and the private sphere. 
The ultimate goal is to make the newcomer 
or minority community indistinguishable 
from the dominant or host society. Under 
assimilationist strategies, people are 
required to manifest themselves according 
to the dominant culture in public spaces. 
The result of well-enforced assimilation is 
acculturation, that is to say that the 
newcomers or the minority assume the 
culture of the dominant group. As Laura 
Coello and Baukje Prins observe, although 
assimilation was widely used throughout 
the 20th century in the United States, 
Australia and France, it is increasingly seen 
as an unfeasible and unfair practice.445 
The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) 
In 1976, the UK adopted the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). The ICCPR demands that all 
member states must commit themselves to 
ensuring for “all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.”446 
There are three particularly relevant 
articles within the covenant in need of 
mention at this stage; Articles 1, 18, and 21 
Article 1 
All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 
446 "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," The United Nations, Office 
of the High Commissioner, accessed May 18, 2017, 
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Article 18  
 Everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice, and freedom, 
either individually or in community 
with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, observance, practice and 
teaching. 
 No one shall be subject to coercion 
which would impair his freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of 
his choice. 
 Freedom to manifest one's religion or 
beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others. 
 The States Parties to the present 
Covenant undertake to have respect 
for the liberty of parents and, when 
applicable, legal guardians to ensure 
the religious and moral education of 
their children in conformity with their 
own convictions. 
Article 27 
In those States in which ethnic, religious 
or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be 
denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own 
language.447 
By adhering to the ICCPR, the UK limits its 
choice of strategies to integration and 
multiculturalism. In light of the protections 
afforded within the covenant to religious, 
linguistic and cultural identities, 
assimilationist policies aimed at 
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Policy Research and Refugee Studies Centre for the Home Office, University of 
Oxford, December 2002, 
acculturation of minority groups is clearly 
in direct contradiction to the commitments 
in the ICCPR. 
Integration 
Policies based on integration seek to join 
people of various ethnic backgrounds 
closer by asserting one, common public 
identity or culture, yet allowing or 
tolerating manifestations of differences in 
the private sphere. As Coello and Prins 
explain: “[w]hen the host community 
welcomes or allows the manifestations of 
differences, it can lead to fusion: the 
creation of a new identity emerging from 
the contact with elements from the various 
groups, but without purposely eliminating 
cultural differences.” 
Castles et. al define integration thus; 
“Integration is a two-way process: it 
requires adaptation on the part of the 
newcomer but also by the host society. 
Successful integration can only take place 
if the host society provides access to jobs 
and services, and acceptance of the 
immigrants in social interaction. Above all, 
integration in a democracy presupposes 
acquisition of legal and political rights by 
the new members of society, so that they 
can become equal partners. Indeed, it is 
possible to argue that, in a multicultural 
society, integration may be understood as 
a process through which the whole 
population acquires civil, social, political, 
human and cultural rights, which creates 
the conditions for greater equality. In this 
approach, integration can also mean that 
minority groups should be supported in 
maintaining their cultural and social 
identities, since the right to cultural choices 
is intrinsic to democracy.”448 
Ultimately, integration is a two-way 
process, while assimilation is a one-way 
process. This is clearly misunderstood by 
some political commentators and advisors. 




worrying example of this confusion after 
she famously stated that integration 
should not be a two-way street.449 The 
reason for special concern over Dame 
Louise Casey’s misunderstanding is the 
fact that the Government’s currently 
proposed integration strategy relies 
heavily on the Casey Review. As such, the 
distortions present in Dame Louise Casey’s 
review have infiltrated and informed 
current strategies. This will be discussed 
further below. 
Multiculturalism 
Multiculturalism can be considered as an 
idea, political theory, pursuit of policies, or 
enactment of civil society initiatives that 
establish and foster a society composed of 
several groups of individuals that 
prescribe to different cultures co-existing 
at the socioeconomic and political level.  
However, the concept does not limit this 
ideal to individuals restricted to one 
culture, rather it suggests that whilst the 
cultures are discreet, the individuals may 
prescribe to different cultures for different 
aspects of their lives. For example, one may 
wear western clothing whilst 
simultaneously enjoying cultural cuisine 
or participating in a multitude of religious 
festivals. Therefore, individuals have the 
freedom to adopt chosen aspects of their 
respective cultures to enrich their lives.  
This adoption of multi-faceted cultural 
identities can be fostered or regulated 
through integrative or assimilative policies 
pursued at a governmental level. The 
pursuit of such policies thus affects the 
relationship between the majority and 
minority cultures, either resulting in the 
dominance of the former over the latter or 
allowing individuals to pursue either 
without restriction.  
                                                     




strategies and Muslims 
Britain has always claimed to embody a 
proud history of supporting 
multiculturalist principles advocating 
respect and celebration of the multitude of 
diverse ethnic and religious identities that 
have led themselves to a British identity 
built upon pluralism and collaboration. 
However, recent years have seen 
simmering resentments and debates 
surrounding national identity and a 
perceived “ghettoisation” of minorities.  
In line with the development and 
consequences of moral panic, these fears 
have culminated in calls for the UK to 
reassess its policies towards 
multiculturalist principles. The result is an 
increasingly restrictive integration 
strategy, within which examples of 
Islamophobic assumptions and 
institutional racism can be readily 
witnessed regarding the treatment of 
Muslim communities. 
The Government recently closed its 
consultation on its “Integrated 
Communities Strategy Green Paper; 
Building Stronger, More United 
Communities”. This green paper sets out 
the Government strategy and approach 
towards integration. As a starting point, 
the Green Paper heavily relies on the 
highly criticised 2016 Casey Review. As a 
consequence, its analysis and suggested 
strategies are inherently tainted by the 
same flawed evidence and lack of 
understanding that has guided the 
Government’s policies on community 
cohesion and integration in the past.  
The scope of this current report on 
Islamophobia does not allow for a full 
analysis of the Green Paper.450 However, 
there are several key areas wherein the 
infiltration of Islamophobic narratives and 
assumptions have directed the 
development of this strategy, and 
450 Indeed, MEND’s submission to the consultation process exceeds 40pages and can 
be found at https://mend.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MEND-
Submission-to-the-Green-Paper-on-Integration-V1.pdf 
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therefore, limit its potential to make a 
positive difference. 
Overlap with counter-terror 
The Green Paper is littered with references 
and allusions reminiscent of counter-terror 
strategies that have previously been 
condemned as hugely damaging to 
cohesion and inclusion of minorities. This 
fear has been heightened with the 
publication of the Home Office’s updated 
counter-terror strategy “CONTEST: The 
United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering 
Terrorism”, which explicitly mentions the 
Green Paper in outlining its strategy. It is 
imperative that strategies of community 
integration and of counter-terrorism do not 
overlap, as this can only result in the 
further securitisation of an already 
problematic tripartite relationship between 
government, society and minorities. 
Prescribed views of “acceptable Islam” 
The call for a “clearer interpretation of 
Islam for life in the UK” is extremely 
worrying for the Muslim community and 
needs to be clarified. The concern is that a 
certain liberal interpretation of “acceptable 
Islam” will be championed by consultation 
with Government selected Muslim 
representatives, whilst mainstream 
conservative views will be marginalised as 
“extremist”. Furthermore, it is concerning 
that Islam has been singled out without 
references to any other faith groups.  
De-contextualising challenges and an 
absence of introspection 
The overall approach of the Green Paper is 
highly problematic. By unilaterally shifting 
the responsibility and blame for a lack of 
social inclusion almost entirely onto 
minority communities, it de-contextualises 
barriers to inclusion and examines them in 
a vacuum. While there are brief mentions 
of hate crimes contributing to isolation, 
there is a concerning lack of analysis of 
institutionalised and systematic racism in 
Britain. Similarly, there is no mention of 
the way developments, such as the 
Government’s “hostile environment” 
policy, the PREVENT strategy, and Brexit, 
have further contributed to creating a 
climate of fear, mistrust and 
disillusionment that prevents BAME 
individuals from fully and actively 
participating in British society.  
Moreover, the absence of any form of 
introspection and self-criticism results in a 
very limited understanding of some of the 
key causes that contribute to limiting 
integration between minorities and 
broader society. For example, there is no 
mention of the impact of the Government’s 
policy of austerity and cuts to public 
service affect minorities’ access to health 
services, nor is there mention of severely 
reduced police budgets at a time in which 
hate crime against minorities is on the rise. 
Furthermore, there is an absence of 
commentary on how elements of the 
British media contribute to spreading 
harmful narratives surrounding 
minorities, as well as a lack of analysis 
regarding the Government’s recent 
cancellation of the second part of the 
Leveson inquiry.  
Without a stronger focus on the broader 
issues and mechanisms of socio-economic 
discrimination and exclusion, the Green 
Paper will be confined to be a collection of 
half measures that will be insufficient to 
bring about positive change. 
Islamophobia and the myth of 
Muslim distance 
Dr Jan Dobbernack, 
Newcastle University 
The idea that Muslims lead “separate 
lives” is yet again in the news. Breathless 
stories about urban ghettoes and 
dangerous no-go areas have long had a 
presence in the British press. In a series of 
policy reports, Theresa May’s government 
now presents its own view on Muslims’ 
spatial and cultural distance. The Casey 
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Review451 and Government’s Integrated 
Communities Green Paper identify 
segregation as the main obstacle towards 
improving the national condition.452 The 
remedy that both reports envisage is 
contact. Both parts of the equation, contact 
and segregation, need to be unpacked to 
examine the understanding of Muslim 
“difference” that informs Government’s 
current policy offer. 
Casey’s apocalyptic perspective on British 
Muslims speaks of a “downward spiral 
with a growth in regressive religious and 
cultural ideologies”453 and also underpins 
the more policy-minded approach in the 
recently published Green Paper. Both 
documents proceed from the assumption 
that things go well when there is contact – 
when “meaningful interaction” takes place 
– and that the absence of contact needs to 
be understood as a critical failure of 
integration. This is despite the fact that 
contact is an ambivalent remedy. There is 
no sociological evidence that heightened 
interaction – that is, contact without due 
attention to socio-economic circumstances, 
political environments and local 
geographies that structure the relationship 
between social-cultural groups – would 
improve anything, much less resolve the 
problems of multicultural Britain.454 
It is perplexing that UK policy-making, 
despite some lip service to the contrary, 
continues to present contact as a 
comprehensive solution to urgent social 
problems.455 Among the reasons is that the 
remedy is cheap. Policies that target 
“segregated” populations for deficient 
attitudes, not for their socio-economic 
circumstances, require fewer resources 
than any material investment in the good 
society. At the same time, initiatives that 
do valuable work in fostering local 
                                                     
451 The Casey Review: a review into opportunity and integration. 
452 Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper, HM Government, March 2018, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/at
tachment_data/file/696993/Integrated_Communities_Strategy.pdf.  
453 The Casey Review: a review into opportunity and integration, p15. 
454 James Laurence, "Reconciling the Contact and Threat Hypotheses: Does Ethnic 
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conviviality – youth centres, inter-faith and 
outreach initiatives – face chronic 
underfunding. How can “libraries and 
other community hubs”, as the Green 
Paper requests, “maximise their 
contribution to building integrated 
communities”456 when they cannot even 
maintain reasonable opening hours in the 
face of cuts? In light of Government’s 
defunding of ESOL instruction, its 
emphasis on the importance of language 
for integration rings hollow.457 
It is tempting to disregard the new agenda 
of “meaningful contact” and “integrated 
communities” altogether, and not just 
because the concerned policies lack 
funding. Their excessive emphasis on 
contact only makes sense against the 
background of dominant myths about 
Muslim separation. Government responds 
to manufactured anxieties about Muslim 
distance, which explain its direction of 
political travel much better than any 
positive definition of “integration”. Echo-
chamber bureaucrats, such as Casey, single 
out political, residential and educational 
choices by Muslim citizens, whom she 
blames for the lack of cross-cultural contact 
in British society. Her understanding of 
Muslim separation isn’t gleaned from any 
evidence-based approach. It reflects 
alluring myths that persist despite a wealth 
of readily available counterevidence, 
suggesting that Muslims are as much part 
of British society as any other social 
group.458 
The myth of separation doesn’t need to be 
backed up by facts. It brings long-standing 
anxieties about Muslim difference into 
play. The idea that British Muslims lead 
“separate lives” draws on cultured 
understandings of “the Muslim world” as 
irredeemably different, anti-modern and 
455 Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper, p12. 
456 Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper, p15. 
457 Maya Goodfellow, "English Language and Integration," Discover Society, May 01, 
2018, https://discoversociety.org/2018/05/01/english-language-and-integration/.  
458 Farah Elahi and Omar Khan, eds., Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us All, report, 




engulfed in a civilizational crisis. There is 
an entire genre of contributions that speaks 
of a Muslim “rebellion” against modernity 
which, as one commentator suggests, finds 
expression in “aimless and formless 
resentment and anger of the Muslim 
masses at the forces that have devalued 
their traditional values and loyalties”.459 
The description of Muslim life in Casey’s 
report is not materially different. It is 
informed by the civilizational 
understanding that Muslims are 
dangerously distant, which it re-describes 
in the spatial terms of “segregation”. Such 
distance is slippery and attempts by 
Muslim organisations, including MEND 
and the Muslim Council of Britain, to 
defeat the myth by demonstrating 
proximity, or by highlighting the civic 
“normality” of Muslim concerns, are 
always subject to evasive manoeuvres.  
When a recent report by Policy Exchange 
found very little difference between 
Muslim and non-Muslim priorities in 
housing, education, values and national 
identity, David Goodhart – one of the 
report’s authors – decided to downplay 
such findings and underline the one 
remaining marker of difference that 
conveniently remained (here: a somewhat 
more pronounced tendency to embrace 
conspiracy theories about foreign 
policy).460 In his private writings, Goodhart 
is committed to reinforcing the idea of 
Muslims’ radical otherness.461 Available 
counterevidence, including from the think 
tank that employs Goodhart, does very 
little to change such views. For British 
Muslims findings of proximity never seem 
to stick. Distance always does. 
The myth of distance extends to social and 
political agency. Where British Muslim 
organisations refuse to buy into Prevent, 
the problematic agenda of counter-
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extremism, this is registered as evidence of 
dangerous distance. The new counter-
terrorism tsar, Sara Khan, alleges that 
organisations that do not proactively 
engage with the policy belong to a “Salafi-
Islamist line-up”.462 Campaigns for civil 
liberties and against Islamophobia do not 
reflect a welcome commitment to the 
common good, but underscore the alleged 
self-centredness of Muslim political 
agency, which is often portrayed as a 
politics of grievance.463 
The myth of distance draws on a continuity 
of ideas about Muslim otherness. It is not 
possible to discuss here if available 
understanding of Islamophobia capture 
this continuity and provide a good basis 
for pushing back against such myths. But 
there is no doubt that the idea that Muslims 
are dangerously distant — for the stigma 
that this idea entails and for its 
invulnerability to counterevidence — 
constitutes a form of cultural racism that is 
both common and widely acceptable in 
British society. 
Protecting Minority Rights 
When considering Islamophobia and its 
infiltration into discussions surrounding 
the rights of minority communities and the 
place of Muslims in society, it is important 
to briefly acknowledge the national and 
international legislative commitments that 
the United Kingdom observes with regards 
to protecting civil rights, minority rights 
and human rights more broadly. Important 
pieces of legislation include: the 1950 
European Convention on Human Rights 
and the 1998 Human Rights Act; and the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.  
461 David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of 
Politics (London: Hurst & Company, 2017). 
462 Sara Khan, The Battle for British Islam: Reclaiming Muslim Identity from 
Extremism (London: Saqi Books, 2016), 68. 
463 Jan Dobbernack, Nasar Meer, and Tariq Modood, "Misrecognition and Political 
Agency. The Case of Muslim Organisations in a General Election," The British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations 17, no. 2 (2014): doi:10.1111/1467-856x.12033. 
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The European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) 
The European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), originally draft in 1950, is 
an international treaty that protects 
fundamental freedoms and human rights 
in Europe that all the 47 Council of Europe 
member states must observe. The treaty 
provides a number of legal provisions that 
protect the British Muslim community. 
Amongst these protections is Article 9, 
freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.  
Article 9 states: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and 
observance. 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or 
beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.” 
The unambiguous consequence of the 
article is the provision of legal protection 
for British Muslims (and other religious 
minorities) to be able to hold, observe, and 
practice their faith.  
Human Rights Act, 1998 
The UK strengthened the provisions 
outlined in the ECHR by introducing them 
into domestic law as part of the 1998 
Human Rights Act. The intention of this act 
was to provide remedies for human rights 
breaches within the UK court system and, 
therefore, not requiring an individual to go 
through the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg.  
Specifically, the Human Rights Act makes 
it unlawful for any public body to act in a 
way which is incompatible with the ECHR, 
unless to do so would contravene any 
other primary legislation. The Human 
Rights Act requires judiciary bodies to take 
any decisions, judgment or opinion of the 
European Court of Human Rights into 
account, and to interpret legislation, as far 
as possible, in a way which is compatible 
with the protections afforded by ECHR.  
The practice of religious rights 
Despite the protections afforded by the 
ICCPR, the ECHR and the Human Rights 
Act, 1998, recent years have witnessed 
numerous controversies, scandals, and 
vicious public debates that have 
challenged Muslim religious practice and 
observance in the UK context. Particular 
public controversy has surrounded the 
right to halal meat, the building of 
mosques, and the right to religious dress, 
amongst other topics of public interest. 
Such debates demonstrate how religious 
practices, whilst protected by national and 
international legislation, can still be 
contested and the discourse around them 
used as a proxy argument to marginalise 
minority communities and Muslims 
specifically. 
Halal Hysteria 
Animal welfare should rightfully be of 
primary concern, particularly considering 
today’s industrialised meat industry. 
Indeed, all citizens have a responsibility to 
confront issues such as cruelty, 
overproduction, and inhumane conditions 
that have notoriously characterised certain 
segments of the industry. To give a general 
picture of some of the controversies 
surrounding meat production: 
 Between July 2014 and 2016, a total of 
9,511 breaches of animal welfare were 
reported to the Food Standards 
Agency, nearly half of which were 
classed as category 4, the most severe 
category, and caused “avoidable pain, 
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distress or suffering”.464 Cases included 
chickens and pigs being immersed in 
boiling hot water while still being alive 
in order to “soften the skin”.  
 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
(BIJ) in 2017 noted that there are 
around 800 “megafarms” which house 
more than a “million chickens, 20,000 
pigs or 2,000 dairy cows” with around 
15 chickens per square metre; or as BIJ 
illustratively noted, around an area 
“about the size of an A4 sheet of paper 
for each bird”.465  
 A 2003 report by the Farm Animal 
Welfare Council noted that 1/3 of pigs 
slaughtered were killed using gas 
chambers in which carbon dioxide is 
pumped into the rooms, resulting in 
suffocation.466  
However, in the face of these numerous 
and highly problematic practices and 
outcomes, Muslims are frequently singled 
out for special and aggressive scrutiny. 
The debate on religious slaughter has been 
ongoing in the UK for almost a decade. In 
2009, a blog post on the PETA (People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals) website 
was published entitled “The Cruelty 
Behind Muslim Ritual Slaughter.”467 This 
blog post effectively initiated the “halal 
hysteria” that would characterise much of 
the discussion surrounding halal meat ever 
since. It did not take long for various 
newspapers to latch on to the moral panic 
and produce typically fear driven and 
divisive headlines, such as “Now halal 
school dinners,” from the Daily Star in 2010 
which claimed that schools will give pupils 
“no option but to eat meat slaughtered 
following Islamic teachings specifically for 
Muslims”.468  
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This has led to calls for all animals to be 
stunned before slaughter, with the 
assumption that stunning leads to a 
morally acceptable “pain-free” method of 
meat production. However, this is not 
always the case. A study by the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) looked at 
conventional slaughter methods 
employing pre-stunning, including the use 
of the penetrative captive bolt (PCB) 
method, whereby a bolt of 7-11cm is fired 
into the animal’s brain to render it 
unconscious and the non-PCB method 
whereby a bolt is fired at the head of the 
animal but does not enter the brain. The 
study found that the failure rate for 
stunning in cattle for PCB method was 
around 4%, and between 20-30% for the 
non-PCB method. Therefore, 20-30% of 
animals undergoing non-PCB have to be 
re-stunned. Obviously, a bolt being fired at 
an animal’s head that fails to render them 
unconscious is clearly going to be a painful 
and distressing experience. In fact, 
research has found that in some animals 
the non-PCB method causes skull 
fractures. Hence to advocate that stunning 
is always pain free is not supported by 
research.469  
Furthermore, these studies highlight the 
need for serious analysis of animal welfare 
and the advocating of responsible farming 
and slaughter across all strands of the meat 
industry. 
One of the first people to bring the topic of 
religious slaughter to the attention of 
Parliament is Philip Davies, Conservative 
MP for Shipley. In 2010, Davies stated that 
numerous retailers sell halal food without 
informing customers. Consequently, he 
urged the Leader of the House to ensure 
that the issue of food labelling would be 
tachment_data/file/325241/FAWC_report_on_the_welfare_of_farmed_animals_at_s
laughter_or_killing_part_one_red_meat_animals.pdf. 
467 "The Cruelty Behind Muslim Ritual Slaughter," PETA, December 08, 2009, accessed 
May 11, 2017, http://www.peta.org/blog/cruelty-behind-muslim-ritual-slaughter/.  
468 Gary Nicks, "NOW HALAL SCHOOL DINNERS," Daily Star, August 05, 2010, 
accessed May 11, 2017, http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-
news/147870/NOW-HALAL-SCHOOL-DINNERS.  
469 "Opinion on BSE Risk from Dissemination of Brain Particles in Blood and Carcass 
following Stunning," EFSA Journal 2, no. 12 (2004): 1-4, doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2004.123. 
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debated in Parliament.470 The topic of food 
labelling was thus debated in April 2012, 
when Davies proposed a bill requiring all 
food to be labelled, so that consumers 
would be better able to make informed 
decisions on what to buy.  
Muslim and Jewish communities have 
subsequently supported policies which are 
seen to promote good practice in animal 
slaughter, such as the installation of CCTV 
in slaughterhouses and calls for clearer 
food labelling. However, they have argued 
that a wide framework of labelling be 
adopted, including labels for electrocution, 
strangling, and other methods used in non-
religious stunned slaughter as well. Thus, 
the aim is to avoid discriminatory 
treatment or burdens on Muslim and 
Jewish producers and consumers.  
The welfare of animals is in fact a major 
concern in both the Islamic and Jewish 
faiths, with the requirements of halal and 
Kosher slaughter dictating the 
requirements for humane treatment and 
respect for the animal, not just in the 
process of its death, but also in the 
conditions of its life, including 
requirements such as providing ample 
space, adequate nourishment, and 
avoiding pain, suffering and distress.  
The media’s preoccupation with halal 
slaughter has allowed far-right groups to 
capitalise on anti-Muslim sentiment to 
further their own anti-immigrant and anti-
Muslim agendas. UKIP is a prominent 
example of this rhetoric. Having called for 
the banning of non-stunned slaughter in 
their 2015 manifesto, UKIP became the first 
party willing to back such a ban. Their 
stance attempted to draw on the moral 
aspect of the debate, claiming that religious 
slaughter is overriding “the UK’s 
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compassionate traditions of animal 
welfare,”471 ostensibly appearing to be 
centring their policies around prioritising 
the “ethical treatment of animals”.  
However, the reality behind their 
proposals was a specific targeting of 
Muslim communities and the party was 
repeatedly accused of using divisive 
language to enflame anti-Muslim 
sentiment.472 This is evident as the 
agricultural spokesman himself, Stuart 
Agnew, stated that the policy was not 
meant to target Jews, but rather it was 
“aimed at others” implying that the policy 
was addressing halal meat and Muslims, 
and the impact on Jews would be 
“collateral damage”.473 He also clarified 
that this move was made distinctly to win 
votes ahead of the general election.474 The 
topic of religious slaughter even reached 
the UKIP leadership elections in August 
2016, where one candidate, Bill Etheridge, 
claimed that he would call for a ban on 
religious slaughter if he became the party 
leader, stating that he is “highly 
concerned” that these practices cause 
“unnecessary suffering” to animals.475 
As previously mentioned, a genuine 
concern for animal welfare should be 
encouraged and commended, it is in fact 
central to the practice of religious 
slaughter. However, UKIP’s sudden stand 
for animal welfare is somewhat surprising 
and would appear disingenuous given 
their history of policy positions that run 
contrary to the welfare of animals. For 
example, UKIP have committed to 
bringing back fox hunting in the UK, their 
MEPs voted against measures to protect 
elephants and crack down on the illegal 
ivory trade, and they also voted against an 
EU ban on importing seal fur, with one 
MEP, Roget Helmer, claiming that “it's 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2938362/Farage-accused-wanting-drive-
Jews-Britain-Ukip-pledge-ban-religious-slaughter-animals.html.  
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mawkish, sentimental and unhelpful to 
adopt a Bambi attitude to animals”.476 
Therefore, regarding halal slaughter, 
debates have frequently been characterised 
by an aggressive (while often superficial) 
adoption of animal rights concerns 
combined with the perpetuation of 
Islamophobic tropes and misinformation, 
aimed at stigmatising and marginalising 
British Muslim communities. Such rhetoric 
leads to both a failure to properly address 
legitimate and urgent animal welfare 
concerns and to a furthering of anti-
Muslim discourses and agendas.  
Representing Muslim women 
and Islamophobia 
Dr Lasse Thomassen  
Queen Mary University 
A terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge. A 
woman walks past an injured person on 
the pavement. She is looking at her mobile 
and seems to be in a hurry. The woman is 
wearing a headscarf. Because terrorism is 
associated with Islam, the woman is seen 
as a Muslim. The woman on the bridge is 
now a Muslim woman ignoring a victim of 
Islamist terrorism.  
People commenting on the photo of her on 
social media do not know that the woman 
is a Muslim. They take her headscarf as a 
transparent sign of her Muslim-ness. It is a 
familiar pattern: the more covered a 
woman is, the more transparent is her 
identity to others. The woman becomes yet 
another Muslim woman who is identified 
by her hijab, and by that alone. She is 
reduced to her Muslim-ness. Like other 
Muslims, she can only speak and act as a 
Muslim. She becomes bound to, and by, 
this identity. 
The photo of the woman on Westminster 
Bridge becomes yet another way of talking 
about Islam and Muslims by talking about 
a woman in a hijab. This is possible 
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because, as a group, Muslims are 
homogenised. We get a homogenous 
image of Muslims where one can stand in 
for the rest: if they are all the same, we can 
simply substitute one for another. What’s 
more, if one is a terrorist, then the rest must 
be too – or at least they must sympathise 
with the terrorists. This is also why, when 
the media need to illustrate a story about 
anything involving Islam or Muslims, they 
pull out a picture of women in hijab or a 
picture of angry young men. These are the 
images that Islam and Muslims have 
become reduced to. The story about the 
woman on Westminster Bridge draws 
upon, and reproduces, these wider 
representations of Islam. Islamophobia is 
nourished by this homogenisation of 
Muslims (‘they are all the same’) and this 
reduction of them to a particular image 
(‘they are all like this’). 
The cloth of the hijab becomes part of a big 
cloth that envelops all Muslim women 
wearing the hijab, creating a homogeneous 
mass out of them. At the same time, 
different degrees of covering are taken as 
reflections of different degrees of 
autonomy: the more covered you are, the 
less free you must be. Take, for instance, 
the case of Shabina Begum. Her school had 
a shalwar kameeze version of the school 
uniform, but she wanted to wear a jilbab. 
The whole case concerned the significance 
of the sartorial difference between the two 
forms of the hijab. This had to do with 
much more than the physical cloth: it 
precisely had to do with the significance – 
the meaning – of the shalwar kameeze and 
the jilbab. In the debate about the case, the 
jilbab was taken as a sign of extremism, but 
it also became a sign of Shabina Begum’s 
lack of autonomy: she cannot have chosen 
to wear the jilbab herself, she must have 
been under the influence of her brother, 
and so on and so forth. One version of the 
hijab (the shalwar kameeze) becomes the 
version worn by moderate and reasonable 
girls who can choose themselves; the other 
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version of the hijab becomes what a girl 
under the influence of darker forces would 
choose to wear. 
The misrepresentation of Islam and 
Muslims in the media and by government 
agencies is a common theme, and 
complaint, in both public and academic 
debates about Islamophobia. It is 
particularly important in the context of 
Muslim women. Their clothing and their 
bodies have become the primary sites for 
debates about the place of Islam in society 
(and not just what we usually refer to as 
‘Western’ societies, but also in the so-called 
‘Muslim world’). 
Women’s clothing and bodies have become 
the real and metaphorical sites for 
discussions of ‘the Muslim question’. This 
makes it all the more important that we ask 
which and whose representations of Islam 
dominate not just public debate but also 
the conversations we have at work, at 
home and on social media. In those debates 
and conversations, how can we let Muslim 
women speak for themselves? In 
answering that question, we must 
remember that a woman can cover and 
uncover but can never completely control 
how others interpret this. What we say and 
what we do as individuals draw upon 
existing structures of meaning. For 
instance, we could not follow a religion, if 
our actions were not recognisably 
‘Muslim’, say. And this is precisely why it 
is so important who gets to define what it 
means to be a ‘Muslim’ and the 
associations people make. It is why it is 
important that we pay attention to the 
representations of Islam and Muslims that 
have become dominant in our society. 
Hijab, veiling, and the niqab 
debate  
MEND’s working definition of 
Islamophobia includes “applying 
ethnocentric approaches to the treatment 
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of Muslims (judging another culture solely 
by the values and standards of one's own 
culture). For example, evaluating Muslim 
women’s choice of dress exclusively 
through the speaker’s expectations and 
without reference to the personal cultural 
norms and values of the women in 
question.” 
Women’s dress is an area that is repeatedly 
highlighted within media, political, and 
public discourses as a mechanism for 
stigmatising Muslim communities as 
backwards, oppressive, and incompatible 
with Western societies. However, it is rare 
that Muslim hijabi or niqabi women are 
themselves afforded platforms or 
recognised agency within the debate.  
As Todd Green observes, “The 
stereotypical Muslim woman in the 
Western media is depicted as a victim of 
either violence or sexism (or both) at the 
hands of angry and misogynist Muslim 
men”.477 Within these narratives, Muslim 
women are consistently represented as 
voiceless, submissive, oppressed, and 
passive victims and there is a serious lack 
of representation of Muslim women as 
creative, successful and powerful leaders. 
Meanwhile, Muslim women’s 
achievements are overlooked, particularly 
women who do not fit into the stereotype 
of the veiled and the victimised.    
As such, the following discussion attempts 
to explore some of the ways in which 
Islamophobic narratives infiltrate the 
debates surrounding Muslim women’s 
dress. 
Focus on Muslim women’s dress 
The media, and society in general, are 
obsessed with the way women look. What 
women wear frequently overshadows any 
other achievement or endeavour in a way 
that is undeniably distinct to the way 
men’s dress is approached. A good 
example of this is when, in an attempt to 
expose the sexism directed at his female 
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colleagues, the Australian TV anchor Karl 
Stefanovic wore the same blue suit on his 
show every day for a year.478 While his 
female co-host received regular unsolicited 
appraisals on her wardrobe choice from 
viewers, not a single viewer noticed that 
the man sitting next to her had been 
wearing the same cheap suit for months. 
In many ways, Muslim women are victims 
of this particular strain of sexism not only 
in terms of their adherence to fashion 
sensibilities, but also through accusations 
that they are in some way socially deviant 
and refusing to integrate and adhere to 
British cultural norms and values. 
Newspaper articles that talk of “shroud-
swishing zombies”479 and dressing “like a 
Dalek”480 constitute completely 
dysphemistic481 representations with the 
expressed purpose of condemning Muslim 
women for their choice of dress, and 
directly link this choice of dress to a lack of 
social morality. 
Ethnocentric approaches to Muslim 
women 
Many scholars have observed that Muslim 
women are frequently considered to be 
victims of their religious and/or cultural 
heritage without having actually been 
consulted on the matter.482 As has often 
been the case throughout the history of 
feminism, usually educated, Western, 
White men and women have spoken on 
behalf of their non-Western and non-White 
counterparts. This paints a generalised and 
incomplete picture, whilst simultaneously 
presenting solutions and approaches that 
do not resonate with the women that they 
are intended to help. 
It is imperative that Muslim women are 
recognised, not as a monolithic group, but 
                                                     
478 See Michael Lallo, "Karl Stefanovic's sexism experiment: Today presenter wears 
same suit for a year," The Sydney Morning Herald, November 14, 2014, 
http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/tv-and-radio/karl-stefanovics-sexism-
experiment-today-presenter-wears-same-suit-for-a-year-20141115-11ncdz.html and 
Bim Adewunmi, "Male TV presenter wears same suit for a year – does anyone notice?," 
The Guardian, November 17, 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/womens-blog/2014/nov/17/male-tv-
presenter-same-suit-year-female-colleagues-judged. 
479 The Sun, 24th June 2009. See Paul Baker, Tony McEnery, and Costas Gabrielatos, 
Discourse analysis and media attitudes: the representation of Islam in the British press 
(Cambridge: University press, 2013), 216. 
as a diverse collection of voices, 
experiences, and values. Moreover, the 
damaging tendency to examine issues 
facing Muslim women purely through and 
ethnocentric lens, and without wider 
consultation with these women 
themselves, is uncomfortably reminiscent 
of the age old imperialist paradigm of 
“White men saving Brown women from 
Brown men”. 
This ethnocentric lens was recently applied 
when Ofsted announced proposed plans to 
question Muslim girls who wear the hijab 
in schools. In November 2017, Amanda 
Spielman, Ofsted’s Chief Inspector of 
Education, raised concerns surrounding 
young Muslim girls being “sexualised” by 
wearing the hijab at a young age. For many 
Muslims, this accusation is confusing, as 
sexualisation is directionally oppositional 
to the purpose of the hijab. It is possible 
that the assumption of the hijab sexualising 
young girls actually stems from a much 
more convoluted set of 
misunderstandings.  
In reality, the issue is one of the 
comparative tastes and normative 
behaviours of differing cultural or 
religious traditions. In the United 
Kingdom today, the dominant cultural 
norms of women’s dress dictate that the 
head remains uncovered. There is no value 
judgement to be made in this respect – it is 
simply a cultural norm and tradition; no 
better or worse than any other. However, 
this cultural norm is in contrast to the 
norms of many British Muslims — 
regardless of whether these norms derive 
from cultural, religious or ethnic 
understandings. 
Those that accuse the hijab of “sexualising” 
a girl or a woman have taken the dominant 
480 The Sun, 20th June 2008. See Paul Baker, Tony McEnery, and Costas Gabrielatos, 
Discourse analysis and media attitudes: the representation of Islam in the British press 
(Cambridge: University press, 2013), 215. 
481 Intentionally employing derogatory or offensive terminologies and phraseologies 
over terms that are more innocuous and neutral. 
482 See Moosavi, "Orientalism at home.” 
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norms of Western dress as the standard 
benchmark of normality. From this 
perspective, the hijab is something 
additional which is thus in need of 
explanation. The conclusion of some in 
searching for this explanation is that of a 
“backwards culture” which oppresses 
women. This explanation overlooks the 
actual lived experience of millions of 
women that choose to wear the hijab 
globally. 
Amanda Spielman’s concerns surrounding 
young girls supporting religious dress is 
not a new topic of public discussion. 
Indeed, debates have been raging for 
several years across Europe surrounding 
the idea that veiling practices hinder 
educational development or that it is a 
symbol of the oppression that young girls 
face at the hands of their parents and male 
relatives.483 
However, as Marjane Satrapi has argued, 
“I passionately believe that the young 
women who have been expelled from 
school for wearing a veil should have the 
freedom to choose. It is surely a basic 
human right that someone can choose 
what she wears without interference from 
the state. Critics argue that it is not the girls 
themselves who want to wear the veil, 
rather they are forced to do so by their 
parents. But if that is the case, if these are 
the kind of parents who will force their 
daughters to wear a veil, they are probably 
the kind of parents who will be happy to 
withdraw them from school and then to 
marry them off to a distant cousin at 15 
with whom they will bear five children. If 
we want to give these girls any chance of 
emancipation, any chance that one day 
they will decide for themselves that they 
don't want to wear the veil, it will come 
from education. It will certainly not come 
from being withdrawn by their 
families.”484 
                                                     
483 Jess Staufenberg, "Muslim Teenager Forbidden from Wearing Face Niqab by 
German Court," The Independent, August 23, 2016, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-muslin-student-
banned-niqab-face-veil-school-islam-a7204671.html. 
MEND’s definition of Islamophobia 
includes measures that seek to or result in 
restricting or excluding Muslims from 
enjoying and accessing fundamental 
freedoms in public life. Restricting a 
Muslim women’s right to choose what to 
wear will do nothing to encourage 
participation in the economic, social, 
political, and public spheres. In reality, and 
as our definition of Islamophobia suggests, 
the consequence will be to exclude them 
and marginalise them further.  
Furthermore, while British Muslim 
women’s lives are framed within their 
ethno-cultural and religious 
circumstances, the challenges they face 
cannot and should not be completely 
dislocated from structural disadvantages 
that all British women face more generally. 
Moreover, political and media discourses 
that serve only to perpetuate stereotypes of 
Muslim women can only ever be 
counterproductive for all women by 
misrepresenting the nature - or worse, 
completely distracting from - the issues 
that they actually face. Therefore, while 
cultural practices should be examined, 
women’s issues do not exist in a vacuum 
and need to be confronted with 
appropriate honesty and nuance. 
It is, therefore, essential that ethnocentric 
limitations are removed and that Muslim 
women are fully consulted, heard, and 
respected in discussions surrounding 
issues that innately affect them. 
The Façade of Women’s Liberation 
The history of Western (and often male) 
politicians supposed support of women’s 
advancement and liberation is largely one 
of general hypocrisy and insincerity. The 
Egyptian American feminist, Leila Ahmed, 
points to Evelyn Baring, the Earl of 
Cromer, who served as Britain's first 
consul general of Egypt between 1883 and 
1907. Cromer is an emblematic proponent 
484 Marjane Satrapi, "Veiled threat," The Guardian, December 12, 2003, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/dec/12/gender.uk.  
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of the “White man’s burden” mentality – 
the need for White men to save Brown 
women from Brown men that has been 
pushed in every imperialist and colonialist 
project even to this day.485 Cromer believed 
Islam degraded women and that it was 
essential that Egyptians "be persuaded or 
forced" into abandoning the veil, which he 
described as a "fatal obstacle" to the 
Egyptians' "mental and moral 
development". 
However, back in Britain, as Ahmed 
observes, "this champion of the unveiling 
of Egyptian women" was the "founding 
member and some-time president of the 
Men's League for Opposing Woman 
Suffrage". She therefore concludes that 
"[f]eminism on the home front and 
feminism directed against white men was 
to be resisted and suppressed; but taken 
abroad and directed against the cultures of 
colonised peoples, it could be promoted in 
ways that admirably served and furthered 
the project of the dominance of the white 
man." 
In following this tradition, politicians 
advocating a niqab ban, for example, 
frequently use it as a vehicle for garnering 
political support and legitimacy through 
the façade of supporting women’s rights. If 
this were the case in reality, equal concern 
would be shown for major social issues 
such as rape, gendered violence, 
employment discrimination, harassment, 
sexual objectification and a whole host of 
other issues that obstruct women’s 
equality on a far greater scale across 
Europe than does the choice of a tiny 
minority of Muslim women to cover their 
faces with a niqab.  
Likewise, if genuine concern was given to 
oppression through women’s dress, there 
would be equal prominence given to 
company policies and dress codes that 
demand women to wear makeup and high 
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heels. This oppression is also seen in the 
damage caused by media representation 
and advertising that serves to objectify 
women’s bodies.  
As Satrapi notes, “I have been incredibly 
surprised by the reaction of French 
feminists, who have publicly campaigned 
for the banning of "this visible symbol of 
the submission of women". The western 
woman is so entranced by the idea that her 
emancipation comes from the miniskirt 
that she is convinced that if you have 
something on your head you are nothing. 
The women who are forced to wear the 
veil, and the women who are portrayed 
naked to sell everything from car tyres to 
orange juice, are both facing a form of 
oppression.”486 
As the Moroccan-American academic Laila 
Lalami has noted, "[t]he societies that 
already have coercive laws - Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, for example, which force women to 
wear headscarves, Turkey and Tunisia, 
which forbid women to wear face veils - 
are not known for their respect of human 
rights."487 Therefore, in European countries 
which pride themselves on tolerance, 
freedom and respect for human rights, it 
seems paradoxical that there is so much 
impetus afforded to restricting Muslim 
Women’s dress.  
According to François Hollande, the 
former head of the French Socialist Party, 
"the tactic is clear. It's about getting back a 
hold of a part of the electorate which has in 
part retreated into abstention or voting for 
the far right."488 Ultimately, it is about 
scoring political points. 
Indeed, throughout Europe, support for a 
niqab ban cuts across the left-right divide. 
While it is seen on the right as a threat to 
“European” culture and values and a 
symbol of a “foreign, belligerent faith 
community, the ‘other’”, it is seen on the 
487 Mehdi Hasan, "Thinly Veiled Threat: Mehdi Hasan on the Niqab," New Statesman, 
May 28, 2010, http://www.newstatesman.com/religion/2010/05/face-veil-muslim-
women-ban. 
488 Ibid.  
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left as a form of oppression that subjugates 
women and violates their rights. 
However, this seems to ignore the fact that 
not every Muslim woman is forced, under 
threat of violence, to wear the veil by her 
male relatives. In reality, many wear the 
niqab or burqa as a matter of personal 
choice. 
As Mehdi Hasan has observed “[t]he irony 
of using the threat of prison to freewomen 
from the so-called prison of the burqa is not 
lost on Muslim commentators, either.” 
This irony is noted by British Muslim 
writer and activist Myriam François-
Cerrah; “[t]he Belgians have a funny idea 
of liberation… criminalising women in 
order to free them.” She also points out that 
the individuals and organisations who 
support the ban on face veils as a matter of 
women’s liberation largely have seriously 
troubling attitudes to women’s rights: 
“[b]ut what else do we expect from the 
likes of Sarkozy in France or Silvio 
Berlusconi in Italy? Their co-opting of 
feminist rhetoric and the language of 
human rights cannot hide their abysmal 
form on gender issues - from Sarkozy's ex-
wife Cécilia branding him a "stingy 
philanderer" to Berlusconi's string of 
alleged affairs with very young women. In 
the UK, Nick Griffin and Malcolm Pearson, 
leaders of the BNP and UKIP respectively - 
the only political parties advocating an 
outright ban on the veil in this country - 
have similarly questionable attitudes to the 
advancement of women's rights.”489 
Islamophobic sentiments within 
nationalist discourse  
A major accusation levied against veiling is 
that it is a visible rejection of British values, 
and that the niqab specifically is an alleged 
barrier to integration. In 2006, the Member 
of Parliament for Blackburn in Lancashire, 
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Jack Straw, wrote in his local paper about a 
Muslim woman wearing a niqab. The 
woman in question had come to Mr. 
Straw’s office accompanied by her 
husband to discuss a problem. Despite 
being impressed with her “entirely English 
accent” and the couple’s completely UK 
based education, Jack Straw had serious 
reservations about her choice of dress.490 In 
the article he described the veil as a “visible 
statement of separation and of 
difference.”491 This is significant as one 
could argue the same thing about Scottish 
kilts, Jewish kippahs, Japanese kimonos, 
Sikh turbans, and Indian saris which are 
worn as much as (if not more than) niqabs 
are worn in Britain.492 
There are several key issues with this strain 
of integration discourse. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the first is a clear 
misunderstanding of what the term 
“integration” actually means. In reality, 
while many proponents of restricting 
Muslim women’s dress (most often seen in 
calls for a niqab ban) refer to “integration”, 
they are actually describing assimilation. 
As Professor Tariq Modood493 has 
observed, assimilation involves the 
‘newcomers’ becoming as much like their 
hosts as possible while not disturbing the 
host society, with the least change in the 
attitudes of the latter.494  
This is in direct contrast to integration 
which relies upon mutual understanding 
and accommodations:  
“Integration is a two-way process: it 
requires adaptation on the part of the 
newcomer but also by the host society. 
Successful integration can only take place 
if the host society provides access to jobs 
and services, and acceptance of the 
immigrants in social interaction. Above all, 
integration in a democracy presupposes 
492 L. Moosavi, "Orientalism at home: Islamophobia in the representations of Islam and 
Muslims by the New Labour Government," Ethnicities 15, no. 5 (2014): 655. 
493 Whose own contribution to this report can be found in the earlier chapter on 
Islamophobia, Racism, Xenophobia, anti-Semitism and Othering. 
494 Tariq Modood, "Remaking Multiculturalism after 7/7," OpenDemocracy, 
September 29, 2005, https://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-
terrorism/multiculturalism_2879.jsp.   
 157 
acquisition of legal and political rights by 
the new members of society, so that they 
can become equal partners. Indeed, it is 
possible to argue that, in a multicultural 
society, integration may be understood as 
a process through which the whole 
population acquires civil, social, political, 
human and cultural rights, which creates 
the conditions for greater equality. In this 
approach, integration can also mean that 
minority groups should be supported in 
maintaining their cultural and social 
identities, since the right to cultural choices 
is intrinsic to democracy.”495 
In Moosavi’s study on Labour Cabinet 
Ministers’ speeches between 2001 and 
2007, he observed that politicians 
frequently argued for increasing 
patriotism by emphasising “British 
values”. However, in so doing, they 
constructed ideas of Britishness as 
something directly opposed to what it 
means to be Muslim.496 Consider the 
following two quotes from the then Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, and cabinet minister 
Ruth Kelly: 
“[W]e expect all our citizens to conform to 
[“our common values”]… not optional for 
British citizens. They are what British is 
about. Being British carries rights. It also 
carries duties. And those duties take clear 
precedence over any cultural or religious 
practice.” (Blair, 2006) 
“making [British values] resonate with 
some people, including a small group of 
younger Muslims, is a genuine challenge.” 
(Kelly, 2007)497 
Kelly and Blair were not alone in these 
kinds of statements, and in making such 
statements advertise to wider society that 
Muslims are making a conscious decision 
to reject British values. Ultimately, it 
suggests that Muslims need to be “taught 
morality, a trope of the white man’s 
burden, a trope which singles Muslims out 
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as inferior and in need of being 
civilised.”498 Moreover, it implies that 
Muslims are unwilling to engage in 
dialogue. 
Ultimately, this discussion of “British 
values” and Muslims’ supposed rejection 
of these values is symptomatic of 
underlying fears surrounding national 
identity and Muslims as an “invading 
threat” to this identity. 
Discourses surrounding gender are central 
to self-definition of social groups. 
Throughout history, men have been 
equated to rationality and social agency, 
while women have been equated to 
familial belonging and cultural 
authenticity. At its most basic level, a 
woman’s body is the source of future 
citizens, and as the mothers of the nation, 
it is women that are considered the 
nurturers of that identity. Therefore, it is 
women’s bodies that are representative of 
what these future citizens should become. 
Consequently, it is upon the bodies of 
women that displays of national identity 
are played out and negotiated.  
Furthermore, Muslim women’s bodies 
have become the territory over which the 
imagined “clash of civilisations” has 
frequently been fought. If we look at the 
history of Western images of Muslim 
women, colonialist logic traditionally 
centred upon veiling and the seclusion of 
women as the emblem of women’s 
oppression and cultural backwardness. As 
such, it was the colonial regime’s duty to 
educate and liberate women. This stigma 
against veiling leads to the public 
perception of veiling as an inferior practice 
that has no place in the construction of a 
modern society. Needless to say, such a 
perception stems from the deep vacuum of 
understanding within Western discourse 
surrounding veiling and the meaning that 
497 Quoted in Moosavi, "Orientalism at home,” 660. 
498 Moosavi, "Orientalism at home,” 660. 
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it holds for the women whom choose to 
practice it.  
These attitudes towards the 
“backwardness” of veiling are emphasised 
in media discourses. In 2006, the News of 
the World attested that “95% of Britain’s 
Muslims do not wear the veil. They are 
normal people who want to integrate.”499 
Similarly, in 2007, the Times stated that 
“many Indian women still wear 
headscarves and veils.”500 Firstly, the use of 
the word “normal” implies that women 
who do choose to veil are in some way 
deviant. Secondly, the use of the term 
“still” positions veiling as something 
irrational, inferior and backward that 
should be “grown out of” and abandoned. 
Consequently, hijab, niqab, burqa or any 
other kind of veil is frequently portrayed 
within public, political, and media 
discourses as a signifier of a lack of social 
progress. 
Thus, women themselves have become the 
physical embodiment of both a society’s 
civilizational progression and its 
adherence to cultural identity. It is in this 
way that veiling has become seen as a 
physical representation of deviation from 
the British national identity. Women are 
the culturally authentic and, in Britain, (in 
theory) women are deemed to be 
empowered, progressive and bestowed 
with sexual liberation and freedom. This is 
in stark contrast to the Islamophobic 
stereotypes that are prevalent in the media 
surrounding veiled, oppressed, backward 
and victimised Muslim women. 
Veiling as extremism and a security risk 
The burqa and niqab specifically, but hijabs 
more generally, are often viewed as 
symbols of extremism. Across the West, 
politicians and public figures have 
repeatedly pointed to the potential security 
threats posed by the practice of face 
veiling. In 2014, the Australian Reverend 
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Fred Nile argued that criminals and 
terrorists can use face coverings such as the 
burqa and niqab to hide their identities.501 
At the same time, Australian Government 
Senator Cory Bernardi linked recent raids 
on suspected terrorists to face veils, 
claiming that burqa wearers had been 
found in several of the houses raided.502 
Many UK politicians and public figures, 
such as Nigel Farage, have echoed these 
security concerns and argued that face 
veils obstruct counter-terrorism efforts.  
Indeed, referring once again to Ofsted’s 
concerns surrounding the hijab in schools, 
according to The Guardian, Ms Spielman 
referenced “fundamentalist groups 
influencing school policy” in her proposal 
to question Muslim girls in hijab. The 
consequence of directly linking the hijab to 
fundamentalism is to imply that those who 
chose to wear the hijab must do so out of 
extremist tendencies. For many Muslim 
women who choose to wear the hijab, it is 
simply part of a cultural or religious norm 
of dress and, therefore, it has no more 
correlation with extremism than a crucifix, 
skull cap or turban. The danger of 
influential public figures making such 
connections is to malign practicing 
Muslims and marginalise them within 
public life.  
As discussed in a previous chapter 
regarding Securitising Muslim Identities: 
Security and Counter-Terror, this 
connection between Muslim women’s 
dress and extremism is another example of 
the ways in which Muslim identities have 
become securitised to such a level that even 
religious clothing is deemed to be a 
heightened risk to security. 
This heightened level of securitisation and 
concern must be examined thoroughly so 
that counter-terror measures may be 
expounded in a proportional manner. For 
example, a blanket ban on the niqab/burka 
501 Renae Barker, "Banning the Burqa Is Not the Answer to Fears about Public Safety," 
The Conversation, September 22, 2014, http://theconversation.com/banning-the-
burqa-is-not-the-answer-to-fears-about-public-safety-31628. 
502 Ibid.  
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on the grounds of security (as some have 
suggested) is a disproportionate response 
to the potential for a terrorist attack to be 
committed using a niqab or burqa to 
obscure the attacker’s identity. In practice, 
police already possess the power to request 
a person remove their face covering in 
front of a female officer for the purposes of 
checking their identity. This is a far more 
proportionate and sensible approach. 
Furthermore, as the lecturer of law, Renae 
Barker, argues, “[f]ace veils can, in certain 
circumstances, impede identification and 
pose a security risk. However, there is no 
security threat from women wearing the 
burqa while having coffee at their favourite 
café.”503 
Furthermore, the security risk from 
women generally is incredibly low. 
Indeed, in the UK, women make up only 
around five per cent of the prison 
population, of which 81 per cent are 
serving a sentence for a non-violent 
crime.504 Furthermore, even considering 
the tiny number of terrorist incidents in the 
UK, these too, are overwhelmingly carried 
out by men. 
In response to UKIP’s announcement of the 
inclusion of a niqab ban in their proposed 
“Integration Agenda”, Kirsty Strickland of 
the Independent made an important point 
in her article “Paul Nuttall's burqa ban 
seems to forget that the public are more at 
risk from white men than Muslim 
women”. She argues that men in general 
(regardless of ethnicity or religion) are the 
perpetrators of violent crime in far greater 
numbers than similar crimes committed by 
women. Yet, as a group, men are not 
characterised as a risk to public safety nor 
placed under restrictions. 
She notes that “[i]f you pick up a 
newspaper today you will see examples of 
white men harming women, children, 
minority ethnic groups and each other. It is 
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unlikely that this week you will read any 
reports of a UK terrorist incident. Even less 
likely that a Muslim woman in a veil 
would be the culprit.”505 As such, the 
argument that restricting the freedoms of 
Muslim women will mitigate security risks 
completely ignores the reality of violent 
crimes.  
Furthermore, while the niqab may receive 
a lot of attention due to its visibility, the 
numbers of women who actually choose to 
wear them remains incredibly low. 
According to the co-director of the Belgian 
Institute for Equal Opportunities, Edouard 
Delruelle, only around 215 women "at 
most" in Belgium wore the veil before the 
ban. Others estimated the number to be as 
low as 30, in a Muslim population of just 
over 600,000 and a total Belgian population 
of 10.8 million. Consequently, the majority 
of Belgians would never have met a niqabi 
woman. Likewise, the French security 
services estimated that 2,000 of 
approximately two million adult Muslim 
women in France - 0.1 per cent - wore the 
full-face veil. In discussions surrounding 
Belgium’s banning of the face veil in 2011, 
Green MP, Fouad Lahssaini, described 
passing a ban on the face veil as "taking out 
a bazooka to kill a fly".506 
Ultimately, these debates merely serve to 
highlight the infiltration of processes of 
securitisation into the lives of innocent 
Muslim women. These processes of 
securitisation, as previously discussed, 
thereby result in the stigmatisation, 
demonization, and marginalisation of 
Muslim communities.  
Controversy and Muslim 
women’s clothing practices 
Dr Azeezat Johnson  
Queen Mary University 
505 Ibid.  
506 “Thinly Veiled Threat: Mehdi Hasan on the Niqab." 
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We all wear clothes that we think reflect 
how we want to present ourselves (or how 
we think we should present ourselves) as 
we learn to negotiate different people, 
schools, homes, workplaces, etc. Yet 
Muslim women’s clothing practices are 
often the source of much public (and 
academic) debate and controversy: after 
all, the Casey Review posited a connection 
between the “adherence to Muslim dress” 
and a “pull[ing] further away from 
mainstream society”.507 Such connections 
work to stereotype Muslim women and fix 
them into specific garments as 
representative of “the Muslim woman”, 
instead of thinking about the diversity of 
clothing practices that different Muslim 
women engage with across different 
spaces. More importantly, by associating 
“Muslim dress” with a lack of integration, 
Muslim women are represented as a 
potentially transgressive and threatening 
presence within public spaces. 
The rhetoric surrounding Muslim women 
is not particularly new, but reflects a long 
colonial history of positioning these 
clothing practices as a source of oppression 
that Muslim women had to be “liberated” 
from by European colonisers.508 509 Rather 
than focusing on discrimination against 
Muslim women within the employment, 
housing and education sectors, “Muslim 
dress” appear to overshadow the woman 
that is wearing it. Muslim women’s own 
words or experiences are silenced and 
ignored: rather, “Muslim dress” is solely 
understood through the ways in which 
other (non-Muslim) people might view or 
interact with their clothing practices.  
The focus around whether Muslim women 
“choose” to wear specific clothing is 
ultimately used to avoid addressing the 
ways in which Muslim women’s bodies are 
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objectified within Islamophobic rhetoric. A 
number of feminist scholars have already 
pointed to the social conditioning that 
informs all of our clothing practices, 
whether Muslim or not:510 511 after all, 
‘nobody is born knowing how to walk in 
high heels’.512 This language of “choice” is 
used to position Muslim women’s clothing 
practices as deviant from the norm of 
Western liberal societies. 
By positioning these specific garments as a 
symbol of Muslim women’s lack of 
integration, Muslim women are forced into 
a defence of their clothing practices as 
either empowering and feminist (i.e. white 
liberal feminist), or oppressive and 
barbaric (i.e. Muslim). Jasbir Puar 
highlights how this logic of gender 
exceptionalism works to position the 
experiences and behaviours of Muslim 
women as subordinate to that of the white, 
non-Muslim Western woman:   
Gender exceptionalism works as a 
missionary discourse to rescue Muslim 
women from their oppressive male 
counterparts. It also works to suggest that, 
in contrast to women in the [West], Muslim 
women are, at the end of the day, 
unsavable. More insidiously, these 
discourses of exceptionalism allude to the 
unsalvageable nature of Muslim women 
even by their own feminists, positioning 
the [Western] feminist as the feminist 
subject par excellence.513 
When Muslim women continue to wear the 
headscarf or burqa and refuse the gift of 
liberty presented through this white 
saviour narrative, she then becomes a 
threat, a representation of one’s 
unwillingness to conform to these 
supposedly tolerant Western societies. 
And this double role as both victim and 
threat is what feeds the objectification of 
511 Beverley Skeggs, Formations of Class and Gender: Becoming Respectable (London: 
SAGE, 2012). 
512 Richard Phillips, Muslim Spaces of Hope: Geographies of Possibility in Britain and the 
West (London: Zed Books, 2009), p73. 
513 Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer times (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2008). 
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Muslim women within racist discourse. It 
is of little surprise that one of the activities 
of the now infamous “Punish a Muslim 
Day” included “pulling the headscarf off a 
Muslim ‘woman’”. This illustrates the way 
visibly Muslim woman have become 
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MEND’s Model to 
Tackling Islamophobia 
What processes are allowing 
Islamophobia to continue? 
Media negativity  
The media is a key driving force behind 
how minority groups, including Muslims, 
are received and understood within public 
perception. However, mainstream media 
in the UK is falling desperately short of its 
ethical responsibilities not to incite moral 
panic against vulnerable and innocent 
communities.  
In fact, newspapers such as The Sun and 
The Daily Mail have repeatedly 
demonstrated discriminatory, 
misrepresentative, distorted, exaggerated 
and inaccurate reporting of Muslims. 
Indeed, the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recently 
highlighted discriminatory reporting in 
both The Daily Mail and The Sun, claiming 
that they “are responsible for most of the 
offensive, discriminatory and provocative 
terminology”. The commission further 
concluded that “hate speech in some 
traditional media continues to be a serious 
problem”.514 
Considering the media promotion of 
stereotypical, stylised and distorted 
representations of Muslims, it cannot be 
surprising that sections of the public 
would hold negative and prejudicial 
understandings of British Muslim 
communities. 
It is thus imperative that proper regulation 
of newspapers is enforced, in order to 
ensure that newspapers are held 
accountable for inaccurate, discriminatory 
and distortive reporting on vulnerable 
minorities. 
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country/united_kingdom/gbr-cbc-v-2016-038-eng.pdf  
Weakness of incitement to hatred 
legislation  
The Racial and Religious Hate Crime Act, 
2006, contains a disparity between the 
protections afforded on grounds of race vs 
the protections afforded to religious 
groups. In terms of racial hatred, a person 
is protected against abusive, insulting, or 
threatening words or behaviour. However, 
the protections afforded on the basis of 
religion only extends to threatening words 
or behaviour. This specifically excludes the 
protection from abusive or insulting words 
or behaviour that is included under racial 
hatred. 
Furthermore, within the protections 
against religious hatred, there is an added 
condition that intent must be proven. In 
other words, it must be proven that the 
perpetrators intention was to stir up 
religious hatred. This differs from 
incitement to racial hatred, wherein the 
likelihood that the offence would have 
stirred up racial hatred is enough to 
prosecute; there is no need to prove that 
the perpetrator intended to stir up racial 
hatred. 
The primary result of this disparity in 
legislation, is that Muslim communities are 
often not protected against comparable 
abuse against which groups such as Jews 
and Sikhs are protected on the grounds of 
race. 
Secondly, the requirement of intent makes 
the burden of proof within this legislation 
almost unachievably heavy. Indeed, the 
intention of the perpetrator is virtually 
impossible to ever prove. The consequence 
is that, since the legislation was enacted in 
2006, only a small handful of successful 
prosecutions have occurred under 
incitement to religious hatred legislation.   
Social media legislation 
As Nazir Afzal stated in his article earlier 
in this report when discussing protections 
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from hatred, “many haters don’t care about 
the line anymore and rely upon perceived 
anonymity, bots, and limited police 
resources to just keep generating hate.” 
Anonymity combined with a lack of 
protection from online abuse has resulted 
in an almost toxic atmosphere of anti-
Muslim racism across a variety of social 
media platforms.  
Indeed, between March 2016 and March 20 
17, almost 144,000 Tweets were sent from 
the UK that are considered to be 
derogatory and anti-Islamic – this amounts 
to roughly 400 a day.515 Meanwhile, 
Facebook and Twitter accounts of leading 
far-right and anti-Muslim groups can 
attract several thousands of followers. 
As such, there is a clear need for changes to 
be made in order to regulate hate speech 
online whilst also protecting freedom of 
speech within a legal framework. As has 
often been argued, what is illegal offline 
should be illegal online as well. 
Lack of Muslim political engagement 
British Muslims remain woefully 
underrepresented within the political 
sphere. Considering the size of the British 
Muslim population relative to the general 
population, one would expect to find 
approximately 31 Muslim MPs in 
Parliament. In reality, the figure is 15.516 
Likewise, within the senior Civil Service, 
there is also a general under-
representation of BAME communities, 
including Muslims. Encouraging British 
Muslim engagement in political and media 
institutions is MEND’s raison d’être and 
we firmly believe that empowerment 
within politics is essential to ensure 
equality for all. 
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Furthermore, the Government’s policy of 
disengagement is hugely damaging to its 
relationship with Muslim communities. It 
can only fix this currently “broken 
relationship” through honest and open 
engagement with a representative 
spectrum of British Muslims.517 
Lack of Muslim engagement within media 
and broadcasting  
The underrepresentation of Muslims in 
politics is mirrored in mainstream media 
and broadcasting outlets. Media and 
broadcasting institutions have often been 
criticised for their embedded lack of 
representation in terms of ethnicity, 
religion, sexuality, and often gender as 
well. Within these institutions, there are 
still very few Muslim journalists, editors, 
producers and directors, meanwhile there 
is a crucial dearth of normalised and 
representative images of British Muslims 
and minorities more generally. 
Appropriate representation is essential for 
equality and creating a shared national 
identity. Therefore, it is imperative that 
British Muslim communities are actively 
engaged in the fields of politics and media 
in order to ensure that Muslims have the 
platforms necessary to present the reality 
behind their lived experiences. 
Barriers to Muslim economic engagement  
Muslims experience the highest levels of 
disadvantage in the labour market518 and, 
according to the National Equality Panel, 
also suffer the greatest “ethnic penalty”.519 
This ethnic penalty is especially felt by 
Muslim women, who often suffer multi-
level discrimination that is compounded 
by religion, gender, skin colour, and 
ethnicity.520 Studies have also shown that 
CVs submitted under a non-Muslim name 
are three times more likely to be offered an 
interview than those with a Muslim name 
518 “Employment opportunities for Muslims in the UK”, report, House of Commons 
Women and Equalities Committee, August 11, 2016, 6, https:// 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmwomeq/89/89.pdf.  
519 An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK. 
520 "Women Are the First to Pay the Price of Islamophobia in Europe," European 
Network Against Racism, May 26, 2016, http://www.enar-eu.org/Women-are-the-
first-to-pay-the-price-of-Islamophobia-in-Europe. 
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attached.521 Meanwhile, Muslims are 
heavily concentrated in unskilled and 
semi-skilled professions with limited 
career progression and are frequently 
victims of frustrated ambitions as they 
remain under-represented in the higher 
positions within their professions.522  
At the same time, Muslim communities are 
characterised by a younger age 
demographic than any other social group. 
With 48% of British Muslims aged 24 or 
under523 this is a dynamic and innovative 
population whose potential should be 
encouraged. Considering the obvious 
frustrations hindering Muslims’ success in 
the labour market and the huge potential 
for businesses to benefit from young 
Muslim talent, it is essential that barriers of 
discrimination are challenged through 
governmental and industry initiatives. 
Wider community engagement  
As discussed in the previous chapter on 
Political and Public Exclusion, debates on 
integration frequently and incorrectly 
portray demands for Muslims to assimilate 
as a lack of integration. Choosing to 
maintain ethno-cultural and religious 
identities, for example by wearing 
religious dress, is not an indication of a lack 
of integration or “Britishness”.  
Furthermore, integration is a two-way 
process which also requires interaction 
from the dominant group. With the 
overwhelming negativity stemming from 
popular mainstream media 
representations, it cannot be surprising 
that large sections of the non-Muslim 
community may hold distorted 
impressions of their Muslim neighbours. 
Inter-community engagement is necessary 
to overcome these barriers to interaction 
and community cohesion. Meanwhile, 
there needs to be greater emphasis on 
promoting our nation’s shared history and 
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the role of minority communities in 
building this country. 
Flawed counter-terror strategies  
Prof. Tendayi Achiume is the third UN 
special rapporteur to criticise the 
PREVENT strategy and its damaging and 
discriminatory impact on British Muslims. 
While security is a real and necessary 
concern, strategies must be evidence-based 
and developed through cooperation and 
engagement with all stakeholders. 
Furthermore, security strategies must be 
carefully balanced with the rights, civil 
liberties, and values upon which Britain is 
founded.  
The model to tackle 
Islamophobia  
To solve a society-wide problem, a 
combination of legislative change, 
Government and industry initiatives, 
Muslim community empowerment, and 
wider community engagement is required. 
As such, MEND humbly proposes the 
following initiatives and policy changes to 
tackle the causes, driving forces, and 
impacts of Islamophobia, 
Legislative changes 
Press regulation: With the recent 
Government decision to cancel Leveson 
Part II, the current future of press 
regulation remains uncertain. However, it 
is imperative that the press is held 
accountable in order to protect minorities 
from the damaging impacts of 
sensationalist, distorted, and 
misrepresentative narratives. Therefore, 
we call on policy makers to ensure a full 
implementation of the Leveson system, 
including aspects such as the enforcement 
of an independent press regulator and 
ensuring the commencement of the second 
part of the Leveson inquiry. Furthermore, 
Leveson II should place explicit emphasis 
on including an investigation of 
select/women-and-equalities-committee/news-parliament-2015/employment-
opportunities-for-muslims-evidence-15-16/.  
523 "British Muslims in Numbers," 
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Islamophobia in the press as a mandatory 
requirement. 
Counter-Terror legislation: In light of the 
PREVENT strategy’s lack of empirical 
grounding and the disproportionate 
impact of Schedule 7 on Muslims, it is 
imperative that the Government commits 
to an independent review of PREVENT 
and all counter-terrorism legislation 
enacted since 2000 with a view to curbing 
the encroachment of counter-terrorism 
policies on civil liberties. Strategies must be 
developed that work to foster social 
cohesion and community resilience to all 
forms of violence and criminality through 
programmes in which all communities are 
active stakeholders.  
Incitement to Religious Hatred 
legislation: Considering the disparities 
between the protections afforded for racial 
and religious hatred, it is essential to 
review the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 
2006 with a view to strengthening legal 
protection afforded to religion and 
equalise it with those granted to race. 
Primary legislation to deal with social 
media offences and online hate speech: In 
order to deal with the large swathes of hate 
filled rhetoric that thrives online, the 
Government should consider primary 
legislation to deal with social media 
offences and work with social media 
companies to protect free speech while 
developing an efficient strategy to tackle 
online hate speech online. 
Government and industry initiatives 
Racial and religious equality: In addition 
to reviewing legislation and in the context 
of current Brexit negotiations, attention 
needs to be given to supporting the 
principles of the EU Equal Treatment 
Directive to advance protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of religion 
to education, healthcare, housing, access to 
goods and services and social protection, 
within UK law post-Brexit.  
Employment: The barriers to Muslim 
economic empowerment is an area that 
needs to be tackled by both governmental 
and industry initiatives designed to 
address religious, racial and gendered 
discrimination in the workplace through 
targeted interventions at all stages of 
recruitment, retention and promotion, 
including through the use of name-blind 
applications. Indeed, these already exist in 
parts of the public sector, for example, in 
the NHS. 
Particular attention needs to be given to 
Muslim women’s experiences of the triple 
ethnic penalty and improving their access 
to employment. Furthermore, there needs 
to be greater focus within the civil service 
and within industry to improve ethnic 
diversity in all sectors through schemes 
designed to encourage BAME recruitment, 
mentoring and promotion. Considering 
the disproportional representation of 
Muslims within the higher echelons of 
their professions, one area for potential 
development is schemes designed to 
promote and facilitate careers progression 
and advice services.  
As well as the special attention that needs 
to be given to the barriers facing Muslim 
women, the young age demographics of 
Muslim communities singles out young 
people as also needing increased support 
in achieving their career aspirations. 
Therefore, programs are needed that aim 
to improve young people’s access to the 
labour market, for example, through 
funding apprenticeships, internships and 
alternative routes into employment. 
Finally, employers need to be supported in 
developing widely accessible inclusion 
strategies within the workplace, such as 
recognising and accommodating religious 
festivals and religious observance within 
the workplace. 
Media and broadcasting: The 
overwhelming negativity of mainstream 
media representations of Muslims is an 
area in need of immediate attention. This 
can only be countered by promoting 
positive (and perhaps more importantly) 
normalised images of Muslims within 
 167 
media and broadcasting. Considering this 
need and the necessity of encouraging 
more sensitivity when it comes to stories 
and narratives affecting British Muslims, it 
is essential that support is given to 
educative and industry initiatives 
designed to attract Muslim and BAME 
individuals into the spheres of journalism 
and broadcasting. 
Public exclusion: It is the responsibility of 
political figures to educate themselves and 
understand the meanings behind and 
inherent requirements of terminologies 
such as “integration”. In understanding 
the requirements of integration, it is 
imperative that public figures show greater 
maturity and responsibility when 
discussing integration debates and take 
care not to cause hysteria for the sake of 
political popularity and agendas. 
Meanwhile, especially considering the 
unclear status of Human Rights 
commitments within Brexit negotiations, 
we must ensure that the tenants of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Human Rights Act are preserved 
within UK law post-Brexit.  
Crime and policing: The relationship 
between Muslim communities and their 
local police and their experiences of the 
Criminal Justice System is key to the way 
in which British Muslims relate to and feel 
valued by the state. Considering the 
inequalities and issues discussed in the 
earlier chapter on Crime, Policing and the 
Criminal Justice System, changes need to 
be made to counter the impacts these 
inequalities have on Muslim communities. 
Areas in need of Government support 
include: 
 Tackling the high number of Muslim 
prisoners through schemes to facilitate 
rehabilitation, cut re-offending and 
develop pathways for social inclusion.  
 Launching research into the underlying 
reasons for the disproportionately high 
numbers of Muslim prisoners, including 
issues of socio-economic deprivation and 
structural issues within the judicial system. 
 Supporting educative and industry 
initiatives to attract BAME individuals into 
the police force. 
Muslim community empowerment  
The Government’s current disengagement 
policy is a clear barrier to British Muslim’s 
participation in social and political life. It is 
essential that the Government mends its 
broken relationship with Muslim 
communities by committing to engaging 
with and listen to a wider spectrum of 
representative Muslim grassroots 
organisations, such as MEND and MCB. 
Engagement does not mean agreement on 
every level. However, it is only through 
engagement that the Government will be 
better equipped to understand structural 
barriers affecting British Muslims and 
implement meaningful policies to tackle 
them. 
However, the responsibility for tackling 
issues of socio-economic discrimination 
and exclusion is in no way limited to wider 
society. Muslims themselves have a 
responsibility to ensure that they are 
engaging with processes of democracy to 
overcome the challenges they face. After 
all, one cannot be helped if they refuse to 
help themselves. Moreover, as British 
citizens, everyone has a right, a 
responsibility, and a duty to work towards 
the betterment of our society as a whole.  
As such, there are a number of ways in 
which British Muslim communities may be 
empowered to play their full role as civic 
actors. Strategies to achieve this include: 
 Supporting educative and industry 
initiatives designed to attract Muslims and 
BAME individuals into the spheres of 
politics, the civil service, media, and 
broadcasting. 
 Placing greater emphasis on educational 
programmes aimed at empowering 
minority communities to be actively 
engaged within politics and media. This is 
one of the strategies in which MEND has 
invested a great deal of attention. As but a 
few examples of our work, our politics and 
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media training courses, our toolkits, 
factsheets, manifesto summaries, and our 
Get Out And Vote campaign have 
empowered and encouraged thousands of 
British Muslims to take a greater role in 
active civic engagement. 
 Encouraging grassroots and community 
led movements to overcome barriers to 
reporting hate crime and encouraging 
maximum reporting of Islamophobic 
incidents to the police. 
Wider community engagement  
Struggles for equality are never limited to 
those directly experiencing discrimination. 
Anti-Semitism, sexism and homophobia 
are not issues that should be limited to 
Jews, women, or LGBTQ communities. 
They are problems for which the solutions 
are the responsibility of the whole of 
society. The same should be said of 
Islamophobia. Islamophobia, like all forms 
of hatred, is an issue of social justice, and 
therefore, it is inherent upon every 
member of society to contribute towards 
ending it. As such, there are certain areas 
than MEND feels should be addressed: 
Promoting a greater awareness of Islam: 
The distorted images of Islam and Muslims 
needs to be countered through programs 
aimed at combatting stereotypes and 
raising greater awareness amongst the 
non-Muslim population. Islamophobia 
Awareness Month (IAM) is a month-long 
campaign that MEND and its local 
partners coordinate every November. The 
campaign is designed to highlight not only 
the challenges facing British Muslims, but 
also the contributions that Muslims make 
to British society. 
Promoting greater inter-community 
engagement: Local communities need to 
play a proactive role in events, activities 
and programs designed to bring together 
diverse neighbours, friends and work 
colleagues. Relationship building is key to 
encouraging understanding of differing 
experiences and is thus integral to 
overcoming narratives of hate. 
Developing diversity, citizenship, and 
engagement in education: Schools play a 
vital role in educating children on how to 
be members of a diverse and pluralistic 
society. Therefore, schools need to be 
supported in this role by being given 
greater support in terms of curriculum and 
teacher training. Areas to address this 
include: 
 Prioritising PSHE and PSRE in the national 
curriculum to prepare young people for 
life in a diverse and pluralistic society. 
 Developing training programmes and 
resources for teachers focussed on tackling 
bullying based on race, religion, disability 
or sexuality. 
 Developing teaching materials to educate 
young people on the dangers of 
Islamophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, 
homophobia and other forms of hatred. 
 Supporting community and school-led 
programmes that encourage cultural 
exchange between pupils of different 
racial, religious, ethnic and other 
backgrounds. 
 Supporting academic freedoms and 
initiatives to decolonise education, whilst 
giving greater emphasis within the 
national curriculum to shared histories and 
the contributions of minority communities 
in building our society. 
 
 
 
 
